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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN VIRGINIA TAXATION
A discussion of Virginia tax legislation, court decisions, Tax Commissioner rulings, and
Att0rney General opinions from October 1, 2010 through September 30, 2011.
I.

CORPORATE INCOME TAX

A.

2011 Legislation

1.
Federal Conformity. House Bill 1874 (Chapter 2) and Senate Bill 1384
(Chapter 866) advanced Virginia's date of conformity to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) from
.
January 22,2010 to December 31,2010. Virginia will continue to disallow:
•

any bonus depre~iation allowed for certain assets under federal income
taxation and any five year carry-back of NOLs allowed for NOLs
generated in either taxable year 2008 or 2009;

•

deductions for applicable high yield discount obligations under IRC §
163(e)(5)(f); and

•

tax exclusions under IRC § 108(i) related to cancellation of debt
income realized in connection with a reacquisition of business debt at
a discount after December 31, 2008, and before January 1, 2011.
However for the 2010 taxable year, a taxpayer may elect to recognize
the income ratably over a three year period.

Virginia will continue to allow the federal deduction for qualified domestic production
activities under IRC § 199 at a level equal to two-thirds of the federal deduction. In addition,
this legislation reconforms the Virginia Code to a 2009 law that temporarily increased the federal
earned income tax credit (EITC) for taxable year 2010, and repeal the provision adopted in the
2010-2012 Appropriations Act that disallows the deduction for qualified motor vehicle taxes.
The bills contain an emergency clause which states that it would be in force from its passage. "In
addition, the legislation makes the repeal of provisions relating to the federal EITC and the
deduction for qualified motor vehicle taxes retroactive to taxable years beginning on and after
January 1, 2010.
.
2.
" Research & DeVelopment Tax Credit. House Bil11447 (Chapter 742) and
Senate Bill 1326 (Chapter 745) created a refundable individual or corporate income tax credit
(Va. Code § 58.1;.439.12:08) for qualified research and development expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year. The credit amount is equal to (i) fifteen percent of the first $167,000 in
Virginia qualified research and development expenses; or (ii) twenty percent of the first
$175,000 in Virginia qualified research and development expenses if the research was conducted
in conjunction with a Virginia public college or university, to the extent the expenses exceed the
Virginia base amount for the taxpayer. The total amount of tax credits available for all taxpayers .
who qualify is limited to $5 million for each fiscal year. If the total amount of tax credits applied
for is less than the $5 million limit, the credits will be prorated and allocated to the taxpayers
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who applied for the credit on a pro rata basis. This credit is effective for taxable years beginning
on or after January 1,2011, but before January 1,2016.
3.
Telework Tax Credit. House Bill 2197 (Chapter 409) and Senate Bill
1335 (Chapter 417) created an individual and corporate income tax credit (Va. Code § 58.1439.12:07) for employers who incur eligible telework expenses. ' The credit is equal to the
eligible telework expenses incurred during the 2012 and 2013 calendar years, not to exceed
$50,000 per employer. The maximum amount of expenses that could be used to detennine the
amount of the credit would be $1,200 per employee. This legislation also creates an individual
and corporate income tax credit for employers who conduct telework as~essments. This credit is
equal to the costs of preparing the assessment, but would be limited to $20,000. In addition, this
credit may only be churned one time by an employer. The amount of these credits is not allowed
to exceed the tax liability of the taxpayer. To be eligible for either of the above credits, the
employer will not be allowed to deduct the qualified expenses in any taxable year. The taxpayer
will also not be eligible for this tax credit if any other income tax credit is also claimed. The
total' aggregate amount of credits approved by the Tax Commissioner will not exceed $1 million
for credits earned in taxable years 2013 and 2014. taxpayers will be required to apply to the
Department of Taxation for an allocation of the credit. If the applications for the credit exceeded
the, cap, the credits would be allocated to employers on a pro rata basis. J'his credit will be
effective for taxable years beginning on and after January 1, 2013 but before January 1, 2015.
However, taxpayers will be required to apply for the credits between September 1 and October
31 of the year proceeding the taxable year for which the tax credit is to be earned.
4.
Barge and Rail Usage Tax Credit. House Bill 2385 (Chapter 820) and
Senate Bill 1282 (Chapter 861) created an income tax credit (Va. Code § 58.1-439.12:09) for
transporting additional containers oil a barge or by rail. The amount of the credit for any
international trade facility will be equal to $50:00 per 20-foot equivalent unit moved by barge or
rail rather than by trucks or other motor vehicles on Virginia's highways. The credit will be'
allowed against the individual income tax, the corporate income tax, the tax on estates and trusts,
the bank franchise tax, the insurance premiums tax, and the tax on 'public service corporations.
No more than $1.5 million in tax credits will be issued in any fiscal year. The credit is effective
for taxable years beginning on and after January 1, 2011, but before January 1, 2015. No tax
credits may be issued after the fiscal year ending June 30,2015.
5.
Virginia Port Volume Increase Tax Credit. House Bill 2531 (Chapter 831)
created an individual income tax and corporate income tax credit (Va. Code § 58.1-439.12:10)
for taxpayers engaged in manufacturing goods or the distribution of manufactured goods that
uses port facilities in the Commonwealth and increases its port cargo volume at these facilities
by a minimum of five percent in a single calendar year over its base year port cargo volume. The
credit is equal to an amount determined by the Virginia Port Authority. The Virginia Port
Authority may waive the requirement that port cargo volume be increased by a minimum of five
percent over bas~ year port cargo volume for any taxpayer that qualifies as a major facility. The
maximum amount of tax credits allowed to all qualifying taxpayers may not exceed $3.2 million
for each calendar year. Generally, a qualifying taxpayer may not receive more than $250,000 for·
each calendar year. The credit is effective for taxable years beginning on and after January 1,
2011, but before January 1,2016.
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6.
International Trade Facilitv Tax Credit. Senate Bill 1136 (Chapter 49)
created an individual income tax and corporate income tax credit (Va. Code § 58.1-439.12:06)
for either capital investment in an international trade facility or increasing jobs related to an
international trade facility. The amount of the credit is equal to $3,000 per new qualified fulltime employee that results from increased qualified tr~de activities by the taxpayer or two
percent of t4e amount of capital investment made by the taxpayer to facilitate the increased
eligible trade activities. taxpayers may elect either credit, but will not be entitled to claim both
credits in the same taxable year. No more than $250,000 in tax credits will be issued in any
fiscal year. If the amount of tax credits requested exceeds $250,000, the credits will be allocated
proportionately among all qualified taxpayers. The amount of the credit is limited to fifty
percent of the taxpayer's tax liability for the taxable year. Any unused credit amount could be
carried forward for ten years. This bill is effective for taxable years beginning on and after
January It 2011, but before January 1, 2015; however no credits will be issued after the fiscal
'
year ending June 30, 2015.
7.
.Clean Fuel Vehicle and' Advanced Cellulosic Biofuels Job Creation Tax
Credit. Senate Bill 1236 (Chapter 176) extended the sunset date for the Clean Fuel Vehicle and
Advanced Cellulosic Biofuels Job Creation Tax Credit from taxable years beginning on and
before December 31,2011 to taxable years beginning on and before December 31, 2014.
8
Coal Employment and Production Incentive Tax Credit. Senate Bill 1111
(Chapter 294) 'extended the sunset date for the redemption or refund provision of the Coal
Employment and Production Incentive Tax Credit by a person with an. economic interest in the
coal on which the credit was earned from July 1, 2011 to July 1,2016.

B.

Recent Court Decisions
No recent court decisions.

C.

Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings

1.
Captive REITs. P.D. 10-246 (October 26, 2010). The taxpayer requested
a ruling on the application of Virginia's addback requirement pertaining to Captive Real Estate
Investment Trusts (IREITs"). A limited. partnership (the II Fund ") owns membership interests in
three separate REITs, which are organized as limited liability companies. One of the REITs
("REIT 1 ") derives a portion of its income from properties located in Virginia. REIT 1 owns a
99.9 percent limited partnership interest in REIT OP. REIT OP owns single member limited
liability companies (ISMLLCs") that are treated as disregarded entities for federal tax purposes
and other joint venture 'interests. It is these SMLLCs and joint ventures that hold the property
and income that is sourced to Virginia. The remaining 0.1 percent general partnership interest in
REIT OP is owned by REIT l's wholly owned subsidiary, REIT GP. REIT GP is taxed as a
corporation for federal income tax, purposes. The Fund's general partner is a wholly owned
subsidiary of the taxpayer which is a C corporation. General Partner holds no units in the Fund;
but as the general partner of the Fund, General Partner can make certain decisions for the Fund
that do not require votes from the rest of the owners. The limited partners of the Fund are taxexempt entities, including state and local governmental pension plans exempt under Internal
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Revenue Code ("IRC") § 115, corporate and multi-employer (Taft-Hartley) pension plans
exempt under IRC § 501, and foundations and endowments exempt under IRC § 501. The Fund
has over 200 partners and no one partner owns more than a 50 percent share in the Fund.
Virginia Code § 58.1-402(B)(10) requires a Captive REIT to add to its federal.
taxable income the dividends paid deduction allowed under the Internal Revenue Code. A REIT
is considered a Captive REIT if it meets the following conditions:
1. It is not regularly traded on an established securities market;
2. More than 50 percent of the voting power or value of beneficial
interests or shares of which, at any time during the last half of
the taxable year, is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly,
by a single entity that is (i) a corporation or an association
taxable a corporation under the Internal Revenue Code; and
(ii) not exempt from federal income tax pursuant to § 501 (a) of
the Internal Revenue Code; and

as

3. More than 25 percent of its income consists of rents· from real
property as defmed in § 856(d) ofthe Internal Revenue Code.
The taxpayer conceded that REIT 1 meets the first and third conditions listed
above, but contended that it does not meet the second condition. The Tax Commissioner
examined ,the ownership arid control of REIT 1 and determined that it does not meet the second
condition and is not a captive REIT for purposes of the 'addition. None of the partners in the
Fund, including the General Partner, own more than 50% of the Fund. The ,Tax Commissioner
therefore determined that no one entity has control over the REIT.
2.
Nexus. P.D. 10-252 (November 10, 2010). The taxpayer, based in State
A, coordinates on demand repair and maintenance services for customers that have locations in
multiple states including Virginia When the taxpayer receives a call from one of its customers,
it will engage and dispatch a third party service provider located near the cUstomer's facility to
perform the required repairs and maintenance. The third party serviCe provider bills the taxpayer
for the services perfonned, and the taxpayer bills the customer for the service call and the
logistical service. The taxpayer is registered to do business in Virginia, but does not own or
lease either tangible or real property, retain employees, or store inventory in Virginia. The
taxpayer does not perform any marketing activities in Virginia but estimates it. generates
approximately $2,000,000 in revenues resulting from activities conducted by third party service
providers located in Virginia. The taxpayer requests a ruliIig as to whether th~ services provided
by third party providers in Virginia would subject the taxpayer to Virginia income tax. The Tax
Commissioner did not.have enough information regarding the taxpayer's relationship with the
third party service providers to determine if the taxpayer is subject to Virginia income tax. The
Tax Commissioner did say that if the third party service providers are independent contractors
then the taxpayer is purchasing services from a vendor and reselling them to its customers and
would not have nex1.:lS. However if the third party service providers are not independent
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contractors, then the activities may exceed the P.L. 86-272 protections and create nexus for the
taxpayer.
3.
Nexus: Activities of Related Members. P.D. 10-279 (December 22,
2010). The taxpayer, a corporation commercially domiciled outside Virginia, is the parent
corporation of four subsidiaries (Sl, PI, P2, and P3). The taxpayer has no property or payroll in
Virginia. In addition to providing administrative and management functions on behalf of the
corporate family, the taxpayer owns and manages certain intangible assets (trademarks, patents,
manufacturing know-how, and other intellectual property) used by members of the corporate
family. The taxpayer licenses intangible assets to Sl for an arm's length royalty fee. Sl uses the
intangible assets in connection with the packaging, marketing and sales of its products. All four
subsidiaries are commercially domiciled. outside Virginia. PI, P2, and P3 manufacture products
that are sold by Sl and have no property, payroll, or sales in Virginia. SI imports, manufactures,
markets, and sells products in the United States, incl~ding Virginia. Its activities in Virginia are
limited to two employees that solicit orders for S l's products for approval at an office outside
Virginia. The taxpayer requested a ruling that the activities of the corporate family in Virginia
are not sufficient· to create nexus. The Tax Commissioner opined that based on the facts
presented, none of the subsidiaries have nexus.
4.
Guidelines .and Rules for the Virginia Motion Picture Production Tax
Credit. P.D. 10-281 (December 21, 2010). The Tax Commissioner issued guidelines 'and rules
for· the Virginia motion picture production tax credit.
5.
Fixed Date Conformity Tax Bulletin. P.D. 11-22 (February 18, 2011).
The Tax Commissioner issued Virginia Tax Bulletin 11-1 to provide instructions to taxpayer for
complying with House Bill 1874 and Senate Bill 1384 which updated Virginia'S date of .
conformity with the Internal Revenue Code.
6..
Alternate Method of Apportionment. P.D. n-52 (April 5, 2011). The
taxpayer acquired stock in Corporation A through four separate transactions made in 1996
through 1998. In connection with one of the transactions, the taxpayer granted Corporation A an
exclusive license to use technology to produce a product developed by the taxpayer. Corporation
A used the monetary proceeds from the other transactions to build a plant to manufacture the
product. During the taxable years at issue, the taxpayer sold its stock in Corporation A,
recognizing a capital gain. The taxpayer subtracted this gain on its Virginia corporate income
tax returns as nonbusiness income. Pursuant to
audit, the Tax Department disallowed the
subtraction of the capital gain and assessed additional tax and interest. The taxpayer appealed
and contended it did not have a unitary relationship with Corporation A, and its ownership in
Corporation A stock was not operational in nature. The taxpayer requested a refund of Virginia
income tax paid for the taxable years ended December 31, 1999 through 2001, and November
30, 2002. The Tax Commissioner treated the taxpayer's appeal as a request for. an alternate
method of apportionment and denied the taxpayer's request. .

an

In any proceeding with the Tax Department, the taxpayer bears the burden of
showing that the imposition of Virginia's statute is in violation of the standards enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S.
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768 (1992). In this matter, the taxpayer was required to demonstrate that its investments are not
operational assets involved in a unitary. business. In considering the existence of a unitary
relationship, the Supreme Court has focused on three objective factors: (1) functional integration;
(2) centralization of management; and (3) economies of scale. (See Mobil Oil Corp. v
Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue
Dept. ofN.M., 458 U.S. 352 (1982); and Allied-Signal.) The Tax Commissioner agreed that the
taxpayer did not have a' unitary relationship with Corporation A based on these criteria.
However, the Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer's relationship with Corporation A
was operational rather than a passive investment function which means that the gain is subject to
Virginia income tax. The Tax Commissioner noted that while not functionally integrated, the
taxpayer did agree to provide Corporation A with technical assistance, training, and instruction
in order to enable Corppration A to design, construct, start-up, test, and operate a manufacturing
facility for the taxpayer's product. As a result of the taxpayer's investments, Corporation A was
able to build a plant to manufacture and sell the product, and its gross revenues increased by'
more than 1,600 percent trom the 1996 through 1999. The technology license agreement
required the taxpayer to provide technical assistance at Corporation A's manufacturing facility.
The agreement also allowed Corporation A employees to observe procedures. in the taxpayers' .
fabrication line and afforded Corporation A support for the its fabrication process, device
modeling, quality control and reliability testing. Based on the agreement and information
provided, the Tax Commissioner determined the taxpayer was able to significantly influence
Corporation A's operations.
7.
Interest Add-Back and Net Operating Loss. P.D. 11-57 (April 12, 2011).
The taxpayer, commercially domiciled outside Virginia, files a consolidated corporate income
tax return with its subsidiaries for federal income tax purposes. In Virginia, the taxpayer and a
number of affiliated entities file separate returns. The taxpayer was audited. for the 2003 and
2004 taxable years, resulting in numerous return adjustments and an 'assessment for the 2004
taxable year. The taxpayer filed an appeal contesting: (1) the add back of interest expense from
the intercompany loan with one of its affiliates for the 2004 taxable. year, and (2) the auditor's
adjustments to net operating loss deductions (NOLDs) carried forward into the audit period. The
Tax Commissioner adjusted the assessment. First, the Tax Commissioner determined that the
taxpayer was not required to add back interest expense paid to the related entity pursuant to
. Virginia Code § 58.l-402(B)(9)(a)(2) as the related entity held no intimgible property. Virginia
,Code § 58.1-402(B)(9)(a)(2) requires a taxpayer to add back intercompany interest expenses and
costs that are directly or indirectly related or connected to transactions involving intangible
property.
On the second issue, the taxpayer incurred NOLs for the taxable years ended
March 3, 2001 (2000 taxable. year), March 2, 2002 (2001 taxable year), and February 28, 2004
(2003 taxable year). On its Virginia returns, the taxpayer carried the resulting NOLDs forward
without carrying them back as required under· IRC § 172. The taxpayer contended that because
. the Tax Department has never issued any guidance on how to elect to forego the carryback, the
taxpayer's carry forward of an NOLI? resulting from a net operating loss (NOL) incurred for the
taxable year ended 2000 taxable year constituted a de facto election to forgo the carryback of the
NOL. The Tax Commissioner disagreed and stated that the Tax Department had issued guidance.
in three separate rulings issued in 1988, 1993, and 2005. Ultimately, the Tax Commissioner
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adjusted the auditor's NOL computations while requiring the taxpayer to carryback the NOL.
. Observation: If there is a ruling that clearly shows why regular regulation development is
desperately needed in Virginia, it is this one. While the taxpayer probably did not do the best job
of indicating its election to forego the NOL carryback, the Tax Commissioner expected the
taxpayer to search thousands upon thousands of rulings to fmd one of the three rulings issues in
the last twenty-three years stating the Tax Department's policy on how to elect to forego an NOL
carryback. If the Tax Department promulgated a regulation with its policy on how to elect to
forego an NOL carryback, this matter may have never occurred.
8.
Responsible Officer. P.D. 11-73 (May 17, 2011). The taxpayer owned
10% of the stock of the Corporation and was its secretary and treasurer. The taxpayer's son (the
"President") was president and owned a 60% share of the Corporation. The Tax Department
issued assessments to the Corporation for withholding tax liabilities owed for the taxable periods
October 2008 through March 2009. When the Corporation failed to pay the deficiencies, the Tax
Department converted the assessments to othe taxpayer and the other officers of the Corporation
as permitted under Va. Code § 58.1-1813. The taxpayer paid the assessments and filed an appeal
contending he should not be held personally liable for the unpaid withholding taxes of the
Corporation because hi's sole responsibilities were as the Corporation's registered agent
responsible for filing the annual report with the Virginia state Corporation CoIl1.IDlssion (SCC).
The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer was not a responsible office and ordered a
refund of the taxes. The available evidence did not indicate whether the taxpayer had the
authority to sign the Corporation's tax returns or to prevent the Corporation's failure to pay the
tax liability.
0

9.
Statute of Limitations. P.D. 11-111 (June 17,2011). The taxpayer and its
affiliates were audited for the 2006 and 2007 taxable years. Numerous adjustments were made,
resulting in assessments of additional corporate income tax and interest. The taxpayer agreed to
all of the adjustments except for the disallowance of net .operating loss deductions (NOLDs)
carried forward from the 2004 and 2005 taxable years. The auditor concluded that the taxpayer
had failed to properiy make an election to forgo the two-year carryback rule for the net operating
losses (NOLs) incurred in 2004 and 2005. The auditor also determined that the taxpayer was
barred by the statute of limitations from filing amended returns for the taxable years to which the
NOLDs could have been carried back. The taxpayer appealed the audit results contending the
auditor misapplied federal and state regulations and the taxpayer made a proper election by its
actions. In the' alternative, the taxpayer sought an equitable resolution to this matter by
permitting a credit against the audit assessments for the amount of the refund the taxpayer would
have received if it had carriedOthe NOLDs back.
Under IRC § .172(b)(3) and Treas. Reg .. § 301.9100-2T, a taxpayer is entitled to
relinquish the carryback period by including a statement with the federal return or amended
return. Under Title 23 of the Virginia Administrative Code (VAC) 1O-120-325(B)(2), taxpayers
are required to file astatement with the Virginia return. for the taxable year in which the NOL
occurred. The taxpayer contended that the purpose of this election is to commit a taxpayer to
forgo the carryback period, so that the taxpayer cannot file an amended return to redistribute the
NOLD to prior years. The 'taxpayer also argued that it's filing history clearly demonstrates that it
had no intent. to file amended returns and redistribute the NOLDs. The Tax Commissioner
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disagreed with this interpretation. Instead, he detennined that because title 23 VAC 10-120-325
pennits an election to forgo the carryback of an NOL independent of any federal election
provided the taxpayer files its federal and Virginia returns on a different basis, Virginia's
requirement that a taxpayer file a statement with the Virginia return in order to make the election
would not be subject to the interpretation of a similar federal regulation. Therefore, the Tax
Commissioner detennined that. the assessments were correct as the taxpayer did not indicate
anywhere on its 2004 and 2005 Virginia tax returns that it intended to elect to forgo the
carryback of the NOLDs incurred in those taxable years. As far as the equitable recoupment
argument, the Tax Commissioner detennined that equitable recoupment is not applicable to this
situation as the taxpayer had an avenue for relief, but failed to act within the statute of
limitations.
10.
Nexus. P.D. 11-139 (August 2, 2011). The taxpayer, a corporation
commercially domiciled in State A, provides engin~ering technology and consulting services.
The taxpayer's affiliates flied a Virginia consolidated income tax return for the 2007 taxable
year. Under audit, the Tax Department determined that the taxpayer had nexus with Virginia and
included it in the Virginia consolidated return. . The Tax Department issued an assessment for
additional tax and interest. The taxpayer appealed the audit assessment contending the activities
in Virginia were not sufficient to establish nexus. During 2007, the taxpayer had no property or
sales in Virginia. The taxpayer did employ two employees who resided in Virginia. The
taxpayer registered with Virginia to withhold income tax on behalf of the resident employees.
The taxpayer was located outside Virginia and had no contracts to perform services in Virginia.
The employees that lived in Virginia performed services pursuant to a contract in State B dUring
2007. The employees performed no activities on behalf of the taxpayer in Virginia. Therefore,
the Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer did not have nexus with Virginia for the
2007 taxable year and should not have been included in the Virginia consolidated return.
11.
Kentucky Limited Liability Entity Tax. P.D. 11-147 (August 10, 2011).
For pUrposes of computing the taxable income of a corporation, Virginia requires an addition for
income taxes and other taxes based on net income. A taxpayer requested a ruling as to whether
the Kentucky Limited Liability Entity Tax, effective for taxable years beginning on or after
. January 1, 2007, is required to be added back. Virginia's modification under Va. Code § 58.1402(B)(4) requires an addition for net income taxes and "other taxes, including franchise and
excise taxes, which are based on, measured by, or computed with reference to net· income,
imposed by the Commonwealth or any other taxing jurisdiction, to the extent deducted in·
detennining federal taxable income." The Tax Commissioner determined that because the .
Kentucky Limited Liability Entity Tax excludes almost all b1,lSiness expenses normally permitted
in detennining net income, the Tax Department would not consider it to be a tax based on,
measUred by, or computed. with reference to net income. Therefore, the Kentucky Limited
Liability Entity Tax is not required to be added back under Va. Code § 58.1-402(B)(4) when
computing Virginia taxable income .

. D.

Opinions of the Attorney General

1.
Transfer and Carryforward of Unredeemed Coal Tax Credits under 2010
Senate Bill 1111. 2011 Va. Att'y Gen. 11-022 (April 1,2011). Delegate Albert C. Pollard, Jr.
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asked' about the impact of Senate Bill 1111 and whether the proposed measure would allow
unredeemed tax credits earned before 2006 to be sold, and/or whether the unused tax credits can
be carried forward after 2016. The Attorney General did not address whether Senate Bill 1111
would allow unredeemed tax credits earned before 2006 to be sold. However, he stated that
generators of electricity can continue to rely on these tax credits and continue to carry them over
after July 1, 2016.

II.'

INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
A.

2011 Legislation

1.
Land Preservation Tax Credit. House Bill 1820 (Chapter 212) and Senate'
Bill 1232 (Chapter 296) amended Va. Code § 58.1-512 to provide that the maximum amount of
land preservation tax credits that may be issued in any calendar year is $100 million, adjusted for
inflation, plus any credits 'that have been disallowed or invalidated by the Tax Department.
These bills also clarify that, if within 30 days after an application for tax credits has been filed
the Tax Commissioner provides written notice to the donor that the preparation of a second
qualified appraisal is warranted, the land preservation tax credit application will not be deemed
complete until the fair market value of the donation has been [mally determined by the Tax
Commissioner~ The Tax Commissioner would then be required to make a final determination
within 180 days of notifying the donor, unless the donor files an appeal. The donor would have
the right to appeal any decision in accordance with the standard 'appeal process. The legislation
was effective on July 1,2011.
2.
Land Preservation Tax Credit. Senate Bill. 1153 (Chapter 377) amended
Va. Code § 58.1-512 to clarify that a land preservation tax credit will not be reduced by the
amount of unused credit that could have been claimed in a prior year but was unclaimed. In P.D.
04-190 (October 20,2004), the Tax Commissioner ruled that when a taxpayer holds a recycling
tax credit and (i) does not claim it on their tax return and (ii) the statute of limitations for
amending the return expires, then the taxpayer may not carry over the portion of the credit he
could have used. This legislation prevents application of the foregoing rule to unused land
preservation tax credits. The legislation was effective on July 1,2011.
3.
Winery Tax Credit. House Bill 1837 (Chapter 214) and Senate Bill 1264
(Chapter 226) created an individual and corporate income tax credit (Va; Code § 58.1-339.12)
, for Virgini~ farm wineries and vineyards in an amount equal to 25 percent of the cost of all
qualified capital expenditures made in connection with the establishment of new Virginia farm
wineries and vineyards ,and capital improvements made. to existing Virginia farm wineries and
vineyards. The total amount of tax credits available for a calendar year would not be permitted
to exceed $250,000. The legislation is effective for taxable years beginning on and after January
1,2011.

Livable Home Tax Credit. HO,use Bill 1950 (Chapter 365) amended Va.
, 4.
Code § 58.1-339.7 to expand the Livable Home Tax Credit to allow a licensed contractor who
builds new residences or retrofits existing residences to improve accessibility to be eligible for
the tax credit. This legislation increases the maximum credit amount from $2,000 to $5,000 for

the purchase or construction of each new residential structure or unit, or for retrofitting an
existing residence. Any unused tax credits will be allowed to be carried over for seven taxable
years or until the total amount of the tax credit issued has been taken, whichever is sooner. This
legislation also bifurcates the existing cap of $1 million for credits earned each year. One-half of
the $1 million will be reserved for the purchase or construction of a new residence, and one-half
will be reserved for retrofitting or renovating an existing residence. Any portion of the $500,000
reserved for the purchase or construction of a new residence that is not used will be allocated to
the remaining balance of tax credits authorized for retrofitting or renovating existing residences.
Any portion of the $500,000 reserved for retrofitting or renovating existing residences that is not
used will be allocated to the remaining balance of tax credits authorized for the purchase or .
. construction of a new residence.
This legislation also provides that if the total amount of tax credits applied for
exceeds the amounts allocated by the Department of Housing and· Community Development
("DHCD") for the fiscal year, the credits will be prorated and allocated to the taxpayers on a pro
rata basis. Under this legislation, DHCD will not be allowed to· issue any tax credits for
transactions or dealjngs between affiliated entities or to the same or different persons for the
same retrofitting, renovation, or construction project. In addition, this legislation does not allow
a tax credit for the purchase, construction, retrofitting, or renovation of a residential rental
property. This legislation is effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1,2011.
5.
Refundable Agricultural Best Management Practices Credit.. Senate Bill
974 (Chapter 352) amended the individual income tax credits allowed for agricultural best
management practices (Va. Code § 58.1-339.3) to make such credits refundable. The legislation
permits a pass-through entity that allocates credits among taxpayers to designate a general
partner, member-manager, or shareholder as the person that the Department would be required to
first contact for the coliection oftaxes in the event any portion of the credit is disallowed in the
future. The legislation also prohibits the costs used to· determine this credit from being used to
claim any other Virginia income tax credit. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011.
6.
Neighborhood Assistance Act Tax Credit Expansion. House Bill 2231
(Chapter 370) amended Va. Code §§ 58.1-439.18 arid 58.1-439.21 to expand the types of
business firms eligible for tax credits under the Neighborhood Assistance Act to include trusts.
Under this legislation, a trust that makes a contribution to an organization that qualifies as a
neighborhood organization will be eligible to .receive an income tax credit from that
neighborhood organization. This legislation was effective on July 1,2011.
7.
Neighborhood Assistance Act Credit Extension.
Senate Bill· 1129
(Chapter 317) amended Va. Code § 58.1-439.20 to extend the sunset date for the issuance of tax
credits allQwed under the Neighborhood Assistance Act from 2011 to 2014.
.

·8.
Neighborhood Assistance Act Credit: Pharmacists. Senate Bill. 742
(Chapter 132) amended Va. Code § 58.1-439.22 to expand the health care services eligible for
tax credits under the Neighborhood Assistance Act to include pharmacists donating
pharmaceutical services to patients of a nonprofit free clinic when the· services are performed at
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the direction of an approved neighborhood organization that has received an allocation of tax
credits from the Department of Social Services, regardless of where the services are delivered.
This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011.
9.
Neighborhood Assistance Act: Impoverished People. Senate Bill 863
(Chapter 312) amended Va. Code § 58.1-439.18.to change the defmition of "impoverished
people" for all purposes under the Neighborhood Assistance Act Tax Credit program to include
individuals with family annual income not in excess of 200 percent of the current federal poverty .
guidelines. This legislation was effective on July 1, ~O 11.

B.

Recent Court Decisions
No recent court decisions.

C.

Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings

1.
Domicile. P.D. 10-249 (November 4, 2010). The taxpayers, a husband
and wife, maintain a residence in Virginia and a residence in State A. Beginning in 2005, the
taxpayers began residing in State A for more than 183 days per year and qualified for State A's
homestead exemption. The taxpayers renewed and continue .to maintain. their Virginia driver's
licenses. They have four vehicles registered in Virginia. In 2003, the taxpayers registered to
vote in State A and acquired State A identification cards. The taxpayers filed nonresident
Virginia returns for the taxable years at issue and reported all passive income derived from
Virginia based pass-through entities as Virginia source income. The auditor determined that the
taxpayers were Virginia domiciliary residents for the taxable years at issue an<;l issued
assessments. The taxpayers appealed the assessments contending they successfully terminated
their Virginia domicile and acquired a State A domicile. The Tax Commissioner disagreed
fmding that the taxpayers never abandoned their Virginia domicile.
2.
Domicile.' P.D. 10-255 (November 12, 2010). The Tax Department
received information from. the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) indicating that third-party
fmancial documents for the 2007 taxable year were sent to the taxpayer at a Virginia address. A
review of the Tax Department's records indicated that the taxpayer had not filed a Virginia
.individual income tax return. The Tax Department requested an explanation or a tax return from
the taxpayer. When no response was received, an income tax assessment was issued. The
taxpayer appealed the assessment, contending he was domiciled in State A during the 2007
taxable year. The facts the taxpayer provided the Tax Commissioner showed that he had been a
long-time domiciliary resident of State A when he moved to Virginia in 2000 .. In November
2006, he returned to live in State A. He took a number of actions indicating an intent to
reestablish his domicile in State A. He established a permanerit place of abode and obtained a
driver's license in State. A. His business interests were located in State A. In addition, he spent
the vast majority of his time in State A during 2007. The only evidence linking the taxpayer to
Virginia for the 2007 taxable year was a Virginia address on the third-party information
statements provided to the IRS. Based on this evidence, the Tax Commissioner abated the
assessment.
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3.
Domicile. P.D. 10-256 (November 12,2010). In June 2006, the taxpayer
moved from Virginia to State A when he accepted an employment engagement under a one-year
agreement. The taxpayer passed the State A bar exam and was admitted to practice in State A in
May 2007. At the end of the one-year employment period, the taxpayer declined an offer to·
work for another one-year term and moved back to Virginia in June 2007. While in State A, the
taxpayer leased several houses. He also continued to hold his Virginia driver's license and his
car remained registered in Virginia. His federal and State A tax returns were filed using a
Virginia address. The Tax Dep~ent obtained information from the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) indicating that the taxpayer received taxable income in 2006 and requested information to
verify whether the taxpayer was subject to Virginia income tax. When the taxpayer failed to
respond, an assessment was issued based on the available information. The taxpayer appealed
the assessment, contending he took sufficient steps to establish residency in State A and all
income earned in 2006 was earned in State A. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment as
he determined that the taxp~yer did not take sufficient steps to abandon his Virginia domicile.
4.
Land Preservation Credit. P.D. 10-257 (November 15, 2010). The Tax
Commissioner issued Tax Bulletin 10-11 announcing that the annual aggregate cap on the land
preservation tax credit increased to $108,424,000.
5.
Adjustment to Federal Adjusted Gross Income. P.D. 10-260 (December 2,
2010). The'taxpayer, a resident of Virginia, was audited by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
for the 2005 taxable year. As a result of the audit, the taxpayer's federal adjusted gross income.
(FAGI) was. increased.. The taxpayer amended his 2005 Virginia S Corporation return and .(
included a letter stating he was advised by the IRS to report the income earned from the S
Corporation on his individual income tax return. The taxpayer also stated in the letter that he did .
not believe the adjustment would affect his Virginia taxable income. The IRS notified the Tax
Department of the change in .the taxpayer's FAGI and the Tax Department issued an assessment
to the taxpayer for additional tax and interest. The taxpayer appealed the assessment contending
he reported the results of the audit to the Tax Department and provided the Tax Department with
sufficient information to make adjustments to his Virginia income tax return. . The Tax
Commissioner disagreed and upheld the assessment. In this case, the taxpayer filed. an amended
the return for the S-Corporation but failed to notify the Tax Department that the IRS had also
adjusted his FAGI. The taxpayer included a note indicating the income had been "moved" but
gave no information as to how the income affected his FAGI. The Tax Commissioner did not
consider the taxpayer's submission to be of sufficient detail to accurately recompute his Virginia
income tax liability for the 2005 taxable year..
6.
Domicile. P.D. 10-265 (December 15, 2010). In 1991 the taxpayers, a
husband and wife, moved from Virginia to State A and established their domiciliary residence:
In 1996 the taxpayers sold their State A home when the husband was transferred to Country A.
While in Country A, the taxpayers acquired Country A driver's licenses. In 2000 the taxpayers
surrendered their State A driver's licenses and acquired Virginia driver's licenses. In 2003 the
wife moved into a' Virginia residence' purchased by the taxpayers. During 2006, three vehides
were registered in Virginia in the wife's name. The taxpayers' daughter attended a Virginia
university, and paid out-of-state tuition, and the taxpayers' son attended a private secondary
school. A federal tax return was filed using the husband's employer's post office box located in
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State A. The wife registered to vote and has voted in Virginia. The husband has maintained his
State A voter registration and votes in State A via absentee ballot. The taxpayers have continued
to renew their Virginia driver's licenses and they remain current. The Tax Department obtained
information from, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) indicating the taxpayers received taxable
income in 2006 and requested information to verify whether the taxpayers were subject to
Virginia income tax. The Tax Department requested additional information from the taxpayers
in order to determine their residence for the taxable year in question. Based on the information
provided, the auditor concluded, that the taxpayers were domiciliary residents of Virginia and
issued an assessment for the 2006,taxable year. The taxpayers appealed and conceded that the
wife was a Virginia resident during 2006, but contended that the husband remained a domiciliary
resident of Country A. The Tax Commissioner agreed that the husband was not a domiciliary
resident of Virginia as he did not abandon his domicile in Country A.
7.
DoiniCile. P.D. 10-270 (December 16, 2010). The taxpayers, a husband
and wife, moved to Virgwa in the early 1990s. While residing in Virginia, the husband
established and solely owned a business that operated in Virginia In 2003, the taxpayers legally
separated and the husband acquired a place of abode in State A. In November 2003, the husband
acquired a State A driver's license, but did not surrender his Virginia license. The husband's
Virginia driver's license was renewed in February 2006. While in State A, the husband became
part owner ofa business located in State B. He travels to and performs Services in State A and
State B on behalf of his State B business. He also performed services in Virginia and a
neighboring state several days per month on behalf of his Virginia business. When he performed
services on behalf of his Virginia business, he spent his nights in State C. During 2006 and
2007, the taxpayers had, four vehicles jointly registered in Virginia. Joint federal tax returns
were filed using the husband's, State A address. The husband registered and voted ire State A
since November 2003, but did not end his Virginia voter registration. The wife registered and
voted in Virginia The taxpayers filed joint nonresident Virginia individual income tax returns
using the husband's address. ' The taxpayers were audited and the auditor concluded that the
taxpayers were both actual and domiciliary residents of Virginia. As a result, assessments were
issued for additional tax and interest for the 2006 and 2007 taxable years. The taxpayers
appealed and conceded that the wife was a Virginia resident during 2006 and 2007, but
contended the husband was not an actual or domiciliary resident of Virginia. The Tax
Commissioner reviewed the evidence provided and determined that the husband was present in
Virginia for less than 183 days and was' not
actual resident. The Tax Commissioner also
deterrnifled that the husband was not a domiciliary resident despite the taxpayers numerous
connections with Virginia However given the fact that the' wife remained in Virginia, the Tax
Commissioner determined that it was reasonable under the specific facts and circumstances of
this case that the Virginia residence and some of the taxpayers' joint possessions would remain
for the benefit and use of the wife.

an

8.
Statute of Limitations. P.D. 10-271 (December'16, 2010). The Tax
Department received information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that tax documents
for the 2002 taxable year were sent to the taxpayer at a Virginia address. The taxpayer did not
file a 2002 Virginia individual income tax, return. The Tax Department requested additional
information from the taxpayer in order to determine her domicile for that taxable year. When
adequate response was riot .received, an assessment was issued in February 2005. In February
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2008, the assessment was partially satisfied by an offset of the taxpayer's federal income tax
refund. The taxpayer provided documentation· on May 5, 2010, showing that she was a
domiciliary resident of another state in 2002, and requested a refund of the offset payment. The
Tax Department abated the remaining assessment, but did not issue a refund of the overpayment
because the statute of limitations had expired. The taxpayer appealed the Tax Department's
denial of the refund request, citing personal circtimstances, and asked that the Tax Department
make an exception to the statute of limitations in her case. The Tax Commissioner denied the
taxpayer's request as he is bound by the law and not allowed to make exceptions to the statute of .
limitations.
9.
Mailbox Rule. P.D. 10-272 (December 16,2010). On December 29,2006
the taxpayers took a distribution from an individual retirement account (IRA).· The distribution
was included in the taxpayer's 2006 federal adjusted gross income· (F AGI). The taxpayers
instructed the fmancial inst~tution holding the· IRA to mail checks for the entire amount of the
distribution directly to the.institution that administers the Virginia. College Savings Plan (VCSP)
for deposit into accounts set up for the taxpayers' children. The taxpayers claimed a deduction
against their 2006 Virginia taxable income for the contributions, pursuant to Va. Code
§ 58.1-322 D(7)(a). Under audit, the auditor denied the deduction for the 2006 taxable year
becauSe the transferred funds were not posted until early January 2007. The taxpayers appealed
the assessment contending the transfers were made within the 2006 taxable. year under rules
established by the Internal Revenue Service. The Tax Commissioner abated the assessment as
the funds were mailed and postmarked on December 29, 2006 for unconditional delivery.
10.
Foreign Source Income. P.D. 10-274 (December 16,2010). During 2007,
the taxpayer was a shareholder in a Virginia S Corporation (VSC). VSC wholly owned a C
corporation (VDISC) that operated as a domestic international sales corporation (DISC) for
federal income tax purposes. VDISC was subject to Virginia income tax ·on all of its Virginia
taxable income for the 2007 taxable year. On its Virginia income tax return, VSC subtracted all
of the dividends received from VDISC. The subtraction: was passed through to the taxpayer,
who subtracted the VDISC dividends in determining her Virgipia taxable income. The· Tax
Department denied the subtraction, reduced the amount the overpayment claimed on· the
taxpayer's 2007 individual income tax return, and issued the reduced amount as a refund. The
subtraction was denied because individual income taxpayers are no longer permitted to claim a
foreign source income subtraction. The taxpayer appealed the assessment, contending that Va.
Code § 58.1-390.2 provides that owners are only liable for tax on their separate individual
capacities on income passed through to them. She reasons that, because the VDISC dividend
subtraction is reflective of·the income passed through to the shareholder, the taxpayer is entitled
to the subtraction: In addition, the taxpayer asserts ·that Va. Code § 58.1-391 does not limit
modifications to those permitted under 58.1-322. The Tax Coinmissioner upheld the assessment
as. Va. Code § 58.1-391 restricts subtractions that an individual may take to pass-through income
to those in Va. Code § 58.1-322. As Va. Code § 58.1:.322 does. not permit a subtraction for
. foreign source income, the subtraction was riot allowed. Virginia Code § 58.1-390.2 clarifies the
owners' responsibility for the .income tax liability of a pass-through entity and does not limit the
amount of income for which an owner may be subject to tax.
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11.
Actual Resident & Retirement Income. P.D. 10-283 (December 28,
2010) .. The Tax Department received information from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
indicating the taxpayer had income from Virginia sources. The Tax Department requested that
the taxpayer file the proper Virginia individual income tax return or provide an explanation
concerning why the income was not taxable. When an adequate response was not received, the
Tax· Department issued an assessment based on the information provided by the IRS. The
taxpayer appealed the assessment, contending she was not a domiciliary resident of Virginia
during the 2005 taxable year and that most of the income was retirement income from her former
employer in State A. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment. Based on the evidence
provided by the taxpayer, the Tax Commissioner determined that she was present in Virginia for
more than 183 days in 2005 and was an actual resident. As the taxpayer was a 2005 actual
resident of Virginia, Virginia, not State A, is peimitted to'tax the retirement income under Public
Law 104-95, as codified at Title 4 U.S.C.A § 114, which prohibits a state from imposing an
income tax on any retirement income received by an individual who is not a resident or
domiciliary of that state. 12.
Domicile. P.D. 11-05 (January 11, 2011). The Tax Commissioner
considered an appeal by an individual assessed with additional income tax for the 2006 and 2007
taxable years and determined that the individual was a Virginia domiciliary resident as he did not
abandon his Virginia domicile. The taxpayer was relocated by his employer to State A. In State
A, the taxpayer rented an apartment, received financial documents, and filed his federal income
tax return from his State A address. However, the taxpayer continued to maintain his house in
Virginia, owned motor vehicles registered in Virginia, and he held a Virginia driver's license that
he renewed in November 2007. The taxpayer indicated that he kept his cars registered in
Virginia because the insuran~e rate was lower than in State A. However, the Tax Commissioner
considers a taxpayer's continued connections to Virginia for the purpose of taking advantage of
favorable Virginia laws in order to gain the benefits oflower costs available to Virginia residents
. to be strong intent of a taxpayer's desire to be a domiciliary resident of Virginia.
13.
. Marine Pilot's Pass-Through Income Subject to .Virginia Income Tax.
P.D. 11-12 (January 21, 2011). A nonresident marine pilot requested a ruling on whether passthrough income he receives from an association of marine pilots that operates in Virginia is
subject to Virginia income tax. The Tax Commissioner ruled that the paSs-through income is not
entitled to the federal exemption for wages paid to a marine pilot operating in more than one
state. As the association has Virginia source income, the Tax Commissioner determined that the
nonresident marine pilot should pay Virginia income tax on his portioQ.· of the association's
Income.
14.
Subtraction for Death Benefits. P.D. 11-14 (January 25, 2011). The
beneficiaries of an estate received lump sum death benefit payments from four life insurance
annuities following the death of their mother in 2008; Each beneficiary subtracted the death .
benefit payment on his 2008 Virginia individual income tax return. One beneficiary was audited
and the subtraction for the death benefits was disallowed, which resulted in a reduction of refund
claimed by the beneficiary and his wife on their 2008 Virginia return. A ruling on behalf of the
beneficiaries of the estate' was requested that each beneficiary was entitled to subtract the death
benefit payments in accordance with Virginia Code § 58.l-322(C)(32)~ The Tax Commissioner
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agreed that the beneficiaries should be allowed the subtraction. Virginia Code § 58.1-322(C)(32)
allows a subtraction for death benefit payments if (i) the source of the payment is an annuity
contract between a customer and an insurance company; (ii) the annuity payment was awarded to
the beneficiary in a lump sum; and (iii) the payment was subject to taxation at the federal level.
15.
Residency of Spouse of Active Duty Military Service Member. P.D. 1116 (February 11, 2011). In June 2007, the taxpayer moved from State A to Virginia. In early
2009, she married a service member on active duty in the armed forces in Virginia. The service
member, who had been stationed in State A, was deployed overseas in 2006 and reassigned to
Virginia when he returned in late 2008. The taxpayer claimed the military spouse exemption
from individual income taxation on her 2009 taxable year Virginia income tax return. Under
review, the, Tax Department disallow~dthe military spouse exemption because the
documentation provided showed the taxpayer was not married to the service member when she
moved to Virginia. The -:r:ax Department concluded that she was a resident of Virginia and
changed the 2009 filing to a resident return. The taxpayer appealed contending both she and her
service member spouse were domiciliary residents of State A in 2009.
The Tax Commissioner denied the taxpayer's appeal.
First, the Tax
Commissioner examined her facts and circumstances and detennined that the taxpayer became a
, Virginia domiciliary resident in 2007 before she was married. The Tax Commissioner also
examined the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 571 et seq., as
amended effective for the 2009 taxable year. Under the Act, a spouse can neither lose nor
acqWre domicile or residence in a state when the spouse is present in the state solely to be with
the service member in compliance with the service member's military orders if the residence or
domicile is the same for both the service member and spouse. The taxpayer did ilot acquire her
Virginia domicile when her spouse was assigned to Virginia as she acquired her Virginia
domicile baSed on her own actions prior to her marriage to the servicememberin 2009.
16.
Land Preservation Tax Credit:
Receipt of Credits by a Personal
Representative. P.D. 11-20 (February 18,2011). A mother and daughter (the "Donors") made a
donation of land eligible for the Land Preservation Tax Credit in December 2006. The Daughter
died in, February 2007 and the mother died in May 2008. The taxpayer qualified as the personal
representative on behalf of the estates of the Donors. In his capacity as personal representative,
the taxpayer submitted an application for the credit and simultaneously filed a ruling request with
the Tax Commissioner asking that he qualify to receive the credits. The Tax Commissioner
determined that because the donation' was made by the Donors before their deaths, the credit
could be claimed on the fmal income tax returns of the Donors. However, any used credits may
not be transferred by the taxpayer.
17.
Statute of Limitations on Reporting Federal Changes. P.D. 11-29
(February 28,2011). The taxpayers were audited by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for the
2005 and 2006 taxable years. The IRS adjusted the taxpayers' 2005 and 2006 federal income tax
returns, resulting in a change to federal taxable income. The taxpayers did not file amended
2005 and 2006 Virginia Income tax returns reflecting the IRS adjustments. As a result, the Tax
Department issued assessments for the 2005 and 2006 taxable years. The taxpayers appealed the
assessments, contending they were not issued within the. three-year limitations period. The Tax
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Commissioner upheld the assessments as Virginia Code § 58.1-311 requires any individual to
report a change or correction in federal taxable income within one year of the final determination
of such change or correction by filing an amended return with the Tax Department. If the
taxpayer fails to file an amended return, Virginia Code § 58.1-312(A)(3) permits the Tax
Department to assess the appropriate tax at any time.
18.
Disability Subtraction.· P.D. 11-32 (March 3, 2011) is a request for
redetermination of P.D. 10-153. In P.D. 10-153, the Tax Commissioner determined that the
taxpayers, a husband and wife, were not entitled to the disability income subtraction for the
taxable years at issue because the husband, who received.the income, was not permanently and
totally disabled. The husband late former spouse was the individual for whom the disability
income was approved. In P.D. 10-153, the Tax Commissioner found that an individual must
meet two tests in order to be allowed a subtraction' for disability income on the Virginia
individual income tax return: (1) The individual must receive disability income, and (2) The
individual must be absent from work because of a permanent andtotal disability. The taxpayers
requested a redetermination, contending the payments qualified as disability income under
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 22(c)(2)(B)(iii), and neither the Code of Virginia nor the IRC recharacterize this type of income once the permanently disabled person dies and subsequent
payments are made to the spouse. .The Tax Commissioner upheld the prior ruling. While the
Tax Commissioner did not dispute the characterization of the income under the IRC,' he
determined that the deduction under Virginia Code sec. 58.1-322(C)(4)(b) can only be claimed
by an individual who is permanep.tly or totally disabled.
19.
Land Preservation Credit: Claiming Credits Not Transferred To You.
·P.D. 11-33 (March 3, 2011). The taxpayers, a husband and wife, purchased land preservation
credits to' be claimed on their 2005 and 2006 Virginia income tax returns. At the time of the
purchase of the credits, the notification form filed with the Tax Department, indicated that the
'sellers retained the credits. The taxpayers jointly claimed the 'credits on their 2005 and 2006
returns. In 2008, the Tax Department devalued the credits on a pro-rata basis to all holders of the
credits. The devaluation of the credits resUlted in assessments of tax being issued to the'
taxpayers for the 2005 and 2006 taxable years. The taxpayers paid the assessments and filed an
appeal contending they are entitled to claim credits that were retained by the sellers at the time of
transfer. (WHAT???) Thankfully, the Tax Commissioner denied the taxpayers right to claim
the other credits and noted that the Commonwealth is not a party to the transaction and cannot
grant credits that were not transferred.
20.
Business Expense v. Hobby Expense. P.D. 11-36 (March 7, 2011). The
taxpayers, a husband and wife, operated an import business during the 2007 taxable year. The
business incurred losses, that were reported on federal Schedule C. Under review, the auditor
determined that the business had reported consistent losses in prior 4rXable years and was not
operated for profit. As a result, the auditor disallowed the deductions claimed on the Schedule C
,and issued an assessment for additional tax and interest for the 2007 taxable year. The taxpayers
paid the assessment and filed an appeal contending they intended to make a profit from the
operations of the business, but changing market conditions affected the viability of the business.
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The Tax Conimissioner agreed with the taxpayers and ordered an appropriate
refund. The Tax Commissioner recognized that Treasury Regulation § 1-183-2(b) identifies nine
factors that should be taken into account when determining whether an activity has a profit
motive: (1) The manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the expertise of the
taxpayer or his advisors; (3) the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the
activity; (4) expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the success of
the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities; (6) the taxpayer's history of
income or losses with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which
are earned; (8) the fmancial status of the taxpayer; and (9) elements of personal pleasure or
recreation. All facts and circumstances in this regulation must be considered in determining if an
activity is engaged 'in for profit. The regulation also states that no one factor is determinative and . .
consideration is not necessarily limited to these nine factors. Using the nine factors, the Tax
Commissioner determined that the taxpayers conducted their business for profit and allowed the
deduction. Query: Did the auditor apply the nine .factors? Based on the ruling, the auditor
appeared to arrive at his conclusion based solely on the fact that the business was consistently
reporting losses. If Virginia auditors are going to conduct audits based on federal laws,
shouldn't they understand and recognize federal law before they rriake any adjustments?
21.
Income Earned by Indian Reservation Resident. P.D. 11-38 and 11-39
(March 14, 2011). During the taxable years at issue, the taxpayer, an Indian, resided on an
Indian reservation. On his Virginia individual income tax return, the taxpayer claimed a
subtraction for' wages, interest,. dividends, and retirement income in computing his Virginia
taxable income, which was partially disallowed. The taxpayer was assessed with the difference.
He appealed the assessments; contending the income resulted from activities conducted on an
Indian reservation. In P.D. 10-156, the Tax Department upheld assessments because certain
pension, dividend, and interest income received by the taxpayer and subtracted on his income tax
returns did not result from pursuits conducted by an Indian residing on a reservation. The
taxpayer requested a redetermination, contending the 1677 treaty between Virginia and the
Indians is still in effect and the sites of the income at issue, received by a tribe member living on
the reservation, is exempt from taxation by Virginia under the treaty. The Tax Commissioner
upheld the prior ruling as the taxpayer did not show evidence that the dividend or interest income
at issue was received from pursuits conducted on the reservation or that the pension income at
issue resulted from employment conducted by an Indian residing and working on the reservation.
22.
Sale of S Corporation and Personal Residence. P.D. 11-48 (March'31,
2011). A married couple (the "taxpayers") currently residing in Virginia own all of the shares of
a Virginia S corporation (VSC). The taxpayers' intend to sell VSC and their Virginia home and
change their domiciliary residence to another state. The taxpayers are considering a proposal'
that require a buyer to make an initial payment at closing and contingent payments based on the
S corporation's revenue in future years. The taxpayers requested a ruling as to their Virginia
income tax liability on the contingent payments. In addition, the taxpayers sought guidance
concerning any potential Virginia tax liability resulting from installment payments of principal.
and interest from the sale of their Virginia personal residence after they move out of Virginia.
The Tax Commissioner opined that whether the contingent payments would be subject to
Virginia income tax depends on how the taxpayers sell VSC. If the taxpayers sell the stock of
VSC, any payments the taxpayers receive once they change their residency would not be taxable
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by Virginia. However if the taxpayers sell the assets of VSC or sell the stock and make an
election under IRC § 338(h)(1O) to treat the stock sale asa sale of assets, all payments would be
subject to Virginia taxation. The payments on the sale of the residence would only be subject to
Virginia income tax to the extent that the payments are not excluded from federal mcome
taxation.
23.
Credit for Taxes Paid to Other States. P.D. 11-50 (April 4, 2011). The
taxpayers are Virginia residents who claimed a tax credit on their Virginia individual income tax
return for income tax paid to State A. The income tax due to State A was reduced by a credit for
investing in a historic' rehabilitation project (the "historic rehabilitation credit"). When filing
their Virginia income tax return, the taxpayers claimed a credit for tax paid to another state based
on the total amount of tax. due to State A before application of the historic rehabilitation credit.
Under audit, the auditor reduced the tax credit for tax paid to another state to the actual tax
payment and issued an assessment for additional tax and interest. The taxpayers appealed the
assessment contending the-instructions for the Vitginia income tax return states a taxpayer
receives credit for the. "amount of credit of tax paid to another state." The taxpayers asserted
there is no law or regulation that requires reduction of the qualifying tax liability by the amount
that State A properly granted as a credit for payment of the State A tax. Without citing any law
and only a prior ruling of the Tax Commissioner, the Tax Commissioner determined that the
assessment is correct as the credit is only for amounts paid to other states in cash, not credits.
24.
Domicile. P.D. 11-58 (April 13, 2011). The taxpayers, a husband and
wife, filed a Virginia part-year income tax return for the 2006 taxable year. The taxpayers
performed a number of actions consistent with obtaining and maintaining a domicile in Virginia.
The husband obtained a Virginia driver's license in 2004. In September 2005 the taxpayers
leased an apartment in Virginia and filed a part-year Virginia return for the 2005 taxable year.
They moved to another apartment in Virginia in 2006. The wife obtained her Virginia driver's
license in 2006. They also had an automobile registered in Virginia in 2006. The only evidence
provided showing a connection with another state is a 2006 part year return filed with State A.
The taxpayers did not show that they established a permanent place of abode, engaged in
.employment for an indefinite period of time, registered property, or obtained drivers' licenses in
any other state' during 2006. Under review, the auditor determined the taxpayers were
domiciliary residents of Virginia for the entire taxable year and issued an assessment. The
taxpayers filed an appeal contending they filed a part-year resident return because they did not
obtain employment in Virginia until October 2006. The Tax Commissioner' upheld· the
assessment.. .
25.
Credit for Taxes Paid to Other States & Statute of Lirnitations .. P.D. 11-64
(April 21, 2011). The taxpayers are Virginia residents who owned rental property in State A. In
February 2009, an audit by State A 'resulted in an income tax assessment. An amended 2004
Virginia income tax return was filed in March 2009 claiming a credit for income tax paid to State
A. The Tax Department denied the refund because the return was filed beyond the statute of
limitations. The taxpayers appealed the denial of the refund contending they could claim a
refund within one year of State A's fmal determination. In the alternative, they argued that the
State A assessment impacted their 2009 federal income tax return, thereby opening up the statute
to allow them to file an amended return within one year of a fmal determination by the Internal
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Revenue Service (IRS). The taxpayers also asserted that a refund could be permitted because the
claim resulted from the payment of an assessment and their amended Virginia return raised
issues solely related to the State A assessment. The Tax Commissioner denied the taxpayers'
request for a refund. First, the alternative arguments were denied as the State A assessment did
not require the taxpayer to file an amended federal return nor can it reopen the statute of
limitations under the same provision that a Virginia assessment would.
Qn the primary argunient, the Tax CoIIllilissioner referred to prior law and stated, "Under
Va. Code § 58.1-1823A(v), a taxpayer has one year from the fmal determination of a change
made by any other state to file an amended return tb request a refund resulting from credits for
taxes paid to other states. ... This provision, however, clearly states that a taxpayer must have .
previously claimed a credit for taxes paid to such state tax pursuant to Va Code § 58.1-332 in
. order to file an amended return claiming a refund resulting from an audit conducted by another
state." Prior to 2010, Virginia Code § 58.1-1823(A)(v) stated, "Any person filing a tax return or
paying an assessment requiTed for any tax administered by the Department of Taxation may file
an amended return with the Department within the later of: ... (v) one year from the final
determination of any change or correction in the income tax. of the taxpayer for any. other state,
provided that the taxpayer previously claimed a credit for such tax pursuant to § 58.1-332 and
that the refund does not exceed the amount of the decrease in Virginia tax attributable to such
change or correction." Effective July 1, 2010, the requirement that a credit was claimed on the
.
original return no longer exists.
26.
Extension for Victims of Severe Storms. P.D. 11-62 (April 19, 2011).
The Tax Commissioner issued Tax aulletin 11-3 to grant a thirty day filing and payment
extension to those individuals and businesses affected by the severe storms that caused tornadoes
and flooding on April 8,2011, in Pulaski County, and on April 16, 2011, elsewhere in Virginia.
27.
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. P.D. 11-66 (April 26, 2011). The
. taxpayer and her spouse, an active duty military servicemember, were assigned to a military duty
station in State A in June 2005. In May 2008, the spouse received a change of duty 'station and
transferred to a military installation in Virginia. The wife moved to Virginia with her husband. .
The taxpayer filed a nonresident claim for individual income tax withheld in February 2010, for
the 2009 taxable year. In this claim the taxpayer attested that she and her spouse were
domiciliary residents of State B. The claim was denied on the basis that the information
provided supported the taxpayer's claim that her spouse is a domiciliary resident of State B, but it
did not support her claim of domicile. The taxpayer filed an amended claim in August 2010,
attesting that she was erroneously advised and should have claimed State A as their domiciliary
residence. The Department agreed that the taxpayer maintained· her domicile in State A, but
determined her spouse did not abandon his State B domicile. Therefore they did not share the
same domicile prior to being stationed in Virginia. The taxpayer filed an appeal, contending that
she and her spouse shared domicile in State A, and she should be allowed a refund for individual
income tax withheld in 2009.
The Tax Commissioner denied the claim as he determined that the spouse was domiciled
in State B while the taxpayer was domiciled in State A. The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
(the "Act"), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 571 et seq., was amended, effective for 2009'taxable year
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and thereafter, to provide that a spouse can neither lose nor acquire domicile or residence in a
state when the spouse is present in the state solely to be with the service member in compliance
with the service member's military orders if the residence or domicile is. the same for both the
service member and spouse. Information provided to the Tax Commissioner showed that the
spouse elected State B as his withholding state. He also maintained motor vehicles registered in
State B and held a State B driver's license. The taxpayer provided the Tax Department with a
copy of a State B driver's license issued January 2010. In addition, the service member and the
taxpayer maintained a residence in State A and held State A identification cards issued in 2006.
During the 2010 taxable year, while stationed in Virginia, the· service member and the taxpayer
transferred all vehicle registrations to State A. They registered to vote in State A. The service
member reported an error in the withholding state to the Department of Defense, contending the
withholding state should be State A, and was incorrect since 2005.
28.
Tax Preparer Error. P.D. 11-78 (May 26, 2011) and P.D. 11-82 (May 31,
2011). The taxpayer is a VIrginia resident who filed individual income tax returns for the 2007
and 2008 taxable years. Under audit, the Tax Department disallowed itemized deductions for
charitable contributions, job expenses, and certain miscellaneous expenses. The Tax Department
also adjusted the taxpayer's mortgage interest deduction. The taxpayer appealed the assessments .
contending he relied on the expertise of the tax preparer to complete the returns properly. The
. taxpayer conceded that the itemized deductions reported were incorrect but believes the tax
preparer should be held responsible for the. incorrectly completed returns.
The TaX
Commissioner upheld the assessment as he does not· have the authority to assess the taxpayer's
liability against the tax preparer. The Tax Commissioner noted that the taxpayer may have a
cause of action against the tax preparer.
29.
Domicile. P.D. 11-79· (May 26, 2011). The taxpayer filed a 2006 Virginia
resident part-year return. In April 2006, the taXpayer: was transferred by his employer to State A.
In June 2006, he was transferred to Country A. He was then transferred to two other foreign
countries in 2008 and.2010, respectively. The Tax Department received information from the
IRS that tax documents for the 2007 taxable year were sent to the taxpayer at a Virginia address.
The taxpayer did not file a 2007 Virginia individual income tax return. The Tax Department
requested additional information from the taxpayer in order to determine his residence for that
taxable year. Based on the information provided by the taxpayer, the Tax Department
determined that he was a Virginia domiciliary resident during the 2007 taxable year and issued
an assessment for individual income tax. The taxpayer appealed the aSsessment asserting that he
abando"ned his Vrrginia domicile when he was transferred to State A, and he was a resident of
Country A during the 2007 taxable year. 'The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessinent. The
Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer failed to abandon his Virginia domicile as he
maintained a Virginia driver's license and continued to use a Virginia address for mail purposes..
Also, the taxpayer's employment contracts showed 'that his various assignments were only
temporary and the taxpayer did not attempt to obtain a permanent residence after he left Virginia.
30... Domicile/Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. P.D. 11-90 (June 2, 2011).
The taxpayer moved to Virginia from State Ain February 2008. In April 2008, she married a
military service member assigned to a duty station in Virginia The taxpayer engaged in
activities consistent with establishing domicile within Virginia. She obtained a permanent place
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of abode and accepted employment in Virginia in February 2008 prior to her 'marriage to the
service member. Her employer began withholding Virginia income tax from her salary. The
taxpayer also maintained connections to State A. She continued to hold a StateA driver's license
and maintained a permanent place of abode. In 2008,. the taxpayer updated her motor vehicle
registration in State A to include the service member. The taxpayer filed a refund claim for
withholding for the 2009 taxable year. The auditor, denied the taxpayer's claim on the basis that
.the taxpayer established residence in Virginia prior to marrying the service member. The
taxpayer appealed contending her only purpose in Virginia was to be with the service member.
The Tax Commissioner ordered the taxpayer's withholding refunded and found that the taxpayer
demonstrated her intent to maintain her State A domicile in 2008. The evidence further indicated
to the Tax Commissioner that she did not establish a Virginia domicile in 2009 and the taxpayer
and her service member spouse maintained their domicile in State A.
Observation: This ruling is an indictment of the Tax Department's audit staff. If a
Virginia resident maintained their Virginia home, driver's license, and motor vehicle registration
after moving to another state, they wouJd have been assessed with Virginia individual income tax
as a Virginia resident every time. Such an assessment would probably be upheld, depending on
other facts, as individuals are required to abandon their previous state of domicile to change their
domicile. Here however, the opposite facts exist. The taxpayer maintained significant
connections with State A and the audit staff argued that she changed her domicile to Virginia, yet
the auditor determined that the taxpayer had a Virginia domicile. Which is it?

31.
D.C. Unincorporated Business Franchise Tax. P.D.11-92 (June 2, 2011).
A taxpayer representative requested a ruling on the application of the credit allowed by Va. Code
§ 58.1-332 for income taxes paid to other states to the D.C. Unincorporated Business Franchise
Tax, (','UBFT") and whether Virginia policy has changed as a result of District of Columbia v.
Bender, 906 A.2d 277 (2006). The representative's clients ·are a married couple living in
Virginia. The husband is the sole member of a Virginia LLC that operates a consulting business
located in the District. The LLC was subject to the UBFT. He asked if the couple can claim the
Virginia credit for income taxes paid to other states for this tax. 'The policy for not allowing such
a credit was most recently upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court in Mathy v. Commonwealth,
253 Va. 356, 43 S.E.2d 802 (1997). In doing so, the Virginia Court relied on the characterization
of the tax by the DC Court in Bishop v. District of Columbi~ 401 A.2d 955 (D.C. 1979),'
reinstated en bane, 411 A.2d 997, eert. 'denied 446 U.S. 996 (1980). The recent Bender case
clarified the holding of the Bishop decision, and the representative claimed that it undercuts the
rationale behind Virginia Supreme Court decision in Mathy. Therefore, the representative
. asserted that the Tax Department should ignore the Mathy decision and allow taxpayers to claim
the income tax credit for the UBFT. The Tax Commissioner declined the invitation to
administratively overrule the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Mathy and reaffirmed
Virginia'S policy of interpreting Va. Code § 58.1-332 as not allowing credit for the UBFT. The
Tax Commissioner declined to ignore the Virginia Supreme Court's holding in Mathy for several
reaSons as (1) decisions of the courts of other states are not binding on Virginia administrative
agencies; (2) the Tax Department has consistently hdd administratively, and argued in court, its'
position that the UBFT does not, and never has, qualified for Virginia's credit for income taxes
paid to other states; and, (3) he was not persuaded that the Virginia, Supreme Court would reach a
different result if the matter came before it again.
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32.
Mortgage Interest Deduction. P.D. 11-93 (June 3, 20.11). The taxpayer
claimed an itemized deduction for mortgage interest on his 20.0.7 Virginia individual income tax
return. Under audit, the Tax Department disallowed the mortgage interest deduction because the
taxpayer's father was listed as the owner of the home and the payer of the interest on the federal
information return, Form 1098. The taxpayer appealed contending that he is entitled to deduct
the mortgage interest expense because he lived in and owned the home, made the payments on
both mortgages, and paid the home maintenance expenses. The Tax Commissioner upheld the
. assessment as the information provided by the taxpayer did not clarify any of the outstanding
issues. In this case, the taxpayer and· his father share the exact same name. The federal
information return reporting the mortgage interest bears the father's Social Security number..
Based on the deed, it. was unclear to the Tax Commissioner as to whether th,e taxpayer or his
father had legal title to the residence. In addition, the mortgage documents, bank statements, and
utility bills provided bear th,e name shared by the taxpayer and the father ..
33.
Change in Federal Adjusted Gross Income. P.D. 11-100. (June 9, 20.11).
The taxpayers, a husband and wife, were audited by the IRS for the 20.0.5 and. 20.0.6 taxable years.
The IRS shifted passive activity .losses from 20.0.6 to 20.0.5, resulting in an increase·in federal
adjusted gross income (F AGI) in the 20.0.6 taxable year and a decrease in the 20.0.5 taxable year.
As a result of the shift in income, the amount of Social Security benefits included in :the
taxpayers' FAGI was also adjusted. The taxpayers failed to file amended Virginia income tax
returns for either the 20.0.5 or 20.0.6 taxable years reflecting the federal adjustments as ·required
under Virgiitia law. As a result, the Tax Department issued an assessment for the 200.6 taxable
year.· The taxpayers appealed the assessment contending the IRS adjustment to the passive
activity losses did not affect the net Virginia tax liability for the 20.0.5 and 20.0.6 taxable years
combined. In addition, the taxpayers asserted that the Tax Department included nontaxable
Social Security benefits in computing their liability. The Tax Commissioner disagreed· as
Virginia law required the taxpayers to file an amended return to claim the 20.0.5 refund. As the
statute· of limitation had expired, the taxpayers could not claim this refund and thus could not
offset the 20.0.6 tax due. However, the Tax Commissioner determined that the assessment did not
include the subtraction for Social Security benefits and ordered that the assessment be adjusted.
34.
Domicile. P.D. 11-101 (June 9, 20.11). The taxpayer was a student at a
university in State A during the 20.0.7 taxable year. He resided in a fraternity house and paid
State A tuition. The taxpayer was registered to vote in State A. During the 20.0.7 taxable year,
the taxpayer completed an internship in State A. The taxpayer filed a State A part-year re~ident
return for 20.0.7, reporting the income he earned from his internship. The taxpayer acquired a .
Virginia driver's license in 20.0.2, which he renewed in January 20.0.6 and January 20.11. In 20.08,
he accepted full-time employment in State A to commence after his graduation with the company
for which he interned in 2DD7~ The Tax Department received· information from the IRS that tax
documents for the 20.0.7 taxable year were sent to the taxpayer at a Virginia address.· The
taxpayer did not file a 20.0.7 Virginia individual income tax return. The Tax Department
requested additional information from the taxpayer in order to determine his residence for that
. taxable year. Based on the information provided by the taxpayer, the Tax .Departm~nt
determined that he was a Virginia domiciliary resident during the 20.0.7 taxable year and issued
an assessment for individual income tax. The. taxpayer appealed the assessment contending he·
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took sufficient steps to establish residency in State A and all the income earned in 2007 was
earned in State A. The Tax Commissioner disagreed and upheld the assessment as the taxpayer
maintained all of his Virginia connections thus never abandoned his Virginia domicile.
35.
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. P.D. 11-104 (June 10, 2011) .. The
taxpayer moved to Virginia in May 2003. She established a permanent place of abode, accepted
employment at a Virginia company, and in October 2003, married a nonresident military service
member serving at a VirgIDia duty station. Prior to moving t,o Virginia, both the taxpayer and the
service member were domiciliary residents of State A. The taxpayer obtained a Virginia voter's
registration card in 2008 and surrendered her State A driver's license and obtained a Virginia
driver's license in 2009. The taxpayer filed a refund claim for nonresident withholding for the
2009 taxable year. Under review, the Tax Department concluded that the taxpayer was a
resident of Virginia before she married the service. member, denied the refund claim and issued
an assessment for tax and interest. The taxpayer appealed the assessment contending she shared
the same domicile as the service member prior to joining him in Virginia. The Tax
Commissioner upheld the refund denial as the taxpayer took sufficient steps to abandon her
domicile in State A and establish domicile in Virginia prior to marrying the servicemember.
'
Thus, 'the protection afforded by the. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act did Ilot apply.
36.
Unreported Federal Adjustment. P.D. 11-107 (June 14, 2011). The
taxpayer was audited by the IRS for the 2006 taxable year. The IRS adjusted the taxpayer's 2006
federal adjusted gross income (FAGI). The taxpayer did not amend her Virginia income tax
return to report the IRS adjustment. As a result, the Tax Department issued an assessment for
the taxable year in question. The taxpayer appealed the assessment contending· the prepare!
made an error when filing the income tax return. , Specifically, the taxpayer contended that her
accountant failed to properly report a deduction for education expenses,resulting in the
adjustment to her federal taxable income. Due to personal issues at the time, the ,taxpayer
indicated that she did not contest the IRS assessment. The Tax Commissioner upheld the
assessment after refusing to go behind an IRC audit despite the authority to adjust FAGI.
Interesting quote: "However, where the IRS has examined the federal taxable income of a·
taxpayer, the Department does not look behind the IRS's fmal determination."
37.
Above the Line AudIt. P.D. 11-108 (JUlie 14,2011). The Tax Department
audited the taxpayers' Virginia individual income tax returns for the' 2007 and 2008 taxable
years. The 'auditor adjusted the itemized'deductions for the 2007 taxable year and disallowed tI1e
itemized deductions claimed for 2008 based on documentation provided by the taxpayers. The
taxpayers· appealed the assessments contending' that many of. the documents required to
, substantiate the itemized deductions were lost during a foreclosure proceeding. The Tax
Commissioner upheld the assessment due to a lack of documentation.
38.
Actual Residency. P.D. 11-109 (June 14, 2011). The Tax Department
received information from the IRS indicating that third-party fmancial documents for the 2007
taxable ye~ were sent to the' taxpayer at a Virginia address. The Tax Department requested
information to verify whether the taxpayer was subject to Virginia income tax. When the
taxpayer failed to respond, an assessment was issued based on the available information. The
taxpayer appealed the assessment contending lie waS domiciled in State A during the 2007. The
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Tax Commissioner reviewed the evidence provided by the taxpayer and detennined that he was
domiciled in State A in 2007. However, evidence also indicated that the taxpayer was present in
Virginia for 190 days in 2007. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment and determined
that the taxpayer was an actual resident.
39.
Domicile. P.D. 11-113 (June 20, 2011). In 2006, the taxpayer and her
spouse resided in State A. The couple also owned a house in Virginia, and the taxpayer held a
Virginia driver's license. Her employer was based in State B, which borders Virginia. In early
2007, the spouse was transferred by his employer to Country A and the couple sold their home in
State A. The taxpayer continued to work for her employer in State B and lived the home in
Virginia when she was not in Country A with her spouse. The Tax Department received
infonnation from the IRS indicating the taxpayer had income for the taxable year at issue. The
taxpayer was requested to file a Virginia individual income tax return for the taxable year at
issue, provide a copy of th~ return filed, or explain why she was not subject to Virginia income
taxation. When an adequate response was not received, the Tax Department issued an·
assessment. The taxpayer appealed the .assessment. contending she changed her domicile to
Country A in 2007, the income from her employment was exempt under federal law, and her
income was insufficient to require filing. While never addressing the last two arguments, the
Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer was domiciled in Virginia.

m

According to the Tax Commissioner, the taxpayer performed several actions consistent
with an intent to change domicile in 2007. The home in State A was sold after the spouse was
transferred to Country A and the taxpayer traveled to Country A with the spouse. However the
Tax Commissioner also noted that the taxpayer also performed a number of actions indicating an
intent to establish her domicile in Virginia. The taxpayer purchased a home,· registered an
automobile in Virginia, and obtained a Virginia driver's license prior to 2007. In addition, the
taxpayer spent more days in Virginia than in Country A or State A in 2007. Based upon these
circumstances, the Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment.
Observation: Ninety-nine times out of one hundred, the Tax Commissioner correctly
decides residency appeals. This case is number one hundred based on the facts in this ruling. In
fact, the outcome does not match the policy stated in this ruling. The ruling states,.

"In order to change from one legal domicile to another legal domicile, there must
be (1) actual abandonment of the old domicile,· coupled with an intent not to
return to it, and (2) an acquisition of a new domicile at another place, which must
be formed by personal presence and an intent to remain there pennanently or
indefinitely. The burden of proving that the domicile has been changed lies with
the person alleging the change."
Based on the facts that the Tax COIiunissioner wrote, nothing was acquired in Virginia when the
taxpayer sold the State A house. All of the taxpayer's Virginia connections existed when she
was presumably domiciled in Sta,te A. It is not clear based on the ruling if adequate steps were
taken to establish domicile in Country A. However even if the steps weren't adequate, the
. taxpayer did nothing to acquire a domicile in Virginia. Based on the facts cited in this ruling and
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presuming that the actions taken to establish a domicile in Country A were not sufficient, the
correct outcome would be to say that the taxpayer is still a domiciliary resident of State A.
40.
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. P.D. 11-114 (June 21, 2011). The
taxpayer was a State A resident who attended college in Virginia. In March 2004, the taxpayer
obtained a Virginia driver's license. After graduating in May 2004, the taxpayer returned to State
A. In June 2005, the taxpayer returned to Virginia and married a nonresident military service
member, who was domiciled in State A. The couple moved into a residence in Virginia because
the service member was stationed in an adjacent state. The taxpayer obtained full-time
employment and registered a motor vehicle in Virginia. The taxpayer. renewed her Virginia
driver's license and registered to vote in Virginia in 2008. In April 2010, the taxpayer transferred
ownership of a motor vehicle. to the service member and the vehicle was registered in State A.
She also surrendered her Virginia driver's license for a State A driver's license while continuing.
to reside in Virginia. The taxpayer filed a claim for refund of nonresident withholding tax for the
2009 taxable year. The tax Department denied the claim on the basis that the taxpayer.
abandoned her State A domicile in 2005, and no longer shared the same domicile as the service
member. The taxpayer appealed the refund denial, contending she was complying with Virginia
laws when obtaining aoVirginia driver's license and registering to vote in Virginia, and she never
intended to establish domicile in Virginia. The Tax Commissioner disagreed and upheld the
refund denial.
The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act provides that military and naval personnel do not
abandon their legal domicile solely by complying. with military orders that station them in a
different state or country whether permanently or temporarily. The Act did not apply to the
spouses of military and naval personnel before 2009. The Tax Department has ruled that
residency status of a taxpayer requires analysis separate from their military spouse. In Virginia
Tax Bulletin (VTB) 10-1 (1/29/2010), the Tax Department explained that the domicile of a
military spouse must be the same as the service member in order to be exempt from Virginia's
income tax. The determination of a military spouse's domicile requires analysis of the facts and
circumstances. The elements that may be examined include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Whether the person claiming exemption is married to a service
member who is present in Virginia pursuant to military orders.
The service member's domicile.
The spouse's domicile and the circumstatices in which it was
established.
The extent to which the spouse has maintained contacts with the
domicile.
Whether the spouse has taken any action in Virginia that is
inconsistent with maintaining a domicile elsewhere.

In his examinations of the taxpayer's facts and circumstances, the Tax Commissioner determined
that the taxpayer took sufficient steps to establish a Virginia domicile while abandoning all
relevant connections with State A by 2008.
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41.
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. P.D. 11-119 (June 24, 2011). The
taxpayer married a service member while they both served in the military in State A. Both were
released from active duty, but the service member joined another branch of the military service
in 2003. The taxpayer retired from his full-time employment in 2002. In July 2006, the service
member was assigned to a duty station in State B, which borders Virginia. The taxpayer and the
service member purchased a condominium, registered to vote, obtained driver's licenses, and
registered a motor vehicle in Virginia. In late 2009, the service member was transferred to a
duty station abroad. Before moving, both the taxpayer and the service member surrendered their
Virginia driver's licenses and voter's registrations. They also moved all their personal items to
State A. In December 2009, they obtained driver's licenses and registered to vote in State A.
The Virginia condominium was sold in January 2010 .. The taxpayer filed a refund claim for
nonresident withholding tax for the 2009 taxable year. Under review, the Tax Department
disallowed the military spouse exemption because he was a domiciliary resident of Virginia. In
, addition, the Tax Department changed the 2009 Virginia income tax return to a resident return
and issued an assessment. The taxpayer filed an appeal contending he was an eligible spouse of
an active duty service member. The Tax Commissioner disagreed and upheld both the refund
claim denial and the assessment. The basis for this decision was that the taxpayer was a
domiciliary resident of Virginia in 2009. Lesson: Before you-request a refund for a client, make
sure your client is not vulnerable to an assessment. The request for refund may cost your client.
42.
Domicile. P.D. 11-120 (June 30, 2011). The Tax Department was
notified by the IRS that the taxpayer received financial statements at a Virginia address for the
2007 taxable year. Under audit, the Tax Department found that the taxpayer received financial
statements at multiple post office boxes in Virginia and in State A. Because the taxpayer held a
Virginia' driver's license and owned motor vehicles registered in Virginia, the' Tax Department
concluded that the taxpayer was a domiciliary resident of Virginia. As a result, the Tax
Department issued an assessment for tax, penalty and interest. The taxpayer appealed the
assessment contending that during 2007 she and her husband were in transition between Virginia
and State A while their Virginia home was under construction. The Tax Commissioner
determined that the taxpayer was a resident of Virginia for the 2007 year. Query: There are not
enough facts in this ruling to judge whether the correct decision was made. However, the
presence of a key faet is never mentioned. ' The Tax Commissioner mentioned that there' is no
evidence that the home under construction was completed in 2007. Assuming it was not, did the
taxpayers reside in Virginia? Was the taxpayer ever a domiciliary resident of State A?
43.
Domicile. P.D. 11-129 (July 20,2011). The taxpayer and his wife moved
to State A in 1995. For many years, the wife had been diagnosed with a debilitating disease for
which she has been receiving treatment in State B, which borders Virginia.. The taxpayers
maintained a residence in Virginia where they would return in order for the wife to receive
treatments. Eventually, the wife moved to Virginia permanently while the taxpayer continued to
.travel back and forth to State A. The Tax Department audited the taxpayer and concluded that he
established a domiciliary residence in Virginia. Assessments for additional individual' income
tax and interest were issued for the 2007 and 2008 taxable years. The taxpayer appealed the
assessments contending .he continues to maintain his domicile inState A. The Tax
Commissioner agreed with the' taxpayer and. abated the assessment. Even though it was
determined that the taxpayer rented his home in State A, he maintained all of his other
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connections to State A. The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer demonstrated no
intent to abandon his State A domicile.
44.
Military Wages. P.D. 11-133 (July 25,2011). The taxpayer, a resident of
Vrrginia, claimed subtractions froni the federal. adjusted gross income for' National. Guard and
combat duty pay on his 2007 Virginia individual income tax. return. He also claimed
subtractions for National Guard compensation, combat duty pay, and basic military, wages on
the 2008 return. Under audit, the Tax Department disallowed the subtraction for combat duty
pay and National Guard compensation arid allowed subtractions for basic military pay. As a
result, the· Tax Department issued assessments for additional tax and interest for the taxable years
at issue. The taxpayer appealed the assessments contending that Virginia statutes allow a
military servicemember who meets the qualifications to claim multiple military subtractions.
Title 58.1 of the Code of Virginia provides three subtractions for military compensation.
Military servicemembers may be eligible for a subtraction for: (1) military pay and allowances
earned while serving in a combat zone or qualified hazardous duty area (Va~ Code § 58.1322(C)(23)); (2) military basic pay for personnel on extended active duty for periods in excess of
90 days (Va. Code § 58.1-322(C)(21)); and (3) wages or salaries received for active and inactive
service in the National Guard of the Commonwealth (Va. Code § 58.1-322(C)(11)).
Servicemembers may be eligible for more than one subtraction, but the same income may not be
included in more than one subtraction. In other words, a servicemember may not deduct the
same income for both the military basic pay subtraction and the National Guard subtraction. All
of the subtractions under Va. Code § 58.1-322(C) are prefaced by the words "To the extent
included in federal adjusted gross income." No military compensation excluded from FAGI can
be used to claim a military subtraction in computing Virginia taxable income.
After examining the taxpayer's records,· the Tax. Commissioner ordered certain
adjustments to the audit. The taxpayer's W-2 provided detail of the excluded combat duty or
qualified hazardous duty pay but did not provide the detail required to ascertain the officer's
active service pay from any. taxable combat duty pay. . Without such detail, the. Tax
Commissioner could not determine if combat duty or a qualified hazardous duty pay was
included in the FAGL Therefore, the taxpayer was allowed to present such detail to the Tax
Department within 30 days.
Virginia Code § 58.1-322(C)(1l) allows a subtraction of wages or salaries received by
any person for active and inactive service in the National Guard of the· Commonwealth of
Virginia. The amount of the subtraction is the lesser of the amount of National Guard income
received not to exceed the amount of income from 39 calendar days of service, or $3,000.
National Guard personnel may only claim the subtraction if their rank is captain (03) and below.
The taxpayer provided evidence of his membership as a captain in the Commonwealth's National
Guard; however the National Guard income subtraction was disallowed because the income basis
was the same as the basis used, to calculate the basic military pay. After calculating the
taXpayer's military basic pay subtraction, the remaining inilitary income exceeded the $3,000
.subtraction. Although this income was included in the formula for calculating the military basic
pay subtraction, it was not included in the amount actually subtracted. The Tax Commiossioner
determined that this remaining income was eligible for the National Guard .su~tractions and not
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subject to double exclusion and the subtraction is
322(C)(11 ).

In

accordance with Va. Code § 58.1-

45.
Itemized Deductions.
P.D. 11-140 (August 2, 2011).
The Tax
Department adjusted the taxpayers' itemized deductions reported on their 2010 Virginia income
tax return resulting in a reduction of the taxpayers' refund. The taxpayers appealed the
adjustments to the mortgage interest deduction, cash and non-cash charitable gifts, and'
unreimbursed employee expenses contending they provided adequate documentation to claim the
deductions. The Tax Commissioner adjusted the assessment to allow the mortgage deduction
and certain charitable gifts based on provided documentation. However, the non-cash gifts were
disallowed as the taxpayers did not produce an appraisal which is required under Treas. Reg.
§ 1. 170A-13(c)(1). (A taxpayer must obtain a qualified appraisal to substantiate the donation of
similar items that have an aggregated value of greater than $5,000.) The Tax Commissioner also
disallowed the deduction fo~ mileage for the taxpayers commute to work.
46.
Innocent Spouse. P.D. 11-144. (August 5, 2011). The taxpayer separated
from her spouse during 2008. and divorced in 2010. The spouse electronically filed a joint
Virginia indIvidual income tax return for the 2008 taxable year and a refund was issued. The
taxpayer filed a separate Virginia individual income tax return and paid the balance due. The
Tax Department processed the taxpayer's return and issued an assessment to the taxpayer to
recover the refund issued from the joint return. The taxpayer appealed .the assessment
cOIitending she did not agree to file a joint 2008 return and is not liable for the balance due
related to the filling of the joint Virginia return. The Tax Commissioner agreed and abated the
assessment. Evidence provided by the taxpayer demonstrated that she never agreed to file a joint
Virginia income tax return with her spouse. Because the joint return was filed without her
permission and she appropriately filed a separate Virginia return reporting .her separate tax
liability; the taxpayer would not be jointly liable for any assessment resulting from the joint
return.
47.
Carryback of Net Operating Loss Deduction. P.D.11-1S0 (August 26,
2011). The taxpayers incurred'a net operating loss (NOL) on their 2008 federaltncome tax
return. For federal income tax purposes, the taxpayers carried back the 2008 NOL to their 2004
through 2006 income tax returns. Because Virginia does not conform to this federal five-year
NOL carryback rule, the taxpayers carried back the 2008 NOL to the 2006 taxable year .. The
Tax Department processed the 2006 amended return but could not issue a refund because the
taxpayers had claimed a credit for taxes paid to State A on their original return and all taxes paid .
to Virginia had been refunded. The taxpayers requested permission to apply the 2008 NOL to
the 2007 taxable year. The Tax Commissioner denied this request.
Under Virginia's conformity with federal statutes, the Tax Commissioner noted that the
taxpayers properly carried the 2008 NOL back to the 2006 taxable year. The entire amount of
the 2008 NOL was used to reduce the taxpayers' 2006 FAGI. As a result, the taxpayers' 2006
Virginia tax liability was reduce4 and the taxpayers did receive the tax benefit of the 2008 NOL
according to the Tax Commissioner. The taxpayers asserted that the interaction between State
A's tax laws and Virginia policy cause the taxpayers to lose the tax benefit of-the NOL. Under
State A's rules, nomesidents are required to make an addition for NOLs occurring in other states.
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Thus, the taxpayers' 2006 State A tax liability was not reduced by the 2008 NOL. Likewise,
because the out-of-state tax credit offset their Virginia liability in its entirety, the taxpayers were
not able to claim a refund of Virginia income tax as a result of the 2008 NOL carryback.
Because they did not receive the tax benefit from the 2008 NOL, the taxpayers asserted that they should be able to carry the NOL forward to the 2007 taxable year for Virginia income tax
purposes.
The Tax Commissioner determined that under the federal statutes to which Virginia
conforms, however, the 2008 NOLD would not be permitted to be carried forward because it was
used in its entirety to reduce F AGI for the 2006 taxable year. The taxpayers did receive the
benefit of a reduced Virginia income tax liability for the 2006 taxable year even though they did
not realize an additional refund as a result of the credit for taxes paid to State A. Therefore, the
taxpayers were not allowed to carry forward the 2008 NOL to their 2007 Virginia income tax
return.
'
48. . Land Preservation Credit Devaluation., P.D. 11-154 & P.D. 11-155
(August 30, 2011). VALLCplirchased a hrrge tract of-undeveloped land in a rural Virginia
locality in June 2002. At the time of purchase, the land was' zoned for agricultural- -and low
density single family residential uses. In December 2004, VALLC conveyed a conservation
easement on approximately 64% of the tract to a nonprofit organization. Pursuant to the
conveyance of the easement, VALLC registered its donation with the Tax Department for
purposes of the Land Preservation Credit (the "Credit"). Subsequently, VALLC transferred a
portions of the Credit to another pass-through entity based on an appraisal that valued the
easement at approximately four times the purchase price of the entire property.. The remaining
portion of the Credit was passed through to VALLC's members.

Under examination, the Tax Department prepared an appraisal that reduced the value of
the easement. The Tax Department revalued the Credit based on this appraisal and issued
assessments against the entities that received the transferred Credits. VALLC appealed -the
revaluation of the Credit contending its appraiser followed the accepted professional standards
and the easement was properly valued in V ALLC's appraisal. Subsequent to VALLC's appeal,
the Tax Department commissioned appraisals from two different third party appraisers. After
examining the appraisals, VALLC amended its appeal, arguing that its appraisal most fairly
valued the easement.
VALLC's. appraiser appraised the value of the property prior to the -easement at
approximately $36 million and valued it after the easement at $5 million, resulting in the value of
the easement at approximately $31 million. The appraiser used a "discounted cash flow
analysis" to determine the value of the easement. The appraiser describes the "discounted cash
flow analysis" as a combination of using the cost approach, the income approach and the sales
comparison approach. The appraiser used individual waterfront lot sales -in various counties
throughout Virginia as sales comparisons. The appraiser estimated that the 81 lots would- sell out
in 2 ~ years while appreciating at two percent per month. The appraiser stated that infrastructure
would be funded through a community development authority. The appraiser then added in the
timber value. The Tax Department's examination revealed numerous problems with VALLC's
appraisal. There were no sales comparisons with other large 'acreage sales as comparisons.
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Instead, the appraiser used comparisons of individual waterfront lots located in other counties,
incomplete sales data, and does not support his adjustments. The supporting documentation for
proposed development costs was not complete and no support was provided to show that a
conimunity development authority would be formed or would fund such infrastructure. The land
was part of a larger purchase that was acquired in 2002 for approximately $2,850 per acre. In
December 2004, the appraiser's value of the property prior to conveyance of the easement is .
$22,300 per acre. Such an increase presumes that either VALLC purchased the property at
significantly below its fair market value or the subject property appreciated by almost eight times
the purch8$e price in approximately 2Y2 years. No evidence in the appraisal supported either
conclusion.
The Tax Department commissioned two independent third party appraisals subsequent to
VALLC's appeal. After reviewing these appraisals, the Tax Commissioner determined that the
appraisal prepared by one of the third party appraisers most accurately reflected the value of the
subject easement. The third party appraiser valued the property prior to the easement at
$8,275,000 and valued it after the easement at $4,375,000, resulting in the value of the easement
of $3,900,000. The third party appraiser used the sales comparison approach with four
comparables that ranged in size form 298 to 653 acres with water frontage. The value per acre
ranged from $3,272 to $8,551 before easement. The third party appraiser then looked at the sale
of four comparable properties that sold with limited development potential. The. third party.
appraiser then made some significant adjustments based on the location, size and physical
characteristics of these properties. The range of the sales price before adjustments was $965 to
$1,339 per acre. After the adjustments were made, the appraiser determined that the value of the
subject property after the easement is $2,700 per acre. The third party appraiser's value of the
property before the easement appeared reasonable to the Tax Commissioner and had the best
comparables and best analysis in the Tax Commissioner's opinion. The value after the easement
is well .above the comparables, and the percentage of diminution appeared reasonable to the Tax
Commissioner. Accordingly, the Tax Commissioner determined that the appraisal by the third
party appraiser represented the most accurate valuation of the easement and upheld the
assessments.
Comment:
Based .on the ruling, VALLC' s appraisal sounded as if it had major flaws.
In particular, the lack of an analysis using the sales comparison approach with comparable sales
was likely fatal to this appraisal. The Tax Commissioner probably· did not have a difficult
decision on whether to reject VALLC's appraisal. However, language in the ruling is troubling
for future appeals. The Tax Commissioner stated that the third party appraiser's value seemed
reasonable. What is reasonable? Who in the Tax Department is qualified to make such a
determination? When determining· reasonableness, what is the standard? The Tax Department
does not employ a licensed appraiser. This ruling gives a window into the analyses that should
be included in an appraisal but also creates a question of how to determine what is reasonable.
49.
Hurricane Irene.
P.D. 11-156 (September 9, 2011).
The Tax
Commissioner issued Tax Bulletin 11-9 to provide a one week filing and payment extension to
certain individuals and businesses affected by Hurricane Irene.
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50.
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. P.D. 11-158 (September 16, 2011).
The taxpayer, a resident of State A, married a military service member domiciled and stationed
in State B in July 2001. In May 2006, the service member was assigned to a duty station in State
C.· The taxpayer and the service member moved to Virginia. The taxpayer filed a special claim
for refund to receive her income tax withholding for the 2009 taxable year. The Tax Department
denied the refund on the basis that the taxpayer did not share a domicile with her husband prior
to residing in Virginia. Therefore, she did not qualify for the relief under the Servicemembers
Civil Relief Act (the "Act"). The taxpayer appealed the denial of the refund contending that both
she and the service member were domiciliary residents of State A. The Act provides that
military and naval personnel do not abandon their legal domicile solely by complying with
military orders that station them in a different state or country whether permanently or
temporarily. The Act did not apply to the spouses of military and naval.personnelbefore 2009.
The Tax Department has ruled that residency status of a taxpayer requires analysis separate from
their military spouse. In Virginia Tax Bulletin (VTB) 10-1 (1/29/2010), the Tax Department
explained that the do,rucile of a military spouse must be the same as the service member in order
to be exempt from Virginia's income tax. The determination of a military spouse's domicile
requires analysis of the facts and circumstances. The Tax Commissioner examined the facts and
circumstances of the taxpayer and her spouse and determined that her spouse was not domiciled
in State A. The service member demonstrated. his intent to abandon State B by registering his
motor vehicles, registering to vote, and electing to withholding individual income tax in State A.
However, the documents provided to the Tax Commissioner indicated he never physically
.
resided in State A. Therefore he was never a resident of State A.
51.
Domicile. P.D. 11-159 (September 19, 2011). The Tax Department
received information from the IRS that the taxpayer received wages that may be subject to
Virginia income tax. The Tax Department requested information from the taxpayer to determine
her Virginia taxable income. When no response was received, the Tax Department issued
assessments for the 2007 and 2008 taxable years. The taxpayer appealed the assessments
contending that she was employed as a·travel nurse and did not receive income from Virginia'
sources, nor did she reside in Virginia during the taxable years in question. The taxpayer
admitted that she did not change her residency from Virgini~. and she paid income tax to the
states in which the income was earned. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessments as the
taxpayer failed to abandon her domicile.

D.

Opinions of the Attorney General
No recent opinions.

III.

RETAIL SALES AND USE TAXES
·A.

2011 Legislation

1.
Registration with Local Commissioners of Revenue. fJouse Bill 2183
(Chapter 663) and Senate Bi111226 (Chapter 674) amend~d Va. Code §§ 58.1-604.2 and 58.1613 to authorize local commissioners of the revenue to allow dealers seeking ~o register for the
general Retail Sales and Use Tax and out-of-state contractors who are subject to the special use
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tax in Virginia the option of registering with the local commissioner of the revenue, rather than
registering with the Tax Commissioner. The local commissioner would be required to follow the
guidelines, rules, or procedures set forth by the Tax Commissioner in providing these services.
.
This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011.
2.
Contractors: Sale and Installation of Financial Institution Security. House
Bill 1524 (Chapter 360) amended Va. Code § 58.1-610 to treat any business primarily engaged
in the furnishing and installation of tangible personal property that provides electronic or
physical security on real property used by fmancial institutions as a retailer of such property for
the purpose of the Retail Sales and Use Tax. As a retailer, the business would be required to
collect the tax from purchasers of the tangible personal property providing security, rather than
the business paying the tax on its purchase of the materials, even in situations in which such
property is installed on real estate that is not for the use of a financial institution. This legislation
was effective on July 1, 201}.
3.
Fanners Market Exemption. House Bill 1942 (Chapter 466) amended Va.
Code §§ 58.1-609.2 and 58.1-1707 to provide an exemption from the Retail Sales and Use Tax
for agricultural produce and eggs when such items are raised and sold by an individual at retail in
local farmers markets and at roadside stands, provided that the annual sales by the agricultural
producer do not exceed $1,000.· The legislation also provides a litter tax exemption for
individuals who raise and sell agricultural produce in local fanners markets and at roadside
stands and individuals who sell eggs in local farmers markets or at roadside stands; and whose
annual income from such sales does not exceed $1 ;000, provided that the container the producer
provides. to hold purchased items has been previously used. This. legislation was effective on
July 1, 2011.
4.
Spaceport Exemption. Senate Bill 965 (Chapter 286) amended Va. Code
§ 58.1-609.3 to remove the sunset date of the Retail Sales and Use Tax exemption for space
facilities, space propulsion systems, satellites, space vehicles, space stations, and related items
used to conduct "spaceport activities." The exemption was set to expire on July I, 2011.
5.
Exemption for Certain Drilling Equipment Senate Bill. 1343 (Chapter
183) amended Va. Code § 58.1-609.3 to extend the sunset date for the Retail Sales and Use Tax
exemption for machinery, tools, and equipmeJJ.tused in the extraction of natural gas or oil from·
July 1,2011 to July 1,2016.

B.

Recent Court Decisions
No recent court decisions.

C.

Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings

1.
Aesthetic Injectable Implants .. P.D. 10-243 (October 21, 2010). The
taxpayer requested .a reconsideration ofa prior appeal in which the Tax Commissioner
determined that the sale of aesthetic injectable implants was subject to the sales tax. In its
request for reconsideration, the taxpayer contended that the aesthetic injectable implants are
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prescribed and used to treat lipoatrophy resulting from drug therapy used in the treatment in
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) patients. As such, the taxpayer contended the implants
are used for medically necessary treatments and not only for cosmetic purposes. The Tax
Commissioner upheld the prior determination. Virginia. Code § 58.1-609.10(10) provides an
exemption for "prosthetic devices. and ... other durable medical equipment .and devices, and
related parts and supplies specifically designed for those products ... When such items or parts
are purchased by or on behalf of an individual for use by such individual." Prosthetic devices are
defmed in Title 23 of the Virginia Administrative Code 10-210-940 to mean "devices which
replace a missing part or function of the body and shall include any supplies physically
connected to sUCih devices." The 'Tax Commissioner· was .not persuaded by the taxpayer's
argument. He determined that the aesthetic injectable implant used to enhance a patient's facial
appearance by restoring the skin's volume does not qualify for exemption from the tax as the
implant is a cosmetic treatment rather than the replacement of missing body part or function of
the body for medical purpo~es.
2.
Manufacturing Exemption: Purging' Compounds. P.D. 10-244 (October
21, 2010). The taxpayer manufactures products made of plastic resins. The taxpayer utilizes
molds and injection molding machinery in its production process. The injection molding
machines are used to manufacture products of different colors and resin formulas. Each machine
can produce different products and colors but only one product color or resin formula can be
manufactured during a particular production run. Prior to a color or resin formula change for the
next production run, the taxpayer uses purging compounds to purge or remove from. the
machines' injection lines the resin used in the previous production run. The cleaning of the
. injection lines occurs between production runs so production must be stopped before the'
cleaning takes place. The taxpayer was audited by the Tax Department and appealed an
assessment of use tax on purchases of purging compounds used to clean production machinery.
The Tax Commissioner determined that the purging compounds' do not qualify for the'
manufacturing exemption as the cleaning process cannot be an integral part of the taxpayer's
production process because' production or manufacturing is not occurring when the cleaning is
performed.
3.
Credit for Use Tax Paid by Customers. P.D. 10-248 (November 4,2010).
The taxpayer is a furniture manufacturer. An audit resulted in the aSsessment of sales tax on
untaxed sales. The taxpayer contests the tax assessed on sales made to two customers because it
claims that these customers self-assessed the use tax owed on the untaxed sales' made by the
taxpayer during the audit period. The taxpayer asks for a credit equal to the use tax claimed to
be paid by the two customers on the untaxed sales for the entire audit period. This requested
credit would exceed the amount of the sales tax liability applicable only to the untaxed sales of·
the two customers in question. The Tax Commissioner denied the taxpayer's request for a credit
as the information submitted to claim the credit was incomplete. The taxpayer did not provide a
signed ·and dated statement from either customer certifying that (i) the listings provided show all
of the untaxed sales made by the taxpayer during the taxpayer's audit period, (ii) such customer
correctly reported and remitted all of the consumer use tax owed to the Department of Taxation
on such untaxed sales for the audit period in question, and. (iii) such remitted use tax was
correctly computed based on the taxable sales price of all such untaxed sales of tangible personal
property made by the taxpayer to such customer during the audit period in question.
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Ultimately, the Tax Commissioner overruled a 1990 ruling (P.D. 90-76) that
granted permission for the hotel to calculate sales tax refunds for exempt rooms on the first day
of each month based on the least number of rooms occupied· during the previous ninety day
period. In essence, the method in P.D. 90;.76 created a cutoff point on the first day of each
month for counting the number of days that the hotel's rooms are occupied. In· the instant ruling,
the Tax Commissioner disagreed that nip,ety day periods can be set starting with the first day of
each month for purposes of administering this exemption. The Tax Commissioner stated that
under the statute, a room must be occupied for more than ninety continuous days to qualify for
the exemption. The Tax Commissioner also noted that the statute does not state that a specific
method should be used to count consecutive days and it does not. limit the ninety continuous day
requirement in any way.
5.
Mouth Guards. P.D. 10-254 (November 12,2010). The taxpayer sells a
line of custom fitted sports mouth guards. In instances where a dental patient would like to
purchase a mouth guard, the patient's dentist will take an impression of the patient's teeth and
send the impression to the manufacturer of the mouth guards. The manufacturer will produce a
mouth guard in one of three versions: a mouthpiece designed for the most comfortable fit to be .
used in non-contact sports; a mouth guard with a strap designed to off~r additional protection for·
contact sports; a mouth guard without a strap to offer additional protection for contact sports.
.The taxpayer requested a ruling regarding whether one or more of these versions is an exempt
dental service, a prescription medical device, a prosthetic device,. or safety gear. If the provision
of the mouth guards is deemed to be a sale of tangible personal property, rather than a dental
service, the taxpayer inquires whether it can acc'ept a resale exemption certificate from the
dentist and whether. the dentist should charge sales tax on the sale to the patient. The Tax
Commissioner opined that the mouth guards do not meet the definition of durable medical
equipment to qualify for an exemption. The mouth' guards do not appear to serve a medical

35

purpose because they are not used to address some illness or injury; are for use by the patients in
sporting events, not in the homes of the patients as required; and, are used to prevent injury to
those participating in sports, and are also designed to improve athletic performance., On, the
taxpayer's second question, the Tax Commissioner responded that dentists, should provide a'
resale exemption certificate and then charge sales tax on'the sale to the patient.
6.
Charcoal Briquettes. P.D. 10-259 (November 19, 2010). The taxpayer
requested a ruling on whether charcoal briquettes qualify for the exemption provided under Va.
Code § 58.1-609.10(1). Charcoal briquettes that are the subject of the ruling request are
predomfuately sold in consumer sized bags at retail stores. They are advertised as fuel for use on
an outdoor grill and are strictly meant for cooking. The ruling request stated that the charcoal
briquettes are not used for heating a home, nor can they be used for cooking inside the home.
The Tax Commissioner opined that the charcoal briquettes do not qualify for the exemption
provided under Va. Code § ';;8.1-609.10(1). Virginia Code § 58.1-609.10 1 specifically states the
types of fuels that are subject to the exemption and do not provide for the exemption to apply to
other products, ,such as charcoal briquettes, used as fuel for home heating purposes or for
cooking and heating water.
7.
Pollution Control Exemption & Direct Pay Permits. P.D. 10-262
(D~cember 14,2010). The taxpayer is a workwear and textile services company. As a result of
an audit, the taxpayer was assessed the tax on untaxed sales and purchases. The taxpayer
contests the ,tax assessed on (i) chemicals for use in the taxpayer's wastewater system, and (ii)
sales for which the taxpayer had direct pay permits on file from its customers~ The Tax
Commissioner adjusted the assessment to remove sales for which the taxpayer had direct pay
permits on file. The auditor initially included the sales because the permits 'were not valid. The
Tax Commissioner accepted the same permits. The Tax Commissioner upheld the tax assessed
on the purchase of the chemicals for use ill the taxpayer's wastewater system as the chemicals
were not certified as certified pollution control equipment as required by Virginia Code § 58.13660.
8.
Related. Entity Purchases and Government Contract. P.D. 10-263
(December 15, 2010). The taxpayer is an' information technology services business that
performs contract work for the federal government. The taxpayer was audited and assessed use
tax on various purchases, some of which were made in connection with government contracts.
The taxpayer appealed and maintajned that the. audit erroneously includes use tax assessed on
purchases that were made by related but separate entities.' 'The taxpayer contended that
purchases, made in connection with certain government contracts qualify for the resale exemption .
because the true object of the contracts was the sale of tangible personal property to the federal
government. The Tax CoIllIllissioner .upheld the assessment as the taXpayer did not provide
sufficient information proving that the purchases were made by related entities and the true
object of the government contracts were the purchase of tangible personal property.
9.
Information Services. P.D. 10-264 (December 15,2010). The taxpayer is
engaged in providing commercial information about the financial condition of businesses. The
taxpayer maintains a database for customers to access fmnographic and fmancial information to
. evaluate credit and supplier risk. For the new service offering, a paying subscriber will be able
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to access a global database via the Internet to perfonn searches and create customized reports of
summary trade data, basic credit scores, legal filings, and general company infonnation. The
subscriber may also purchase upgraded data packages and workflow add-ons. For an additional
fees, the taxpayer offers six upgraded data packages that provide access to various additional
data for viewing online or using to generate a report. The additional fee for an upgraded data
package is included in the total annual subscription fee if purchased simultaneously with the core
service offering. If purchased ata later date, the upgraded data package is invoiced separately.
In addition to upgraded data packages, the taxpayer offers workflow add-ons for an additional
fee that is separately invoiced. The workflow add-ons are web based tools providing a variety of
functionalities for customers. Customers receive no software. The taxpayer requested a ruling
on the sales tax implications of providing this service. The Tax Commissioner opined that the·
taxpayer is only providing nontaxable services to its customer and should not. collect any' sales
tax. The Tax Commissioner also noted that the taxpayer will be liable for sales and use tax on
purchases of tangible persol!al property that is used in providing these services.
. 10.
Prescription Drug Exemption. P.D. 10-267 (December 16, 2010). The
taxpayer operates a medical practice. The taxpayer was audited and assessed tax on untaxed .
purchases of tangible personal property for use in its practice. At issue is the'tax assessed on the
taxpayer's purchase of an injectable tuberculin antigen used to screen for tuberculosis. The
auditor concluded that the tuberculin antigen is subject to the tax based on Public Document
(P .D.) 91-178 (8/23/91). The taxpayer appealed and maintained that the injectable tuberculin
antigen is exempt from the tax as are vaccines and other 'prescription drugs. The Tax,
Commissioner adjusted the assessment by removing the injectable tuberculin antigen after
discovering the Food and Drug Administration (the."FDA") guidelines and the Virginia Board of
Phannacy classify it as a prescription drug.
11.
Glass Sold With and Without Installation. P.D. 10-280 (December 22,
2010). The taxpayer is a glass and glazier contractor that also sells mirrors and other products at
retail. The taxpayer maintains a retail shop where inventory of glass, hardware and various
metal extrusions are maintained. The taxpayer seils windows, products for maintenance of glass
and glass products, shower doors for replacement; and shower enclosures, many of which 'are
special order items. All items are available for pickup by customers or may be installed by the
taxpayer. The taxpayer indicates that all items become real property upon installation either by
the customer or by the taxpayer. The taxpayer .collects sales tax on retail sales of tangible
personal property sold without installation. For all installed sales, the taxpayer remits the use tax
on the. cost of materials and supplies used. The taxpayer requested a ruling verifying that it was
collecting, remitting, and paying the proper sales and use tax. The Tax Commissioner verified
the taxpayer's tax collection practice and briefly discussed the sales and use tax rules concerning
real property contractors.
12.
Interstate Commerce: Contract Carrier or Common Carrier. P.D. 11-06
(January 14, 2011). The taxpayer is a manufacturer of concrete structural materials who was
assessed with additional sales tax based on sales the taxpayer claimed were exempt. The
taxpayer claimed that F.O.B. origin transactions held in the four-month sales sample constitute
exempt sales in interstate commerce. According to the taxpayer, the carrier in these contested
transactions is registered as an interstate carrier and delivered the taxpayer's product from the
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taxpayer's Virginia plant to its North Carolina customer. The taxpayer appealed the assessment
and the TaX Commissioner upheld the assessment. In the appeal, the Tax Commissioner found
that the shipping terms for the taxpayer's products were F.O.B. shipping point in Virginia and
the buyer assumed all costs and liabilities related to the shipping of the product~. However, the
taxpayer argued that the products were shipped to the buyer via common carrier as the carrier is
registered as an interstate carrier with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. The Tax
Commissioner determined that there is no evidence that such carrier operated in the capacity of a
common carrier under the common definitions of a "common carrier." Instead, the Tax
Commissioner determined that the carrier operated as a contract carner. for the contested
deliveries based on the facts presented.
13.
Fancy Soap is not Medicine. P.D. 11-07 (January 20, 2011). A taxpayer
requested a ruling on whether the sale of antibacterial gels, soaps, and sanitizers, including
antibacterial hand soaps, antibacterial hand gels, antibacterial hand sprays, antibacterial hand
lotions, antibacterial hanl wipes, hand gel sanitizers, conditioning hand sanitizers, hand
sanitizers, and antibacterial hand foams are exempt under the exemption for nonprescription
drugs and proprietary medicines. The Tax Commissioner had previously opined in. a Tax
Bulletin that the exemption does not apply to cosmetics, toilet articles, devices, food products
and supplements, or vitamins and mineral concentrates sold as dietary supplements (except when
sold pursuant to a written prescription by a licensed physician). The Tax .Commissioner
determined that the taxpayer's antibacterial products are deemed cosmetics or toiletry articles
and are subject to the sales tax.
14. . Burden of Proof. P.D. 11-08 (January 20,2011). In an exceptionally long
determination, the Tax Commissioner adjusted an audit on a variety of issues. In this appeal,
there was no overriding issue. However, the one point that can be learned is that the taxpayer
has the burden of proof when appealing an assessment. Pursuant to Va. Code section 58.1205(1), any assessment issued by the Department is deemed prima facie correct. IIi addition, a
taxpayer has the burden of proving an exemption from a tax regardless of whether the transaction
is for the sale or purchase of tangible personal property. Convincing evidence must be provided
to the Tax Department in support of any exemption cl8.im.
15.
Fabrication. P.D. 11-09 (January 21, 2011). A professional longarm
quilter who owns an industrial sized quilting machine requested a ruling on whether the service it
provides is subject to sales tax. The taxpayer's clients bring completed quilt tops to the taxpayer,
along with the backing fabric and batting that goes in between the two layers. The taxpayer puts
the three pieces together by quilting all three layers in a design agreed upon with the clients. The
quilted piece is returned to the clients with one edge still open. The clients place binding around
the. perimeter of the quilt after the quilt is returned to them by the taxpayer. The taxpayer stated
that the majority of the total cost to its clients is for labor. The only material used by the
taxpayer is thread, which represents about 2 to 3 percent of the total cost. In instances where the
taxpayer provides the batting to its customers, the taxpayer charges its customers separately for
the batting. The Tax Commissioner determined that the services provided by the taxpayer
should be considered fabrication and subject to sales tax. Title 23 of the Virginia Administrative
Code (VAC) 10-210-560(A) defines "fabrication" as "An operation which changes the form or
state of tangible personal property ..." Furthermore, Title 23 VAC 10-21D-560(B) states, "A
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person regularly engaged in the fabrication of tangible personal property for sale at retail must
collect and pay the tax on the sales price of the property."
16.
Government Contractor. P.D. 11-10 (January 21, 2011). The taxpayer
was assessed with sales tax on charges for the hosting and maintenance of a database website for
use· by the government and for charges for exhibits furnished to a. federal agency. The Tax
Commissioner reviewed each of the contracts and. determined that sales tax was not due on the
,charges and removed them from the audit. For the hosting and maintenance charges, the Tax
Commissioner determined that the true object of the task orders was for the provision of exempt
services to the federal government. As a service provider, a taxpayer is generally liable for sales
tax on its purchases of tangible personal property used or consumed in the performance of such
services. However, the Tax Commissioner found that the taxpayer did not purchase any tangible
personal property to use in the provision of the services and therefore did not owe any additional
sales and use tax as a result of providing these services. As to the charges for the exhibits, the
Tax Commissioner reviewed the contract and determined that it Was a contract for the provision
of tangible personal property despite the incidental services that were provided with the exhibits.
17.' Manufacturing Exemption. P.D. 11-11 (January 21,2011). The taxpayer
was assessed with additional sales and use tax on various expenses and fixed· asset purchases that
the taxpayer claimed were exempt under the manufacturing exemption. The Tax Commissioner
determined' that none· of the items qualified for the manufacturing exemption and upheld the
assessment. Each group is addressed below:
•

The auditor determined that the forklifts were being used to
perform construction renovations at a new facility owned by the
taxpayer. Despite the taxpayer's argument that the forklifts would
be used in an exempt activity upon the opening of the new facility,
the Tax Commissioner found that the forklifts were being used in a
taxable manner.
.

•

The Tax Commissioner also concluded that floor scrubbers are not
exempt under the manufacturing exemption even if' they are
essential to the cleanliness of the facility.

•

The taxpayer used storage racks to store finished products. As the
products were finished, the Tax Commissioner determined that the
storage racks were not used directly in the manufacturing process..

•

Purchases of various it.ems such as t091s, cleaners, lubricants, floor
brushes, light bulbs, maintenance supplies, and construction
. materials were. deemed taxable as they were also not used directly
in the manufacturing process.

In addition to the manufacturing exemption issues, the Tax Commissioner .
determined that the purchase of desks and tables weretaxaqle purchases of tangible personal
. property, not real property.
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18.
Valid Exemption Certificates. P.D. 11-15 (February 11, 2011). A
taxpayer was audited and assessed sales tax on sales reported as tax exempt but not supported by
valid exemption certificates. The taxpayer protested the assessment and presented exemption
certificates to substantiate the assessed sales. The Tax Commissioner accepted the exemption
certificates after determining each was valid and removed the associated exempt sales from the
. audit.
19.
Late Filing Penalty. P.D. 11-18 (February 11, 2011). The Tax
Department audited the taxpayer and assessed the taxpayer for the underpayment of sales tax
based on collected but unremitted sales .tax. Based on its.financial capability, the taxpayer filed
all returns and paid some of the returns under the 2009 amnesty program. For the unpaid returns,
the taxpayer was assessed with tax, interest, and penalty for late filing. The taxpayer entered a .
payment plan and appealed: the assessment of the late filing penalty. The Tax Commissioner
denied the taxpayer's appeal as the taxpayer did not present cause sufficient to allow for a waiver
of the late filing penalties.
20. . Tangible Personal Property Sold with Birthday Party Packages. P.D. 11-.
24 (February 25, 2011). The taxpayer sells party packages primarily for birthday parties, but
also for other' special events for children. The parties include a meeting room, a party
coordinator, party set-up, games, a t-shirt for the host child, pizza, cake, and .invitations, as well
as clean-up. The taxpayer requested a ruling regarding whether it should charge the retail sales
and use tax on sales of its party package services. The Tax Commissioner determined that the
taxpayer is selling party services and that the tangible personal property provided at the parties is
incidental to the service. Furthermore, the Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer
should pay sales and use tax on its purchases of tangible personal propertY to be provided with
the parties.
The taxpayer also requested a refund of remitted sales tax if the Tax
Commissioner determined that the sale of party services were not taxable. The taxpayer stated
that a flat fee is charged to the customer, but the sales tax is not passed OIi to the customer for the
service requested. .Instead, the assumed tax remittance amount is calculated as an' accounting
function. The Tax Commissioner determined that in order to receive a refund, the taxpayer
would need to provide documentation demonstrating that either the tax was paid by the taxpayer
directly, or that the taxpayer has refunded to its customers t4e sales tax paid at the time the
purchases took place. The taxpayer would need to file amended returns with the Tax Department
as part of the refund process.
21.
Food Samples. P.D. 11-26 (February 28, 2011). The taxpayer is a food
grocer headquartered out-of-state with stores located in Virginia. Food items are selected (either
by the corporate office or an individual store) for demonstration in the taxpayer's stores. Once
selected, the food item is removed from the taxpayer's resale inventory and prepared for
distribution as samples to the taxpayer's customers. The taxpayer requested a ruling on whether
the eligible food items given away as samples by the taxpayer in Virginia are subject to the full
tax rate or the reduced rate. Relying solely on a 1999 tax bulletin (Tax Bulletin 99-11, October
1, 1999), the Tax Commissioner opined that samples of eligible food products removed from the
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taxpayer's resale inventory are subject to the reduced sales and use tax rate .. Query: In 12 years,
why has the Tax Department never promulgated regulations on the reduced sales tax rate for
food?
22.
Manufacturing Exemption. P.D. 11-35 (March 4, 2011). The Tax
Commissioner continued the Tax Department's questionable practice of ignoring the Virginia
Tax Code regarding the manufacturing exemption for sales and use tax. This ruling involved a
taxpayer who fabricates and installs granite, metal, and concrete countertops. The taxpayer cuts,
forms and shapes the raw materials into custom countertops that it installs in real property. The
auditor concluded that the taxpayer is·a fabricator and a real estate construction contractor. The
auditor assessed the use tax on the taxpayer's purchases of machinery used in its fabrication of
custom countertops. The taxpayer protested the auditor's· conclusion that it. is a fabricating
contractor and cites the definition of manufacturing in Virginia Code sec. 58.1-602, which
provides that businesses cl~sified in SIC code group 32 qualify as "industrial in nature".
Virginia Code sec. 58.1-602 establishes that "industrial in nature" for purposes of the
manufacturing· exemption "shall include, but not be limited to, those businesses classified in
codes .... 20 through 39 published ip. the Standard Industrial Classification Manual ..." The
Tax Commissioner decided that the taxpayer was not eligible to receive the manufacturing
exemption solely on the basis of what he perceives is the proper industty classification of the
taxpayer. The Virginia Tax Code clearly states Plat whether a manufacturer is industrial in
nature is not limited to its industry classification. However, the Tax Commissioner did not
include any analysis in his ruling other than stating what he perceived as the taxpayer's industry
classification.
Rant: The definition itself is clearly problematic as it includes the Standard· Industrial
Classification manual codes which were replaced in 1997 by the North American Industry
Classification System. The translation between the two industrial classification code sets can be
confusing for both businesses and the state. However, this is not. an excuse for the Tax
Commissioner to ignore, not misinterpret, the words in the statute. Unfortunately, this "reading"
is not new. I suspect that if this issue is.ever litigated, the Tax Departmen.t's policy will change.
23.
Used Car Cutoff Units. P.D. 11-40 (March 14,2011). The taxpayer is a
car dealership that sells used cars. The taxpayer purchases cutoff units which are installed in
cars purchased by customers with less than acceptable credit. An audit by the Department
resulted in an assessment for use tax on the purchase of the cutoff units on the belief that the
cutoff units remain the property of the taxpayer after the associated vehicle is sold. The taxpayer .
protested the use tax contending that these units are resold to the customer and taxable to such
customers. The Tax Commissioner examined the contraCt between the taxpayer and its
customers and found that the contract specifically considered. the cutoff unit to remain the
property of the taxpayer after the vehicle purchase.. Based· on this language, the Tax
Commissioner upheld the assessment.
24.
Printed Materials. P.D. 11-43 (March 17, 2011). The taxpayer is a
strategic marketing firm that functions primarily as the marketing department for its clients. The
taxpayer provides strategy, creativity and production management services for its clients for
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media advertising and non-media campaigns. The taxpayer was audited and assessed with
additional sales and use tax for numerous items. The Tax Commissioner upheld the majority of
the appeal as the taxpayer did not provide sufficient information on some issues and the purchase
of printed materials the taxpayer claiffied was exempt was taxable. For the purchase of printed
materials to be exempt from sales tax, the materials must be stored in Virginia for 12 months or
less and distributed outside of Virginia..
25.
Sale of Compressed Air. P.D. 11-46 (March 24, 2011). The taxpayer sells
and repairs scuba diving equipment. The taxpayer also offers scuba tank fill-ups. The tanks are
filled with compressed air using specialized machinery that reduces air volume while increasing
its pressure inside the tank. As part of the fill-up, the taxpayer may also check the tanks for
safety and perform pressure tests. As a result of an audit by the Tax Department, the taxpayer
was assessed the tax on sales of compressed air. The auditor relies upon Title 23 of the Virginia
Administrative Code (VAC) 10-210-660, which states that the sale of oxygen is taxable. The
auditor also cites Title 23 -VAC 10-210-560, which addresses taxable fabrication labor. The
taxpayer protested the assessment and disputed the application of the cited regulations.. The
taxpayer contends the sale of compressed air was not held taxable in the prior audit ~d cites .
Public Document (P.D.) 87-158·(6/2/87) in support of its position that it is selling services and
not tangible personal property. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment. P.D. 87-158
addressed the taxability of tire inflation services through the sale of compressed air. The
taxpayer in this case is not selling a service and the authorities cited by the auditor were found to
be correct.
26.
Government Contract.· P.D: 11-56 (Aprii 11, 2011). The taxpayer
provides information technology services to federal, state, and local governments, as well· as to
industry clients. The taxpayer appealed ·an assessment of tax on tangible personal property
purchased pursuant to a contract with an agency of the federal government. The taxpayer
maintained the contract was for the sale of tangible personal property to the federal government
agency, and the purchase of the tangible personal property at issue is exempt of the tax pursuant
to the resale exemption. The taxpayer also maintained that the transactions at issue relate to a
single· order placed by the federal government pursuant to an indeterminate purpose contract.
The taxpayer stated that the order directed the taxpayer.to acquire office furniture, and the
taxpayer enjoyed the resale exemption with respect to these transactions. The taxpayer disagreed
with the audit fmdings that the furniture was purchased pursuant to a real property construction
contract. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment as the taxpayer did not provide the
indeterrnillate purpose contract. Instead, the Tax Commissioner reviewed the taxpayer's order,
SOW and proposed contract line item number with the government agency to determine the
application of the tax on the purchases at issue. The Tax Commissioner determined· that the
furniture was purchased under a real property construction contract.
27. . Maintenance Contract. P.D. 11-60 '(April 15, 2011). The taxpayer sells
new and used motorcycles and operates an in-house parts and repair facility. The taxpayer also
sells related goods, such as helmets, clothing, and bike accessories. The taxpayer appealed an
assessment of tax on the purchase of software support made' during the audit period. The·
taxpayer contended that the audit staff erroneously assumed a bill that listed a monthly software
support fee was for a maintenance contract that provides parts and labor subject to the tax
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pursuant to Title 23 of the Virginia Administrative Code (VAC) 10-210-910. The taxpayer
maintained the bill is for remote software support, and the vendor never replaces tangible
personal property as part of this support. The taxpayer al~o maintained that the contract is for
labor services only and provided a copy of the service agreement entered into with its vendor.
The Tax Commissioner reviewed the service agreement and disagreed with the taxpayer. The
Tax Commissioner noted that the' service agreement provides for loaner equipment to be
provided to the taxpayer as needed. As the maintenance agreement provided for both tangible
personal property and services, the Tax Commissioner determined that the assessment was
correct.
28.
Trade Name v. Legal Name. P.D. 11-67 (May 6,2011). The taxpayer is a
wholesaler of medical devices and primarily 'sells to hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes. As a
result of an audit, an assessment was issued for a sale made exempt of the tax. The auditor
denied the certificate of e~emption because the name on the certificate of exemption for the
customer was inconsistent with the purchaser's name on the invoice. The auditor held the sale
taxable. The taxpayer protested the tax assessment and asserted that the sale qualifies for
exemption. The Tax Commissioner abated the assessment as documentation provided by the
taxpayer showed that the taxpayer's legal name is shown on the exemption certificate while the
taxpayer's trade name is shown on the invoice.
29.
Medical Exemptions. P.D~ 11-68 (May 11, 2011). The taxpayer
purchases a medical food product (VSL#3) that is used for the dietary management of patients
with ulcerative colitis, irritable bowel syndrome or an ileal pouch. The medical food productconsists of live freeze dried lactic acid bacteria in powder or capsule fonn and is intended for use
under the supervision of a physician. The medical food product is used to maintain adequate and
balanced functioning of the human gastrointestinal tract of a patient who, because of chronic
medical needs, cannot achieve such by the modification of the nonual diet alone. The supplier
ships the medical food product directly to the taxpayer and charges the applicable Virginia use
tax on the invoice. The taxpayer requested a ruling that the medical food product is exempt from
the retail sales and use tax. The Tax Commissioner detennined that the medical food product
does not qualify for an exemption and is subject to, the retail sales and use tax. The Tax
Commissioner discussed two exemptions: the medicine and drug exemption and the
nonprescription drug exemption. The medical food product does not qualify for the medicine
and drug exemption as it does not contain a drug as defmed under the Virginia Orug Control Act
the federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. The medical food product does not qualify for the
nonprescription drug exemption as it is not a drug and it does not cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent
a disease in human beings. Lastly, the Tax Commissioner noted that the medical food product
also does not qualify for the reduced food tax rate as it is not defmed as food under the federal
Food Stamp Act of 1977.
30.
Real Property Contractor and Seller of Tangible Personal Property.' P.D.
11-69 (May 11, 2011). The taxpayer is a steel fabrication and erection business that was audited
by the Department. The taxpayer contracts with general 'contractors to fabricate and install
structural steel for commercial real property construction projects. In addition, the taxpayer
fabricates construction materials and supplies ("deliver only items") that are delivered to the job
site for use by other contractors. The contract tenus and pricing for the deliver only items are
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included in the same contracts that require the taxpayer to perfonn real property construction
services. The taxpayer contested the audit assessment of retail sales tax on the deliver only
items. The. Tax Commissioner upheld the audit and detennined that the. taxpayer is a reai
property contractor and a seller of tangible personal property. As a retailer, the Tax
Commissioner determined that the taxpayer should have collected and remitted sales tax on its
.sale of "deliver only" items.
.
31.
Insufficient Documentation. P.D. 11-70·(May 11, 2011). The taxpayer
offers infonnation technology solutions, and consulting to its customers. The taxpayer offers
comprehensive technology solutions to include server, storage, software, application solutions,
services and fmancing to its customers .. The Tax Department audited the taxpayer and issued an
assessment for additional tax and interest on untaxed sales. The taxpayer disagreed with certain
exceptions included in the sales exceptions list and appealed. The Tax Commissioner upheld the'
assessment. The Tax Commissioner' determined that the taxpayer provided insufficient
documentation to prove that the taxpayer's sales were of nontaxable services to that the federal'
government was the purchaser. Also in several cases, the documentation provided by the .
taxpayer, such as statements of work, contradicted the taxpayer's arguments, and indicated that
the taxpayer was also selling tangible personal property.
32.
Satellite Television Programming Provider Subcontractor. P.D. 11-71
(May 11,2011). The taxpayer is a subcontractor for a satellite television programming provider
(the "prograniming provider"). The taxpayer installs satellite dish equipment for the
programming provider's customers. The taxpayer purchases the satellite. equipment from an
a.:fflliate of the programming provider exempt. of the tax pursuant to the resale exemption. The·.
, taxpayer maintains that ·once the equipment is installed, and the customer signs a contract with
the programming provider, the equipment is transferred to the programming provider and
becomes the property of the programming provider. The taxpayer states that iUs reimbursed by
the programming provider, dollar for dollar, for the equipment installed. The taxpayer maintains
that the programming provider charges its customers sales tax on the lease of the equipment. As
a result of the Department's audit, the taxpayer contested the use tax assessed on the satellite
equipment purchases. The taxpayer contended that it is not liable for the tax because ownership
of the property rests with the programming provider. To support its position, the taxpayer
provided documentation of its agreement and reimbursement arrangement with the programming
provider. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment. The Tax· Commissioner determined
that the programming provider was selling services to its customers and the equipment was
incidental to the services. Therefore, the taxpayer's sale to .the programming provider was a
taxable sale not eligible for a resale exemption.
33.
Accelerated Sales Tax Guidelines. P.D. 11-72 (May 11,2011). The Tax
Commissioner issued revised accelerated sales tax guidelines and rules to, reflect changes made
by 2011 House Bill 1500 (Chapter 890) which increases the annual threshold for dealers and
direct payment pennit holders who are reqUired to make an accelerated sales tax payment from
$1 million of taxable sales and/or purchases to $5.4 million of taxable sales and/or purchases.
34~

Road Service Charges. P.D. ,11-74 (May 17, 2011). The taxpayer is a
motor vehicle repair business that specializes in retail tire sales and repairs. The taxpayer

44

perfonns off-site tire repair and replacement services for cOJllIllercial vehicles. In a typical
transaction, the taxpayer receives a service request and dispatches a service technician to assist
the customer. The service technician drives to the customer's site and makes the vehicle
operational by repairing or replacing one or more tires on the vehicle. The taxpayer bills the
customer a labor charge as a separate line item on the sales invoice. The labor charge may be .
listed on the sales invoice as "Road Service Call," "Road· Service Per Hour" or "OTR Road
Service Per Hour." The labor charge is based on the total amount of time taken by the service
technician to perfonn' the service call for each customer. The taxpayer does not charge ret~l
sales tax on the road service charges. A separate tire dismounting and mounting charge is also.
billed on the customer's 'sales invoice. The taxpayer was audited and assessed sales tax on the
road service charges. The taxpayer appealed and argued that the charges are not taxable because
they are for the technician's direct labor, which varies for each call. The Tax Commissioner
upheld the assessment as he detennined that when the taxpayer sold a tire to a customer and
included road service charges, the road service charges were taxable as they were incidental to a
.
sale of tangible personal property.
35.
Biological Soft Tissue Products. P.D. 11-75 (May 18, 2011). The
taxpayer is a manufacturer and seller of two biological soft tissue products. The taxpayer sells
the soft tissue products (allograft tissue and a xenograft product) to hospitals and med,ical service
.providers used in the treatment of individual patients suffering from damaged soft tissue. The
products are used in the repair or replacement of missing ·or permanently malfunctioning body
parts. The FDA classifies the allograft tissue as "banked human tissue" subject to the rules and
regulations under the American Association of Tissue Banks; The Virginia Board of Pharmacy
concurs with the FDA classification and deems the allograft tissue as a SclJ.edule VI controlled
substance under the Virginia Drug Control Act. The xenograft product is porcine dermis that has
been processed to form an acellular tissue matrix and supports the repair of damaged tissue by
allowing rapid revascularization and cell repopulation required for tissue regeneration. The FDA
classifies the xenograft product a medical device. The Virginia Soard of Pha.n:nacy concurs
with the federal classification and deems the xenograft product as a Schedule VI medical device
under the. Virginia Drug Control Act The taxpayer requested a ruling that the biological' soft
tissue products qualify for exemption under the provisions of Va. Code § 58.1-609.10(10) and
23 VAC 10-21O-940(A).
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The Tax Commissioner determined that the allograft tissue· is a Schedule VI controlled
substance, not a medical device, the sale of which is exempt.from sales and use tax. Pursuant to
Va. Code § 58.1-609.10(9), the taxpayer may sell the allograft tissue exempt of the tax to a
licensed physician, optometrist., licensed nurse practitioner, or lic~nsed physician assistant for'
use in his professional practice. The taxpayer may also sell the allograft tissue exempt of the tax
to a' licensed hospital, nursing home, clinic, or similar corporation not otherwise exempt under
this section. The Tax Commissioner also determined that the xenograft tissue is a medical
device .. The taxpayer may only sen the xenograft product exempt of the tax when such product
is purchased by or on behalf of an individual for use by such individual.
36.
Fabrication. P.D. 11-77 (May 26,2011). The taxpayer cuts bricks that are
used by masonry contractors to construct brick arches. The contractors purchase and furnish the
bricks that the taxpayer cuts to their specifications. The taxpayer returns the cut bricks to the
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contractors and the bricks are then used to construct arches. The Tax Department audited the
taxpayer and assessed retail sales tax on the labor charges billed to, the contractors for cutting the
bricks. The Tax Department treated the taxpayer's charges to cut the bricks as taxable fabrication
labor. The taxpayer appealed and argued that the cutting of bricks does not constitute fabrication
as the term is defined in the dictionary and that the cutting of bricks, is an exempt service. The
Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment. 23 VAC 10-210-560(A) defmes fabrication as n[a]n
operation which changes the form or state of tangible personal property . . . n The Tax
Commissioner determined that the "fabrication" defmition in the regulations was the proper
definition of "fabrication" and that the cutting of bricks by the taxpayer was fabrication.
37. ,Diplomatic Exemption. P.D. 11-81 (May 26, 2011). The taxpayer
'operates a restaurant. An audit resulted in the assessment of use tax on various items including
untaxed purchases of tangible personal property. Sales tax was also assessed on untaxed meals
sold to churches and foreigI! diplomats. The taxpayer appealed the tax assessed on meals sold to
foreign diplomats and asserted that it complied with the Department's diplomatic exemption
regulation. The taxpayer further asserts that the diplomatic exemption was disallowed by the
auditor because copies of the diplomat's exemption cards were not in the restaurant's files. The
Tax Commissioner agreed with the taxpayer. 23 VAC' 10-210-694' provides the diplomatic
exemption and states, "No exemption certificate is required; however, the record of the sale must
indicate the exemption card number of the purchaSer." The taxpayer kept a record of the
diplomats' exemption card numbers. Also, the taxpayer contested the amnesty penalty applied to
the assessment. Per P.D. 09-140 (September 28,2009), as amended by P.D. 09-175 (October 29,
2009), the 20% post-amnesty penalty does not apply to any uncontested liability that is paid
within 30 days from the date of assessment and paytnent for any ,contested liability remaining ,
upon resolution of an appeal under Va. Code § 58.1-1821 that is paid within 30 days from the
date of the Tax Commissioner's fmal determination. Based on this language, the Tax
Commissioner agreed to, waive the penalty pending payment of the uncontested liability within
30 days.
'
38.
Reconsideration: Coordination with Tennessee Sales Tax. P.D. 11-86
(June 2, 2011). The taxpayer is a Virginia business that leases or rents construction equipment
from a Tennessee lessor for use in Virginia projects. Pursuant to an audit, the taxpayer was
assessed Virginia use tax on such equipment rentals on the basis that the Tennessee sales tax had
been erroneously charged and collected on the month-to-month rentals: The taxpayer appealed
such assessment but the Tax Department upheld it. The taxpayer seeks reconsideration of the
Tax Department's prior determination.
The Tax Commissioner overruled the prior
determination. The prior determination applied Virginia's long-standing policy with respect to
the treatment of rentals transported between two states. Under Virginia's policy, each monthly
invoice is treated as a separate rental and subject to taxation by the state in which the property is
located. However, Tennessee does not treat the rentals at issue as separate transactions. Instead,
Tennessee taxes the initial rental agreement and subsequent month-to-month rentals; The Tax
Department made inquiries with the legal department of the Tennessee Department of Revenue
(TDOR). Based on a review of some of the taxpayer's redacted rental agreements, the TDOR
concluded that such rental agreements are taxable in Tennessee because the rental agreements
are executed in Tennessee, the property is delivered to the customer in Tennessee, and the rental
period is for a continuous period (i. e., without interruption from the pick up of the property in
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Tennessee to the return of the property to the Tennessee lessor). Based on these facts, the Tax
Commissioner determined that Tennessee has the first right of taxation. Accordingly, while the
rented equipment used in Virginia remains subject to taxation in Virginia, the Tax Commissioner
allowed a credit pursuant to Va. Code § 58.1-611 for the Tennessee sales tax paid on the rentals
at issue.
Sales of Eggs and Agricultural Products at Farmers Markets and Roadside
39.
Stands. P .D. 11-98 (June 9, 2011). The Tax Commissioner issued Tax Bulletin 11-7 regarding .
sales of eggs and agricultural products at farmers markets and roadside stands pursuant to 2011
House Bill 1942.
40.
Common Carrier Exemption. P.D. 11-99 (June 9, 2011). The taxpayer is
a common carrier of freight and passengers by rail. An audit resulted in the assessment of
consumer use tax on various items of tangible .personal property· purchased for use or
. consumption in the taxpayer~s operations. The taxpayer appealed the assessment on two types of
items assessed in the audit: portable. cab heaters and an event recorder. The cab heaters were
purchased to repair or replace the heaters on locomotives. . The taxpayer contended that the
primary operational function of a cab heater is to defrost the windshield of the locomotive.
Without a properly, functioning heater, the taxpayer maintained that the locomotive cannot be
safely operated when the windshield is fogging. An event recorder is used to record incoming
and outgoing phone and radio transmissions with the rail traffic' controller. The voice recordings
are stored indefinitely on compact discs in the event of a railroad' incident requiring
investigation. These recordings are also used to conduct efficiency tests of rail traffic controllers
to determine whether proper procedures were followed. The taxpayer argued that these· items are
exempt pursuant to the·railway common carrier regulation set out in 23 VAC 10-210-382. The
Tax Commissioner agreed that the .cab heaters should be exempt, but .disagreed that the event
recorders should also be exempt. To be exempt under 23 VAC 10-210-382, property must be
used directly in the rendition of the service provided by the common carrier. The Tax
Commissioner determined that while both items may be essential to providing the transportation
service, only the cab heaters were used directly in the rendition of the service.
41.
Unremitted Sales Tax and Reduced Food Tax Rate. P.D. 11-106 (June 14,
2011). The taxpayer operates a restaurant. The taxpayer collected sales tax at the 5% rate on its
sales of food and remitted tax at a 2.5% rate to the Tax Department. The taxpayer was. assessed
for the difference. between its collected and unremitted sales tax. The taxpayer appealed and
contended that it only sells food for home consumption and is being assessed as a restaurant in
error. In addition, the taxpayer states that it was confused as to the correct filing procedures and.
believes its reporting error should have been discovered earlier by the Tax Department, thereby
avoiding'. the assessment of penalties and interest. The Tax Commissioner upheld the
assessment. The Tax Commissioner determined that the food sold by the taXpayer was not
eligible for the reduced food tax rate as the food sold was hot take-out meals. In addition, the
taxpayer was required to. remit all tax collected under Va. Code § 58.1-625.
42.
Software Purchases. P.D. 11-112 (June 20, 2011). The taxpayer provides
satellite mobile communications. . An audit resulted in the assessment of use tax on untaxed
purchases of software that the taxpayer contended were electronically downloaded and therefore
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not subject to taxation. The Tax Commissioner ultimately adjusted the assessment. The
taxpayer provided evidence that the ftrst purchase of software was electronically downloaded,
however the Tax Commissioner noted numerous other references to a compact disc or physical .
delivery. As the totality of the evidence was not clear, the Tax Commissioner upheld the
assessment with regard to this purchase. The taxpayer failed to provide requested documentation
on the second purchase and the Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment with regard to this
purchase as well. The Tax Commissioner removed the third purchase of software from the audit
because if it was' delivered in a tangible state, the taxpayer's evidence showed that it was
delivered to a location outside of Virginia. Thus it was not subject to Virginia sales tax.
43.
Toilet Pumping. P.D. 11-118 (June 23,2011). The taxpayer leases or
rents portable toilets. The Tax Department's audit disclosed that during the audit period, the
taxpayer charged.for pumping services that were not taxed as part of the gross proceeds reported
on monthly sales tax returns .. The taxpayer disagreed with the application of the tax to pumping
services contending these services are optional and have been separately charged: The taxpayer
submitted additional documentation stating that the untaxed rentals were treated properly and
appealed the assessment. The Tax Commissioner disagreed and upheld the assessment. The
issue of whether toilet pumping is subject to sales tax has already been address by the. Virginia
Supreme Court in LZM Inc. v. Department, 296 Va. 105, 606 S.E.2d 797 (2005). Title 23 of the
Virginia Administrative Code 1O.;,210-4040(D) states that the true object of the refuse disposal
operations is the actual pickup and removal of the refuse ,from its customers. However~ the true
object of the taxpayer's portable toilet operation was the provision of the tangible personal
property, the portable toilet, not the waste removal pumping services. Customers would have no
need for pumping services without the provision of the portable toilets. Accordingly, the
pumping services were incidental to the provision of the tangible personal property.
44.
Installation Charges. P.D. 11-127 (July 6, 2011). The taxpayer installs
home theatre systems for both residential and commercial customers. The taxpayer was assessed
with sales tax on separately stated installation charges. Citing Virginia regulation Title 23 V AC
10-21O-4040(C)(3) which provides, "[s]eparately stated labor or service charges for the repair,
installation, application or remodeling of tangible personal property are not subject to the tax,"
the Tax Commissioner detennined that the separately stated charges were exempt and removed'
the charges from the audit.
45.
Government Contractor. P.D. 11-128 (July 6, 2011). The taxpayer is a
general contractor located in Virginia. An audit resulted in the assessment of consumer use' tax
on various purchases of construction materials and other tangible personal property used or
consumed by the taxpayer. The taxpayer contests the use tax assessed on tangible personal
property used or consumed in connection with its real property construction contracts with a
local public school system t6 provide materials, labor, equipment, and supplies to construct a bus
garage addition at a public school and a canopy at an existing bus garag~. The taxpayer appealed
contending that materials used in the perfonnance of such contracts are not subject to taxation as
the local government was exempt from sales tax. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment
as the governmental exemption only applies to tangible personal property purchased directly by
the government.
'
.
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46.
Government Mandated Purchases. P ~D. 11-130 and P .D. 11-131 (July 21,
2011). The taxpayer is a public water service corporation: Following an audit by the
Department, the taxpayer was assessed use tax on purchases of materials and equipment. The
taxpayer" protested the assessment and argues that the 'purchases are exempt under the
manufacturing exemption. The taxpayer also asserted that the purchases should be exempt.ofthe
tax because they were required by the Virginia Department of Health. The. Tax Commissioner
did riot have enough information to determine if the manufacturing exemption was· applicable
and sent the audit back to the auditors. However, the Tax Commissioner determined. that the
purchases were not exempt due to their m.andate by the Virginia Department of. Health. Title 23
VAC 10-210-920(B)' instructs that the' requirements of federal, state or local law do not
automatically render the purchases made under such requirements tax exempt. Although certain
purchases 'by the taxpayer may be required by the. Virginia Department of Health, those
requirements db not make the p:urchases at issue exempt from the retail sales and. use tax.

47. . Transportation Charges. P:D. 11-134 (July 26; 2011). The taxpayer is a
contract furniture dealer.. The· taxpayer purchases furniture from' manufacturers for contract
customers and has the furniture shipped (transportation-in) to an independently owned and
operated warehouse. The .independent service contractor delivers· and installs the furniture for
the taxpayer's customers. In this case, the taxpayer passed the transportation-in charge on to its
customers as a separate· charge on the sales invoice but did not collect the sales tax on such
charge. An assessment was issued on these charges. The taxpayer contended the auditor
characterized the transportation':'in charges as shipping and handling and erroneously- taxed such
charges. The Tax Commissioner disagreed and upheld the audit. . Title 23 of the Virginia
Administrative Code 10-210-6000 interprets Va. Code § 58.1~609.5(3) and provides that the tax
does not· apply to transportation or· delivery charges added to a taXable sale,. provided such
transportation charges are separately stated on the invoice to' the customer. Such charges,
commonly known as "transportation-out, '.' are charges for the .delivery of the tangible personal
property from' the seller to the purchaser. Exempt transportation and delivery charges do not
include charges from a manufacturer to a· retailer's place of business, commonly known as
. "transportation-in" relating to purchases for .resale.
48.
Spray Paint· Booths. P.D. 11-135 (July 26, 2011). The taxpayer
manufactures wood cabinets, tables and similar products. The taxpayer was audited by the Tax.
Department and assessed use tax on the purchase of two' paint spray booths. The taxpayer
appealed contending that the paint spray booths qualify for the manufacturing exemption. The.
taxpayer contended. that the paint spray booths are used directly in its production process and are
. an indispensable and immediate part of its manufacturing process. The paint spray booths are
enclosed spaces that 'create a special environment for the controlled applicatiori of fInishes. The
paint spray booths allow adjustment~ to be made to drying times, temperature and humidity and
limit the amount of dust particles and other airborne contaminants that can potentially degrade .
the fInishes that are applied to products. The taxpayer states that the use of the paint spray
booths insures .the integrity and uncompromised quality of the taxpayer's fInished products',
Relying on' previously issued rulmgs, the Tax Commissioner determined that' certain
c9mponents of the taxpayer's paint· spray booths may qualify for the manufacturing exemption;
However, the paint 'spray booths are not fully exempt. . While the paint booths; at issue employ
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new technology that enhances the quality of the products produced by the taxpayert the structural
components do not playa direct role in and are not an immediate part of the production process.
In this case t the walls t ceiling t and floor of the paint booths are not constructed of special
materials or built in a manner that rises to the specialized nature and· use of the insulated panels t
lead doors or the clean room framework discussed in the public documents cited by the taxpayer.
49.
Breast Implants. P.D. 11-141 (August 3t 2011). The taxpayer perfonns
cosmetic and reconstruc~ive breast surgery for (i) post mastectomy patients t (ii) patients t with a
lumpectomy or partial removal of a segment of the· breast and (iii) patients with significant
abnOJ.malities .in development that result in very little or no breast volume t or significant
differences between one breast and the other. As a result of the Tax Department's auditt the
taxpayer was assessed the tax on breast implants used in breast augmentation. Breast implants
deemed to have been purchased for reconstructive surgery were not taxed. The taxpayer
appealed asserting that the contested implants are .used to .replace a missing body part are
exempt. Virginia Code § 58.1-609.10(10) provides that the retail sales and use tax does not
apply to durable medical equipment. "Durable medical equipment is equipment that (i) can
withstand repeated use t (ii) is primarily and customarily used to serve a medical purpose t (iii)
generally is not useful to a person in the absence of illness or injuryt and (iv) is appropriate for
use in .the home.,t In order to qualify for the durable medical equipment exemptiont the
contested breast implants must meet the criteria established in Va. Code § 58.1-609.10(10).
Based on the infonnation provided Qn the taxpayer's web site t breast implants for· breast
augmentation are typicallYt perfonned to enlarge small or underdeveloped breasts t restore the .
natural breast volume that may have decreased as a result ofpregnancYt weight losst aging or for
women that desire improved breast balance when each breast is a different size. The Tax
Commissioner detennined that the contested breast implants can withstand repeated use and are·
appropriate for use in the home. Howevert he also determined that the final two criteria are not
met because the breast implants used in breast augmentation do not appear to serve a medical
purpose and because they are not used to address some illness or injury. Thereforet the Tax
Commissioner upheld the assessment.
50.
Manufacturing Exemption. P.D. 11-142 (August 5t 2011). The taxpayer
manufactures absorbent materials for fluid control. The taxpayer's products are use in food
packaging, hygiene products, decorating and filtration. The taxpayer protested the use tax
assessed on a tensile testing system and a metal detector.
The tensile testing system is used in conjunction with another machine that produces the
absorbent pouches used in food packaging and hospital bed protection. The seals on the pouches
must meet pre-detennined standards to ensure they do not burst during customer use. The
machine uses rolls of film to produce the pouches. Each time a new roll of raw film is readied
for use, it is tested for sealant strength using the tensile testing system. Based on test results, the
machine operator will make the necessary adjustments to the machine's sealant bars to' bring the
seal strength to acceptable levels. The tensile testing system is also used to test the fmal product.
The taxpayer stated that the tensile testing system sits next to the machine on the production line.
However, the auditor observed the tester in a separate area behind the machine. The tester was
held taxable because the auditor concluded that the machine was not part of manufacturing based
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on its location away fro1;11 the main production area and its performance of tests on raw materials
and fInished products. '
The metal detector is used to test metal levels in completed sanitary pad and diaper
products. Because Food and Drug Administration regulations forbid metal contaminants in these
products, the manufacturer discards ,the product if metals are discovered. The metal detector sits
in the production area and testing takes place on completed and bagged products that have not
been packaged 'and sealed into boxes for sale., The metal detector was held taxable as the auditor'
concluded that the testing of the fmal completed product was outside the manufacturing
production process.
The Tax Commissioner determined that both the tensile testing system and a metal
detector qualifIed for the manufacturing exemption and were therefore exempt from use tax. The
tensile tester was held tax,!ble as the auditor determined fIlm testing took place before actual
production. The auditor believed that the fIlm testing at issue in this case is pre-production and
not a part of the manufacturing process. The strength test takes place after the fIlm has been
stored at the plant site for use in production. As discussed in Va. Code § 58.1-602, production
includes the "storage and handling" of raw material. In P.D. 99-291, the Tax Commissioner
determined that testing of raw materials qualifIes as "handling" and is part of the production
process'. The metal detector is used to determine, if the fmal product is acceptable for packaging
and 'shipment. This testing determines if the product is suitable for sale based on' pre-set
standards. Although the products are bagged, they are not packaged for fmal sale. The
defInition of "manufacturing" in Va. Code § 5,8.1-602 states that production ends when the
product is completed for sale and conveyed to a warehouse at the production site. Because the
tested products have not yet been 'packaged for fInal sale and shipped to the warehouse, this
testing also takes place within the scope of the production process.
,

,

51.
Government Contractor. P.D. 11-146 (August 10, 2011). The taxpayer
provides various products, systems, and services to prime contractors who are engaged in
classifIed or unclassifIed contracts with the federal government. An audit resulted in the '
assessment of sales tax on untaxed sales of. tangible personal' property made to federal
government contractors and use tax on untaxed purchases of tangible personal property used or
consumed by the taxpayer. Due to insufficient documentation, he Tax Commissioner either
upheld the related portion of the assessment or gave the taxpayer a second chance to produce
sufficient documentation. On the portion of the assessment involving classifIed contracts, the
Tax Commissioner acknowledged' that the Tax Department failed to provide an auditor with
adequate security clear,ance to view the classifIed contracts. The Tax Commissioner sent this
portion back to audit and directed an auditor with adequate security clearance to contact the
taxpayer.
52.
Internet Cafe. P.D. 11-148 (August 12, 2(11). The taxpayer operates an
Internet cafe. The taxpayer was assessed sales tax on unreported sales of prepaid telephone
access cards. The taxpayer was also assessed use tax on fIxed assets, food, and software
licensing purchases. The taxpayer protested the assessed amounts as unrepresentative of its
business activity. The Tax Commissioner adjusted the assessment for certain issues. Despite the'
taxpayer's argument that the access cards solely provided Internet access, the Tax Commissioner
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cited evidence that the cards may also be used for telephone calls. As Virginia Code § 58.1-602
defines tangible personal property to include "telephone calling cards upon their initial sale," the
Tax Commissioner upheld the portion of the assessment related to the access cards. The
taxpayer also argued that its food purchases were exempt from sales and use tax as the food was
provided on a complimentary basis to the taxpayer's customers. The Tax Commissioner
determined that the food purchases were subject to the use tax because they were used by the
taxpayer to provide complimentary food to its customers. However, the assessment applied the
use tax at the full 5% rate, not the reduced 2.5% food ,tax rate. The Tax Commissioner ordered
this correction. The assessment of use tax on asset pw:chases was upheld as the taxpayer failed
to provide sufficient information. Finally, the taxpayer protested the aSsessment of sales tax on
software fees. The taxpayer stated it is not in the business of selling tangible personal and is
leasing the software from a third party for its own use. The Tax Commissioner examined the
pertinent contracts and'determined that the taxpayer was in fact leasing tangible personal
property, not licensing so~are, under the contract. The Tax Commissioner upheld this portion
of the assessment.
53.
Internet Service Provider Exemption & Amnesty Penalty. P.D. 11-149
(August 17, 2011). The taxpayer is a provider of business solutions. An audit resulted in the
assessment of sales tax on sales of maintenance contracts and other tangible personal property
and use tax on incorrectly taxed purchases. The taxpayer contested several sales held in the
audit. One of the contested sales involved the purchase of equipment under the Internet service
provider exemption. Per Va. Code § 58.1-602, a taxpayer must provide proprietary content to be
eligible to receive the exemption. The Tax Commissioner examined evidence from the
taxpayer's website and the quarterly report and determined that the taxpayer solely provided
Internet access and no proprietary content. Therefore, the Tax Commissioner upheld this portion
of the' audit. The remaining contested sales were resolved by an examination of evidence. The
taxpayer also requested abatement of post-amnesty pemilties, which the Tax Commissioner
agreed to. The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer paid the uncontested portion of
the assessment 31 days after the date of assessment as directed in writing by the Tax Department.
The amnesty guidelmes require payment of any uncontested liability within 30 days from the
date of assessment to be eligible for a penalty waiver. Despite the failure to pay this portion of
the liability within the timeline provided by the guidelines, the Tax Commissioner waived the
penalty as th~ taxpayer complied with the Tax Department's written instructions.

D.

Opinions of the Attorney General
No recent opinions ..

IV.

PROPERTY (AD VALOREM) TAXES.

A.

2011 Legislation

1.
Appeals of Tax Assessments to Boards of Equalization & Circuit Courts.
House Bill 1588 (Chapter 232) and Senate Bill 1350 (Chapter 184) amended Va. Code §§ 58.13331, 58.1-3379, and 58.1-3984 to provide that on appeal the taxpayer has the burden of
rebutting the presumption that the valuation determined by the assessor is correct and showing
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by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is valued at more than its fair market value.
In any appeal of an assessment by an owner of real property containing less than four residential
units, the assessor will be required to provide written notice to the owner at least 45 days before
the appeal informing him of his right. to review the assessment records and to have the assessor
make a physical examiriation of the property. The assessor will have 15 days from the written
request of the taxpayer in an appeal to provide such assessment records or would be required to
present at the hearing: i) copies of the records, ii) testimony to explain methodologies to
determine the assessed value of the property, and iii) testimony that states that the assessed value
was arrived at in accordance with generally accepted appraisal practices. In appeals to a circuit
court, the taxpayer win be required to make the written request for assessment records no later
than 45 days prior to trial, unless otherwise ordered.by the court.
Under current law, a property owner may appeal to a Board of Equalization or a
circuit court seeking relief from an erroneous real property assessment. In all such cases, the
taxpayer has the burden of -proving that the property in question is valued at more thim its fair
market value., that the assessment is not uniform in its application, or that the assessment is.
otherwise not equalized. In order to receive relief, the taxpayer must produce substantial
evidence that the valuation determined by the assessor is erroneous. This legislation will· be
effective for tax years beginning on or after January 1,2012.
2.
Statements of Income and Expense. House Bill 1526 (Chapter 200)
amended Va. Code § 58.1-3294 to clarify that statements of income and expense may be used in
a complaint before a Board of Equalization as long as the statements are submitted to the Board
of Equalization no later than the appeal filing deadline of the Board.. Under current law, the
failure to present statements of income and expense to the assessor bars the owner of the
property from introducing such information in any judicial action to correct an erroneous
assessment. This legislation was effective on JUly 1,2011.
Judicial Sale of Certain Real Estate. Senate Bill 1478 (Chapter 324)
3.·
enacted Va. Code § 58.1-3965.2 to authorize localities to provide for proceedings to conduct a
judicial sale of certain real property located in a community development authority or on
abutting property within a community development authority when a special tax or special
assessment imposed on the property is delinquent on the flrst anniversary of the date on which
the tax or assessment became due. Under current law, when taxes are delinquent on the last day
of the year following the two-year anniversary date on which such taxes were due, localities are
authorized to sell the real estate for the pulpose of collecting all delinquent taxes on such
property. The legislation contains an emergency clause and has been in force from the date of its
passage.
4.
Transfer of Certain Tax-Delinquent Properties to the Locality. House Bill .
1532 (Chapter 688) amended Va. Code § 58.1-3970.1 to lower the threshold percentage of taxes
and other liens, together with p~nalty and accumulated interest, on property from 50 percent to
35 percent of the assessed value of the parcel for real estate in the Cities of Norfolk, Richmond, .
Hopewell, Newport News, and Petersburg for a special commissioner to convey the property to
the locality in lieu of a public sale at auction. The legislation would also lower .the threshold
percentage, if only taxes, from 25 percent to 15 percent of the assessed value of the parcel for a
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special commissioner to convey real estate in the Cities of Norfolk, Richmond, Hopewell,
Newport News, and Petersburg to the locality. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011.
5.
Membership of Boards of Equalization. House Bill 1470 (Chapter 10)
amended Va. Code §§ 58.1-3371, 58.1-3373, and 58.1-3374 to authorize circuit courts for any
locality to appoint up to two alternate board members to serve on local boards ofequalization if a
member of the board is absent or abstains. Under the terms of the legislation, the alternate·
members would have the same terms, qualifications, and compensation as those· of regular board
members. The chairman of the board. would be authorized to select one of the appointed
alternates to serve in the absent or abstaining member's place and to vote on any proceeding in
which a regular member is absent or abstains. The number of alternate members the circuit court
would be authorized to appoint would differ, depending upon whether the alternates were
appointed to a permanent board of equalization, whether the alternates were appointed in a
county operating under a c9unty executive or county manager form of government, or whether
the alternates were elected to a temporary board. Under current law, local governing bodies are
required to appoint a board of equalization of real estate assessments for the year following any
year a general reassessment or annual or biennial assessment is conducted, unless a permanent
board of equalization is in place in that locality. The Board must consist of three or five
members, depending upon the type of board of equalization to which the board member is
appointed. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011.
6.
Furnishing Statements of Income and Expense to Assessor. Senate Bill
784 (Chapter 137) amended Va. Code § 58.1-3295 to clarify that a real estate assessor may
. require an owner of real property with four or fewer residential units that is operated in whole or
in part as affordable rental housing to furnish to the assessor a statement of the income and
expenses attributable to the property when the owner applies to the locality to have the real
property assessed as affordable rental housing. This legislation was effective on July 1,2011.
7.
Collection of Taxes By Town and County Treasurers. House Bill 2019
(Chapter 475) and Senate Bill 909 (Chapter 431) amended Va. Code § 58.1-3910 to authorize
county treasurers and ¢.e treasurers of any towns located within these counties to enter into
reciprocal agreements, with the approval of the respective· governing bodies, authorizing the
town treasurer to collect real and personal property taxes owed to the county, and the county
treasurer to collect real and personal property taxes owed to the town .. Each treasurer collecting
taxes under the agreement is required to account for arid pay over whatever amount is owed to
the other locality. This legislation waS effective on July 1,2011.
8.
Disabled Veteran Exemption. House Bill 1645 (Chapter 769) and Senate
Bill 987 (Chapter 840) enacted Va. Code §§ 58.1-3219.5 and 58.1-3219.6 to provide the
necessary statutory authorization required by the constitutional amendment to Article x, § 6 of
the Constitution ojVirginia, adopted by voters authorizing the General Assembly to exempt from
taxation for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2011, real property that is the principal
residence of a veteran (or widow or widower of a veteran) if the veteran has been determined by
the United States Department of Veterans Affairs or its successor agency pursuant to federal law .
to have a 100 percent combat-related, permanent, and total disability. The surviving spouse of a
. veteran is eligible for the exemption, so long as the death of the veteran occurs on or after
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January 1, 2011, the surviving spouse does not remarry, and the surviving spouse continues to
occupy the real property as his or her principal place of residence. The legislation also provides
that the veteran or surviving spouse claiming the exemption must file with the commissioner of
the revenue in which the property is located, on forms to be supplied by the locality, an affidavit
or written statement setting forth the name of the veteran and spouse, if any, whether the real
property is jointly owned, and certifying that the property is occupied as the veteran's principal
place of residence. The veteran must also provide documentation from the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs or its successor agency pursuant to federal law to have a 100 percent combatrelated, permanent, and total disability. This legislation contains an emergency clause and has
been in force from the date of its passage.
.

.

.

9.
Partial Exemption for Structures in Redevelopment or Conservation Areas
or Rehabilitation Districts. House Bill 1899 (Chapter 460) and Senate Bill 785 (Chapter 423)
amended Va. Code §§ 58.1-3219.4 and 58.1-3220 to require the local governing body of a
loc'ality in which partial exemptions for structures in redevelopment or conservation areas or
rehabilitation districts are available to provide written notification to the property owner of the
amount of the assessment of the property that will be exempt from real property taxation and the
period of such exemption. The legislation also clarifies that the exempt amount is a covenant
that runs with the land for the period of the exemption, and would prohibit local governing .
bodies from reducing that amount during the period of the exemption. This legislation contains
an emergency clause and has been in force from the date of its passage.
10.
Separate Classification for Certain Historic Buildings. House Bill 1851
(Chapter 571) and Senate Bill 860 (Chapter 581) enacted Va. Code § 58.1-3221.5 to classify
buildings listed on the Virginia Landmarks Register, not including the real estate or land on
which they are located, as a separate class of real property from all other real estate and
authorizes localities to tax such property.at a lower rate than the general class of real property, so
long as the building is maintained in a condition such that it retains the characteristics for which
it was listed on the Virginia Landmarks Registry. Under current law, generally all real estate is
considered to be one class of property subject to the same rate of tax. This legislation was
effective on July 1, 2011.
11.
Real Property Tax Relief for. Elderly or Disabled. House Bill 2278
(Chapter 496) and Senate Bill 1073 (Chapter 438) amended Va. Code §§ 15.2-936, 15.2-2407,
21-118.4, 58.1-3211.1, 58.1-3212, 58.1-3213, and 58.1-3215 to provide the necessary statutory
authorization ·required by the constitutional amendment to Article X, § 6(b) of the Constitution of
Virginia, adopted by voters authorizing the General Assembly to permit local governments to
establish their own income or financial worth limitations for purposes of granting property tax
relief for homeowners who are 65 years of age or older, or permanently and totally disabled.
The legislation also requires that if the governing body establishes a net fmancial worth
limitation, net frilancial worth must be computed by adding together the total· net fmancial worth,
including the present value of all equitable interests, as of December 31 of the immediately
preceding calendar year, of the owners, and of the spouse of any owner, of the dwelling. The
provisions of this legislation is effective for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2011. The
legislation contains an emergency clause and has been in force from the date of its passage.
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12.
Real Property Tax Relief for Residences with Chinese Drywall. Senate
Bill 942 (Chapter 46) amended Va. Code § 58.1-3284.2 to provide that an owner of residential
property containing defective drywall may request the commissioner of the revenue or other
assessing official where the property is located to reassess the property. After confirmation by
the local building official of the presence of defective drywall, the commissioner of the revenue
or other assessing official will (i) determine the amount by which the defective drywall has
reduced the assessed value of the property, (ii) provide written notice to the owner of the
reduction in value, and (iii) reassess the value of the property accordingly. The local building
official will confmn the presence' of defective, drywall only after a review of the test results
submitted to him from a testing agency that is approved by the building official and procured by
the owner of the resideritial property. The local governing body may, by ordinance, designate
the residential property containing defective drywall as a rehabilitation district for purposes of
granting the owner a partial real estate tax 'exemption. This legislation was effective, on July 1,
2011.
13.
Land Use Valuation. House Bill 1672 (Chapter 12) amended Va. Code §
, 58.1-3237.1 to add James City Courity to the list oflocalities permitted to enact an ordinance to
exclude land lying in planned development, industrial or comri:tercial zoning districts established
prior to January 1, 1981 from its land use assessment program. James City County will also be
permitted to provide that property subject to its land use assessment would no longer be eligible
for land use assessment and would be subject to roll-back taxes at the time the zoning is changed,
at the owner's request, to a more intensive nonagricultural use.' However, agriculturally zoned '
property that is subsequently rezoned to a more intensive use which is complementary to
agricultural use will not lose its eligibility, provided that the agricultural activity continues to be
operated on the property and the property continues to be owned by the same owner. This
legislation was effective on July 1,2011.
,

,

14.
Improvements to Real Propertv: City of Poquoson. Senate Bill 957
(Chapter 146) amended Va. Code § 58.1-3221.1 to reclassify improvements to real property
located in the City of Poquoson as a separate 'class of real property. As a result of this
reclassification, Poquoson is authorized to impose a real property tax on improvements to real
property at a rate of-tax which is different than the rate applicable 'to all other real property and is
not zero. The bill authorizes Poquoson to leVy the real property tax on improvements after
.publishing a notice in a newspaper having general circulation in the locality at least seven days
before the levy is made and giving the citizens an opportunity to appear before, and be heard by,
the local governing body on the subject. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011.

B.

Recent Court Decisions

1.
Riverside Owner~ L.ec. v. City of Richmond, 282 Va. 62 (2011). The
taxpayers sued the City of Richmond in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, under Va.
Code § 58.1-3984, for relief from a r~al property tax assessment. The City and the taxpayer's'
predecessor entered into a development agreement ("Agreement") in 2003. The Agreement
called for the construction of a mixed-use building with a parking garage through the
rehabilitation of power plant buildings. In exchange for'the rehabilitation of the power plants,
the City promised that "the [Property] shall qualify for the full benefit of the Rehabilitated Real
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Estate Program." The Rehabilitated Real Estate Program ("Program") provides a partial
exemption from real estate taxes for qualifying rehabilitated property. The taxpayer's
predecessor applied for the Program in 2002. At that time, the City Assessor's office determined
that the power plants each had a base value of $500. Construction on the Property began in 2003
and was completed two years later at a cost of approximately $63.8 million. In August 2005, the
Property was sold to the taxpayer for $85 million. One month later, the City Assessor's office
conducted its final inspection of the Property and determined that, based on the cost of the
rehabilitation, its office space had a value of $63.8 million. In May 2006, the City Assessor's
office revised that amount to roughly $45.2 million for purposes of the Program. The difference
in the two amounts was due to the application of the "Chandler policy."
In 1981, former City Assessor Richard A. Chandler established a new policy for
determirting a property's initial rehabilitated assessed value under the Program. Pursuant to the
policy, he explained in an internal memorandum, "[t]he [mal estimate of value for rehabilitation
credit will be determined as of the date of the application and computed only on the information
which was available at the time the base value was established." The purpose of the policy, he
further explained, was "to eliminate from the fmal estimate of value any enhancement created by
something other than rehabilitation or physical improvement." The policy was not published in
the Program's materials until. 2006. So, 'in accordance with the Chandler policy, the City
Assessor's office took the value of the Property's office space as of 2005, when the rehabilitation
was completed, and backdated it to 2002, when the Property's former owner, Richmond Power
Plant, applied for the program; Because of this backdating, the value of the office space was
reduced from $63.8 million to approximately $45.2 million for pUrposes of the Program.
The taxpayer paid its 2006 real estate tax bill for the Property under protest and appealed
to the City. Assessor, challenging the Chandler policy. The City Assessor denied the appeal,
concluding that the Chandler policy was consistent with Virginia Code § 58.1-3221 and City
Code § 27-83, and was therefore "correct and legal.'~ In 2008, he taxpayer filed a "Complaint
and Application for Relief from Erroneous Assessments of Taxes Upon Real Property" pursuant
to Virginia Code § 58.1-3984. The taxpayer alleged that the Chandler policy was "ultra vires
and an improper usurpation of legislative power by the City Assessor, and such policy [was] an
i.J:llproper methodology for setting the assessed value of' rehabilitated improvements, and
otherwise illegal." The taxpayer sought a refund of the excess taxes paid because of the
application of the Chandler policy, interest on the overpayments, and attorney's fees. The trial
court held the policy used to assess the property departed from Virginia Code § 58.1-3221 and
former Richmond, Va., City Code § 27-83, and. ruled in favor of the taxpayers, but denied their
request for attorneys' fees. The city and the taxpayers appealed.
Virginia Code § 58.1-3221 provides:

A. The governing body of any county, city or town may, by ordinance, provide
for the partial exemption from taxation of real estate on which any structure or
other improvement no less than twenty years· of age, or fifteen years of age if the
structure is located in an area designated as an enterprise zone by the
Commonwealth, has undergone substantial rehabilitation . .'. subject to such
conditions as the ordinance may prescribe.... The governing body of a county,
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city or town may establish criteria for determining whether real estate qualifies for
the partial exemption authorized by this provision and may require the structure to
be older than twenty years of age,. or fifteen years of age if the structure is located
in an area designated as an enterprise zone by the Commonwealth, or place such
other restrictions and conditions on such property as may be prescribed by
ordinance ....
B. The partial exemption provided by the local governing body may not exceed an
amount equal to the increase in assessed value resulting from the rehabilitation ..
. as determined by the commissioner of revenue or other local assessing officer.
City of Richmond Code § 27-83, which was adopted pursUant to Code § 58.1-3221, in
pertinent part, provides:
(a) Exemption authorized. Partial exemption from real estate taxes is provided for
qualifying property rehabilitated . . . if eligible according to the terms of the
Constitution, the Code of Virginia and the provisions of this section and Section
27-86.
(b) When deemed rehabilitated. For the purposes of this section, commercial or
industrial real estate shall be deemed to be substantially rehabilitated when a
structure . . . has been so improved by renovation, reconstruction or replacement
as to increase the assessed value of the structure by no less than forty (40) percent.
Upon receipt of an application for tax exemption, the Assessor shall
determine the assessed value (hereafter referred to as base value) of the structure
prior to commencement of rehabilitation. Such assessment shall serve as a basis
for determining whether the rehabilitation undertaken increases the assessed value
of such structure by at least forty (40) percent. The application to qualify for tax
exemption shall be effective until December 31 of the third calendar year
following the year in which [the] application is submitted. . . . When it is.
determined that a forty-percent increase in assessed value ... has occurred, the
tax exemption shall become effe~tive beginning on January 1 of the next calendar
year...

(g) Commercial or industrial structures in enterprise zones. Commercial or
in.dustrial structures that are ... qualified under this· section shall be entitled to a
fifteen-year period of exemption in the full amount of the difference in taxes
computed upon the base value and the initial rehabilitated assessed value of the
property for each year of the fifteen (15) years.
The City argued that "initial rehabilitated. assessed value" does not mean the first assessed
value after rehabilitation, i.e., the first value after rehabilitation that is determined by appraiser
for tax purposes. The Court disagreed. Contrary to the City's contention, the parenthetical in
City of Richmond Code § 27-83 does not defme "initial rehabilitated assessed value," but rather
describes what remains when the base 'value is subtracted from the initial rehabilitated assessed
value, which is then used to calculate the amount of the tax credit to which an owner is entitled

an
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under the Progr~. Accordingly, the Court read "initial rehabilitated assessed value" to mean
what it says: the flrst assessed value after rehabilitation and that the Chandler Policy is
inconsistent with Virginia Code § 58.1-3221 and former Richmond, Va., City Code § 27-83 ..

C.

Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings

1.
Local Mobile Property Tax. P.D. 10-282 (December 27, 2010). The
taxpayer,. a resident, of the County, purchased Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) titles for
two antique aircraft. The County determined that the taxpayer owned the two aircraft and
assessed property tax for the 2009 tax year using the valuation provided in an aircraft blue book.
The taxpayer appealed the assessment to the County, contending he did not actually own the
aircraft or any tangible airplane parts. He asserted that all he actually owned was FAA titling.
documents that would permit him to rebuild the aircraft and use the "N" number from the
original aircraft, which had long been destroyed or scrapped by their owners. In its fmal
determination, the County concluded that the taxpayer owned two aircraft based on the FAA
information and upheld the assessment. The taxpayer appealed the County's determination to the
Tax Department contending he did not have any tangible aircraft in the County during that tax
year at issue. For the County to impose property tax on the aircraft based on their blue book
value, the aircraft must be in a tangible form and sitused in the County. The Tax Commissioner.
was unable to conclude that the taxpayer owned tangible aircraft subject to the tax in the C'ounty
and remanded the case back to the County in order for it to determine whether the taxpayer's
aircraft were physically located in the County during the 2009 tax year.

D.

Opinions of the Attorney General

1.
Transfer of Duties to Assessor. 2010 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 10-042
(December 17,2010). The Commissioner of the Revenue for the City of Suffolk asked whether
the devolution of the Commissioner of the Revenue's duties with respect to the assessment of
real estate to a city real estate assessor transfers to the assessor the Commissioner's responsibility
under section 58.l-3984(B). .Section 58.1-3984(B) provides that, Under certain circumstances,
the Commissioner of the Revenue of a locality must apply to the appropriate court for the
correction of an erroneous assessment. However, the City of Suffolk's charter transferred all of
the duties with respect to the assessment of real estate for taxation from the Commissioner of
Revenue to the City Assessor. The Attorney General opined that the charter transfers the
Commissioner of the Revenue's responsibility under section 58.l-3984(B) to the extent section
58:1-3984(B) applies to assessments of real property to city real estate assessor.
2.
Separated Spouse Information Required on Exemption Application. 2010
Va. Att'y Gen. 10-062 (November 5, 2010). The Commissioner of the Revenue for Loudoun
County asked whether a married person, applying for a real property tax exemption must include
his or her spouse's net worth when calculating net combined financial worth to satisfy the
condition set forth in section 58.1-3211(2) if the. spouse's name does not appear on the deed to
property and such spouse either has separated from or abandoned the applicant. Section 58.1-·
3211 imposes restrictions on granting property tax exemptions including, in pertinent part, that
"[t]he net combined financial worth, including the present value of all equitable interests ... ofthe
owners~ and of the spouse of any owner ... shall not exceed $200,000." .The Attorney General
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opined that the spouse's net worth ,must be included on the application irrespective of whethersuch spouse has separated from or abandoned the applicant or whether the spouse's name appears
on the deed.
3.
Meaning of "Substantial Gainful Activity". 2010 Va. Att'y Gen. 10-107
(October 22,2010). The County Attorney for Arlington County asked whether an applicant for
property tax relief under section 58.1-3210, who has obtained a signed statement from a doctor
stating that the applicant is permanently incapacitated, yet who has been a fulltime employee of a
governmental agency for over a decade, where he currently eams an annual salary of $44,000, is
engaged in "any substantial gainful activity." The Attorney General opined that an individual
who is employed full-time and who continues to earn a substantial salary is engaged in
"substantial gainful activity II and is, therefore, ineligible for tax relief under section 58.1-3210.,
4.
_ Exemption for Veterans and Their Surviving Spouses. _ 2011 Va. Att'y
Gen. 11..;.061 (July 15, 201 i). Four members of the General Assembly asked twelve questions
regarding the property tax exemption for veterans and their surviving spouses of veterans if the
veteran is disabled due to service connected injuries. The Constitution of Virginia was amended
in 2010 to include this exemption. The fIrst question was when the exemption was effective.
The Attorney General opined that it became effective on January 1, 2011. A number of
questions asked whether a surviving spou,se would qualify for the exemption if the deceased
spouse passed away prior to the effect,ive date. In each different scenario presented, the Attorney
General opined that a surviving spouse would not qualify for the exemption -if the deceased
spouse passed away prior to the effective date regardless of the scenarios presented.
Furthermore, there are no additional legal means to extend the exemption to these surviving
spouses other than amending the Virginia Constitution again. Among the ot.'1er conclusion
reached by the Attorney General:
1. The local Commissioner of the Revenue is responsible for administering the
exemption;
2. The General Assembly may enact legislation authorizing the Commissioner of the
Virginia Department. of Veteran Services - to promulgate rules and regulations
regarding the administration and/or implementation of the exemption;
3. Real property includes both land and a dwelling;
4. The exemption is not available to a veteran who has placed his property into a
revocable inter vivos trust with or without his spouse or an irrevocable trust; and
5. The exemption does not follow a surviving spouse if the spouse chooses to relocate.
V.

PROCEDURAL

A. .

2011 Legislation

1.
Reduced Accrual of Interest on Aooeals. Senate Bill 1152 (Chapter 295)
amended Va. Code § 58.1-1822 to provide that once a tax liability has been assessed and an
application for correction has been filed by the taxpayer, the amount of the tax paid by the
taxpayer shall accrue interest at the normal Virginia interest rate until nine months from the date
of assessment. After nine months, the amount shall accrue interest at the "Federal short-term
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rate" established pursuant to § 6621 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code. If the Tax Commissioner
determines that any portion of the assessment is correct, interest would resume accruing at the
rate prescribed by Va. Code § 58.1-15 thirty days after the date of the Tax Commissioner's
determination. This legislation is effective for administrative appeals filed on or after July 1,
2011.
2.
Judicial Notice. House Bill 2145 (Chapter 800) amended Va. Code §§
2.2-4031, 58.1-204, and 58.1-205 to provide that tax bulletins, guidelines, and other published
documents, published by the Tax Department are accorded judicial notice. The legislation also
requires the Tax Department to publish tax bulletins and guidelines and would include posting
the documents on the Tax Department's website as a permitted publication method instead of
distribution to national and state tax services. The provisions of this legislation are effective in
proceedings commenced on and after July 1, 2011.
3.
Local Tax Collection. House Bill 1425 (Chapter 383) amended Va. Code
§ 58.1-3919.1 to reduce the period of delinquency before which private collection agents may be
used to collect delinquent local taxes from six months to three months. This legislation also
removes the exclusion of real estate taxes from the local taxes that a treasurer may refer to
private collection agents for collection. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011.
4.
Filing Tax Returns By Commercial Delivery. House Bill 2141 (Chapter
.
368) amended Va; Code § 58.1-9 to recognize that tax returns or payment of taxes remitted by
means of a commercial delivery service, in an envelope or sealed container bearing a
confirmation of shipment on or before midnight of the day the return is due, are timely filed.
Under current law, a tax return or payment remitted by mail and bearing a postmark from the
United States Postal Service on or before the due date is considered timely filed, regardless of
when the taxing entity actually receives it. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011.
5.
Fillable Forms. Senate Bill 1450 (Chapter 680) enacted Va. Code §58.1202.3 to require the Department of Taxation to make all state tax forms fIllable in portable
document format (PDF) for periods beginning on and after January 1; 2012 on the Department of
Taxation's website. The Department of Taxation would begin making fillable forms available no
later than January 1, 2012 and would make all fIllable forms available no later than March 1,
2013.

B.

Recent Court Decisions
No recent court decisions.

C..

Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings

1.
Live Chat. P.D. 10-247 (October 28, 2010). The taxpayer appealed an
assessment of unreported sales and use taxes from auctions conducted by the taxpayer. The Tax
Commissioner ultimately upheld the assessment. However, the taxpayer claimed that it received
erroneous advice via the Tax Department's Live Chat function on its website. The taxpayer
received the advice after the audit so the Tax Commissioner did not consider it. However if the
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taxpayer received erroneous advice via Live Chat before he did not collect sales tax, it is
conceivable that the Tax Department would be precluded from assessmg additional tax.
2.
Incomplete Appeal & Amnesty Penalty. P.D. 11-21 (February 18, 2011).
The Tax Commissioner detennined that a taxpayer is barred from filing an application for
correction of an assessment issued on July 13, 2010. The taxpayer filed a notice of intent to
appeal on September 21, 2010, but ·did not file a complete appeal by October 11, 2010.
Furthermore, the Tax Commissioner noted that the amnesty penalty assessed against the taxpayer
was correct. For certain assessments, the amnesty penalty is not imposed if (1) the audit is the
taxpayer's first audit, (2) no penalty was applied to the tax deficiency, (3) any uncontested
liability is paid within 30 days from the date of assessment, and (4) payment for any contested
liability remaining upon resolution of an appeal under Virginia Code sections 58.1-1821 or 58.11825 is paid within 30 days from the date of the Tax Corrimissioner's or the court's final
determination. As the taxpayer never established that it was contesting all or a portion of the
liability at issue by filing a complete appeal, the unco~tested tax was not paid within 30 days of
the date of assessment and the imposition of the amnesty penalty was deterinined to be correct.
See also P.D. 11-25 (February 28, '2011).
3.
Failure to Furnish Information. P.D. 11-28 (February 28, 2011). The·
taxpayer claimed multiple itemized deductions on his Virginia individual income tax return.
Under audit, the auditor requested supporting documentation to substantiate the deductions
cla.hr\ed. When .the information was not received, the auditor disallowed the deductions and
issued an assessment for additional tax and interest.· The taxpayer appealed the assessment,
stating that he would. provide documentation to substantiate the deductions. The Tax
Commissioner upheld the assessment as the taxpayer failed to' provide the promised
documentation.
4.
Filing of Tax Returns and Payments by COlnmercial Delivery Service.
P.D. 11-96 (June 8, 2011). The Tax Commissioner issued Tax Bulletin 11-5 to provide
information regarding the filing of tax returns and payments by commercial delivery service.
5.
Failure to Provide Information. P.D. 11-126 (July 6,2011). The taxpayer
manufactures and distributes pipes. An audit by the Tax Department resulted in the assessment
of additional sales tax on combined shipping and handling charges. The taxpayer appealed and
contended that the charges are mislabeled on the invoices and are for shipping only. The
taxpayer argued that the invoiced' shipping and handling charges are for shipping services only
that are provided by third party common carriers. Additionally, the taxpayer stated that any .
amo\lI1t it charges above its shipping costs are not for handling, as those costs are included in the
sales price of the product. However, the taxpayer presented no documentation to support its
position. Because this was the taXpayer's first audit, the Tax Commissioner gave ·the taxpayer an
additional 30 days to provide documentation supporting its position with the audit returned to the
audit staff. Observation: Apparently taxpayers who are audited for the first time can appeal
their assessment without providing any documentation· and taking a position that is inconsistent
with precedent and still get 30 additional days to make their case.
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6.
Written Guidance. P.D. 11-132 (July 21, 2011). The taxpayer sells and
repairs tires. The taxpayer was assessed sales tax on tire disposal fees related to the sale of tires.
The taxpayer protests the assessment on the basis that it was given the incorrect guidance by the
Tax Department when it requested instructions as to th~ correct application of the tax. During its
initial registration with the Tax Department, the taxpayer stated it was verbally instructed that
tire disposal fees were not subject to the tax and did not collect sales tax on the fees based on this
guidance. When the taxpayer was subsequently assessed during the audit for failure to collect
sales tax on tire disposal fees, it contacted the Department via "Live Chat." Transcripts of "Live
Chat" document the taxpayer being advised that tire disposal fees are not subject to sales and use
tax. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment. Per Virginia Code § 58.l-1835, taxpayers
may only rely upon written advice from the Tax Department. As the "Live Chat" session
'occurred after the assessment was issue~, the taxpayer did not rely on the advice given.

D.

Opinions of the Attorney General

1.
Issuance of Refunds of Local Taxes' to taxpayers. 2010 Op. Va. Att'y
Gen. 10-094 (December 22,2010). The Commissioner of the Revenue for Spotsylvania County
r~quested an Opinion of the Attor:ney General on (i) what a local commissioner of the revenue is
required by Virginia law to tender to the board of supervisors in order to "certify" the
commissioner's determination that a local tax assessment was erroneous; (ii) what is the role of a
county attorney in providing his "consent" to the commissioner of the revenue's determination
and to what extent the commissioner of the revenue lawfully may provide an affected taxpayer's
local tax filings, with attached business and fmancial records to the county attorney; and, (iii)
whether a county. attorney's review of and consent to a downward adjustment of a local real
. estate tax assessment by the county's board of equalization is' a necessary predicate to the
county's issuance of a refund of excess taxes that a taxpayer initially paid.
The Attorney General responded that (i) a county commissioner of the revenue's
"certification" of a correction of a local tax assessment means that the commissioner should
provide written verification that he has determined tha~ the original local tax assessment paid by
the affected taxpayer was erroneous; (ii) § 58.1-3(A)(2) authorizes a county commissioner of the'
revenue to supply to the attorney for his county any information that is necessary to. enable the
attorney to make an informed decision as to whether to consent to the commissioner of the
revenue's determination; and (iii) that a county attorney's consent to a reduction of a n~al estate
tax assessment by a county board of equalization is not a prerequisite to the county's issuance of
a refund of excess taxes.
.

VI.

BUSINESS LICENSE TAXES
A~

2011 Legislation

1.
Imposition of BPOL Tax on Taxable Income. House Bill 1437 (Chapter
685) amended Va. Code § 58.l-3702 to allow localities the option to impose the Business,
Professional and Occupational License ("BPOL") tax on either the gross receipts or the Virginia
taxable income of a business; The BPOL tax is a tax on businesses for the privilege of engaging
in business at a defmite place of business within a Virginia locality. Currently, the measure or
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basis 'of the BPOL tax is the gross receipts of the business. This legislation was effective on July
1,2011.
2.
Business License Incentive Program. House Bill 1587 (Chapter 25)
amended Va. Code § 58.1-3703 to clarify that localities may provide an exemption, refund,
rebate, or other relief from the BPOL Tax for a period not to exceed 2 years for businesses
locating for the fITst time in a locality. The bill also provides that a business would not be
deemed to .locate for the fITst time in a locality on the basis of merger, acquisition, similar
business combination or a change in business form. This legislation was effective on July 1,
2011.
3.
Unprofitable Businesses. Senate Bill 1408 (Chapter 188) amended Va. ,
Code § 58.1-3703 to authorize localities to exempt BPOL tax or fees of any business that loses
money and does not have a_profit for the taxable year. The business will be required to offer its
income tax return to the local commissioner of the revenue as proof of the losses. Eligibility will
be determined annually, and it would be the obligation of the business owner to submit the
applicable income tax return. This legislation will be effective for taxable years beginning on ot
'after January 1,2012.
'

B.

Recent Court Decisions

1. Ford Motor Credit Company v. Chesterfield County, Supreme Court of
Virginia Record No. 092158 (March 4,2011). The Supreme Court of Virginia again dealt with a
locality imposing ~e BPOL tax on gross receipts generated outside its geographical boundaries.
The taxpayer, Ford Motor Credit Company, (hereinafter "FMCC"), is a fmancial services
provider primarily to the automobile, purchase or loan lessee environment. Until its closing in
2007, the Chesterfield County branch was one of FMCC's 300 sales branches and, at one time,
was one of three operating in Virginia. Approximately 75 percent of the Chesterfield County
branch's business was consumer fmancing for the purchase of vehicles. The Chesterfield County
, branch' was tasked with contacting and training dealers to increase vehicle sales and the number
of loans made by FMCC, approving loan applications, determining loan interest rates, and
providing programs and training for dealers concerning FMCC's fmancing programs. During the
period in question, the Chesterfield County branch reported to a regional office located
elsewhere in Virginia, while offices in Baltimore, Maryland; Nashville, Tennessee; Omaha,
Nebraska; ,Mesa, Arizona; and, Livonia, Michigan also played a role in managing and
administering loans that originated in FMCC's Chesterfield County branch. FMCC also had
centers that dealt with loans originating in the Chesterfield County branch, and elsewhere, that
,
subsequently went into default.
'
Typically, the Chesterfield County branch reviewed loan applications from
customers who sought to purchase a vehicle from a Ford dealership, and decided whether or not
to approve the loan based on procedures set out by FMCC headquarters in Dearborn, Michigan.
While the Chesterfield County branch determined interest rates, sometimes approving a lower
rate for a customer with a good credit score, most of the interest rates were set by the
headquarters in Michigan. When the Chesterfield County branch approved a loan application, it
notified the dealership~ where the customer actually executed the installment loan contract. The
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headquarters in Michigan wired funds electronically to the dealership's bank account which were
used to finance the customer's purchase. After the documents were signed and'returned to the
Chesterfield County branch, all of the documents were forwarded to an office outside of
Chesterfield County, which then serviced the loan. The Chesterfield County branch did not
handle any aspect of the loan after forwarding the documents to another office.
The local Commissioner of Revenue determined that all of the gross receipts of
FMCC's loans were generated by the Chesterfield County branch and were not apportionable.
Pursuantto Virginia Code sections 58.1-3702 and -3703(A), and Chesterfield County Code sec.
6-4, the locality levied BPOLtaxes against FMCC in the amounts of $327,137.85, $306,435.65,
$432,620.96, and $449,740.59 for the tax years 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively.
FMCC paid the taxes and applied for a refund, which'was denied. FMCC then filed suit in
Chesterfield County Circuit Court and argued that the gross receipts should have been '
apportioned to Chesterfield County to reflect the liniited contribution of the Chesterfield County
branch to FMCC's' natiOli'wide business. Ultimately, the circuit court rejected FMCC's
arguments by finding that the Chesterfield County branch's marketing and closing operations
generated the gross receipts in the form of interest and fees and the other FMCC locations merely
serviced and collected the gross receipts: .
FMCC appealed the circuit court's ruling to the Supreme CoUrt of Virginia based
on three issues. First, FMCC argued that the Chesterfield County branch's gross receipts are
subject to apportionment. FMCC also argued that the gross receipts must be apportioned by
payroll, per Virginia Code section 58.1,.3703.1 (A)(3), as it is impractical or impossible to
determine to which definite place of business gross receipts should be attributed. Finally, FMCC
argued that it is entitled to a deduction under Code § 58.l-3732(B)(2) as that statute provides that
receipts attributable to business ,conducted in another state in which the taxpayer is liable for an,
income or other tax based upon income should be deducted from gross receipts that would
otherwise be taxable.
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with FMCC that the gross receipts are
subject to apportionment and shoUld be apportioned by payroll. While FMCC's Chesterfield
County operations could not produce 100% of its gross receipts, the locality essentially argued'
that gross receipts were derived' from the exercise of FMCC's licensed privilege to conduct a
fmancial services business as the gross receipts were generated when a loan was made to a
customer. The Court said that, "To accept the County's position ... would mean that all ,services
'necessary to FMCC's deriving gross receipts from its consumer msta1lment and inventory
financing operations were provided at the [Chesterfield County] Branch."l Clearly, these were
not the facts of the case. The Court rejected the locality's argument noting that only a receivable
was created in Chesterfield County and no gross receipts were yet generated. 2
Next, the Court dealt with whether it was impractical or impossible to determine
to which defmite place of business gross receipts should be attributed. An' expert provided by
FMCC at trial testified that there was no way to take one payment or one dollar of interest and
distribute it among all of the activities that may come into play .on a loan. The locality did not .
1

2

Ford Motor Credit Company v. Chesterfield County. Supreme Court ofVirgiDia, Record No. 092158 at P. 25.
The BPOL tax is imposed on gross receipts, not receivables.
.
,
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contradict this testimony at trial. The expert's testimony led the Supreme Court of Virginia to
conclude that it would be impossible or, at least, impractical to perform that process on every one
of the approximately 20,000 loans processed annually by the Chesterfield County branch.

c.

Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings

1.
Definite Place of Business. P.D. 10-275 (December 16, 2010). The
taxpayer, a contractor, leased space at a self-storage facility in the City where it stored five
commercial vehicles· and all its equipment. The facility was owned by an unrelated third party
and provided storage space for vehicles and equipment for the general public. Every work day,
the taxpayer's employees met at the facility to get assignments and start their. work day.
Construction jobs were assigned and the trucks were loaded at the facility. The owner conducted
all business by mobile phone. The taxpayer did not receive mail (e.g., bills, tax returns, or
payments) at the storage f,!cility, and no administration functions were performed in the City.
The County examined the taxpayer and determined that it did not have a definite place' of
business in the City for the tax years at issue. As such, the County issued BPOL tax assessments
to the taxpayer for the 2006 and 2007 tax years because the taxpayer's sole owner resided in the
County. The County also determined that some of the taxpayer's commercial vehicles garaged at
the storage facility weighed less than' 10,000 pounds. The County sitused these vehicles to the
owner's home in the County and assessed BTPP tax for the tax years at issue. The taxpayer paid
the assessments and appealed the County's assessments, contending its defmiteplace of business
was located in the City and that all of its vehicles weighed more than 10,000 pounds. In its final
determination, the County determined that the taxpayer's definite place of business was not
directed or controlled from the facility in the City and, by default, the taxpayer's definite place of
business reverted to the County under Va. Code § 58.1-3700.1. The County also held·that the
taxpayer was liable for the BTPP tax on any vehicles that weighed less than 10,000 pounds
because they were directed and controlled from the definite place of business in the County. The
taxpayer filed an appeal with the Tax Comntissioner contending it did not have a definite place
of business in the County and that none of its vehicles were subject to the BTPP tax in the
County. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment. According to the Tax Commissioner,
characteristics that may help determine whether the location is a definite place of business
include, but are not limited to, the following on-site activities: (1) a continuous presence; (2)
having an office \Vith a phone; (3) the reception of mail; (4) having employees; (5) record
keeping; (6). and advertising or otherwjse holding oneself out as engaging in. business at the
particular location. The taxpayer's facility in the County was only used for storage and as a
meeting place for employees which was not sufficient enough for the Tax Commissioner to
determine that it is a definite place of business. The Tax Commissioner did not have enough
infonnation to determine if the automobiles weighed more than.1 0,000 pounds and remanded
that issue to the County..
2.
Definite Place of Business. P.D. 10-277 & P.D. 10-278 (December 22,
2010). The taxpayer is a government contractor with a defmite place of business in City A. The
taxpayer is' primarily engaged in providing repair services at military installations in' City A and
surrounding localities. City A has classified the taxpayer as a business service and has assessed
BPOL tax based on the gross receipts generated from the services directed and controlled from
the definite place of ~usiness Within its borders. The taxpayer is currently performing repair
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services on vehicles at a military base located in City B. The taxpayer leases a trailer located on
the base that is furnished with desks and computers. Repair personnel .use the trailer for
meetings and to interact with the City A facility. Clerical staff employed· at the trailer provide
administrative support and organize technical documentation. A telephone land line is installed
in the trailer, but the phone number is not advertised to the public., The name of the taxpayer is
not posted on any signage on or near the trailer pursuant to military requirements. The taxpayer
does not negotiate any contracts or solicit any business from the trailer. The taxpayer did not
receive mail at the trailer and contracts performed at the base list .the City A office as the
taxpayer's address and place of contact.
City B contacted the taxpayer concerning its business license obligations to City
B. City B believes the activities conducted by the taxpayer as the military base are subject to
licensure in City B. City A avers that the taxpayer does not have a definite place of business in
City B, and all the services_ conducted at the base are directed and controlled from the office in
City A. Cities A and B requested, an advisory opinion as to whether the taxpayer is subject to
the BPOL tax in City B. The Tax Commissioner opined that the taxpayer's definite place of
business is City B. According to the Tax Commissioner, characteristics that may help determine
whether the location is a definite place of business include, but are not liinited to~ the following
on-site activities: (1) a continuous presence; (2) having an office with a phone; (3) the reception
of mail; (4) having employees; (5) record keeping; (6) and advertising or otherwise holding
oneself out as engaging in business at the particular location. The determination was based on
prior rulings. In P.D. 10-104 (7/18/2010) 'and P.D. 02..,153 (12/1112002), the Tax Department
opined that contractors that maintained a trailer at a particular site on a daily and continuous
basis for 30 days may have established a definite place of business at the locality in which the
trailers were located. The Department found that the contractor's physicru presence, along with
having some of the characteristics of having a definite place of business, such as having a phone
was indicative of having a definite place of business.
3. ' Classification of Licensed Contractor. P'.D. 11-01 (January 3, 2011). A
taxpayer appealed a determination by a county commissioner of the revenue that it should have
been paying BPOL tax to the County. The taxpayer is a corporation that performs tree and
stump removal, tree pruning, landscaping and tree planting, grinding and recycling, mulch
supply and commercial land clearing. The taxpayer also performs demolition projects and is
engaged in the construction of buildings, additions, and retaining walls. These jobs are
performed in various Virginia localities as well as outside Virginia. The taxpayer holds a Class
A construction license and is licensed as a contractor' for BPOL purposes in the City. The
taxpayer's operates from a facility leased in the City. Its sales staff and business estimators work
from the City facility, and all of its equipment is located and dispatched from the City. The City
facility includes a machine shop operated to 'maintain all of the taxpayer's equipment. The
taxpayer has a phone at its City facility and holds itself out as operating from the City on its
business cards. The taxpayer's president directs the operations of the taxpayer from his office at
the City location or from his home, which is also located in the City.
In addition to its City office, the taxpayer also has an office in the County. The
taxpayer's office in the County· has four individuals that perform record, keeping and
administrative functions. Business dpcuments, including license applications and tax returns,
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reflect the County address. The telephone directory and the taxpayer's Internet web page provide
the County phone number and the address of the County facility. Under audit, the County issued
assessments for the 2006 through 2009 taxable years. In its fmal determination addressing the
taxpayer's local appeal, the County concluded that the taxpayer was subject to BPOL tax because
it had a definite place of business within its jurisdiction. The County also concluded that the
taxpayer should be classified as a business service provider rather than a contractor.. The
taxpayer appeals the fmallocal determination to the· Tax Commissioner contending: (1) it should
be classified as a contractor; (2) it does not have a defmite place of business in the County; and
(3) all of its business was directed and controlled from the City facility.
The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer should be classified as a
business service provider as tree surgeons, trimmers, and removal services are listed as business
services under Title 23 VAC 10-500-500. The fact that the taxpayer holds a contractor's license
has no bearing on its clas~ification for BPOL tax' purposes. However based on other tasks
performed by the taxpayer, the Tax Commissioner noted that the taxpayer might be operating
multiple businesses which may require more than one license. The Tax Commissioner also
determined that the taxpayer had a clear definite place of business in the County. Despite having
a definite place of business, the activities performed in the county (administrative functions)
were merely ancillary. However, if the taxpayer is conducting its contracting activities within
County, and th~se. activities generate more than $25,000 in gross receipts in any year, .the Tax
Commissioner determined that the County may require that the taxpayer get a business license
and assess a tax on those gross receipts.
4.
Imposition ofCountv BPOL in Town. P.D .. 11-03 & 11-04 (January 7,
2011). A county and a town jointly requested, an advisory opinion as to whether the county is
permitted to impose the BPOL tax on lessors of real property within the town. The Tax
Comniissioner determined that a county may not impose a BPOL tax on businesses operating in
a town that lie within its borders unless it has the town's permission. Specifically, a county may
oilly impose a BPOL tax on the lessors of real property within a town that lies within the county,
if the town gives them such permission.
5.
Deduction for Gross Receipts Attributable to Business in Other States.
P.D. 11-13 (January 21, 2011). The taxpayer is a provider of computer-based services with
multiple locations in the locality and throughout the world. The taxpayer apportioned its gross
receipts based on payroll·as it was impossible or impractical to determine the situs of its gross
receipts under the general situs rules. The taxpayer calculated its gross receipts by first
deducting from its total world wide gross· receipts those gross receipts generated from each state ,
in which it filed an income tax return and then multiplied applied the payroll apportionment
percentage. The locality audited the taxpayer and disallowed the deduction for the gross
receipts. The taxpayer appealed the assessments to the locality, contending it was not permitted
a deduction for gross receipts attributable to business conducted in other states. Ultimately, the
locality upheld the audit assessment, concluding that the deduction afforded by Va. Code § 58.1 ~
3732 B 2 is not applicable to the taxp;;lyer because the taxpayer was not otherwise taxable by the
locality. The taxpayer appealed the locality'~ fmal determination to the Tax Commissioner,
claiming it has been denied the deduction.for gross receipts attributable to its business conducted
in other states or foreign countries.
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The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer was entitled to the deduction
per Virginia Code sec. 58.1-3732(B)(2) provided it can show some evidence that employees
from the definite place of business in the locality earn, or participate in earning, receipts
attributable to customers in other states where the taxpayer filed an income tax return. The
amount of any deduction would be determined by multiplying the total out-of-state tax receipts
by the same payroll factor used to determine situs of gross receipts. Before reaching this
conclusion however, the Tax Commissioner noted. that the taxpayer) method of claiming the
deduction was incorrect. The statutory construction of Virginia Code sec. 58.1.-3732 establishes
that the taxable measure of gross receipts must first be determined before any deduction is,
granted. In other words, receipts must first be assigned or sitused to a definite place of business.
Then, from those assigned receipts, ataxpayer may take the deduction. The taxpayer was taking
the deduction before apportionment.
6.
Change in Form of Entity. P.D. 11-27 (February 28, 2011). The taxpayer,
a single member limited liability corporation, began operating in the City in March 2009. Prior
to establishing the taxpayer, the single owner operated the same business as a sole proprietorship.
The taxpayer continued to operate' under the original business license. issued to the sole
proprietorship during 2009. As the result of an audit, the City issued a license fee to the taxpayer
for the 2009 tax year based on the City's fmding that the taxpayer was a new business. The
taxpayer appealed the assessment to the City. The taxpayer also claimed that the license fee
should have been prorated based on the number of months it was in operation during 2009. In its
final determination, the City upheld the assessment, concluding that .the change in the taxpayer's
legal status created a new and separate business, and Virginia law does not provide for the
proration of license fees. The taxpayer appealed to the Tax Commissioner by offering the same
arguments presented in its appeal to the City. In addition, the taxpayer requested the fee be
waived due to personal and fmancial hardship.
The Tax Commissioner upheld the imposition of the fee. Because the taxpayer, a
limited liability company~ is an entity different from a sole proprietorship, it must be regarded as
a beginning business in 2009 and subject to a license tax or fee for the 2009 tax year.
Furthermore, the Tax Commissioner noted that it is in the sole discretion of local taxing
authorities to accept offers in compromises such as the reduced fee' the taxpayer is requesting
from the Tax Commissioner.
7.
Motor Carriers. P.D. 11-42 (March 16, 2011). During the tax years at
issue, the taxpayer, a resident of the City, was a tractor trailer driver that owned a commercial
tractor that was leased to a business (the ~otor carrier) located in State A. The taxpayer operated
the tnick as an independent contractor on behalf of the State A company. The City determined
the taxpayer was engaged in a licensable business activity within its jurisdiction for the tax years
at issue. As such, the City issued BPOL tax assessments to the taxpayer for the 2009 and 2010· .
tax years. The taxpayer appealed the City's assessments. In its final determination, the·City
determined that the taxpayer's residence was his defmite place of business because he was
engaged in business but maintained no defmite place of business elsewhere. The taxpayer filed
an appeal with the Tax Commissioner contending he did not have a defmite place of business in
the City and he was riot engaged in a licensable business activity within the City. In addition, he
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argued that the motor carrier is exempt from the BPOL tax. The Tax Commissioner disagreed
and upheld the assessment. The Tax Commissioner stated that while motor carriers who were
formerly certified by the Interstate Commerce Commission or presently registered for insurance
purposes with the Federal Highway Administration are exempt, the drivers are not exempt unless
they hold the same licenses. The Tax Commissioner also determined that the taxpayer's home
was his definite place of business and that his gross receipts would be sitused there. The Tax
Commissioner cited P.D. 99-84 which said that the home of truck driver who owned his truck,
but leased it to an out-of-state business and operated the truck as an independent .contractor,
would be considered to be a definite place of business if he did not maintain a definite place of
business elsewhere. Finally, the Tax Commissioner sent the appeal back to the City to determine
if the leasing of the taxpayer's tractor constituted a separate licensable business.
8.
Definite Place of Business. P.D. 11-49 (April 4, 2011). The taxpayer is a
limited liability company with four members. The taxpayer formed as a joint venture i.J;:t State A
and took over federal contracts from one of the members (Member A) to perform business
s~rvices for the federal government. The services are performed by employees of Member A at
Member A's facilities in Virginia and other states. Member A bills the taxpayer for the services
if performs, which in turn, bills the federal agency for the services plus a markup. The taxpayer's
corporate address was at Member A's definite place of business for nine months in 2009. While·
the taxpayer's business address was in Virginia, it had no employees or property. It did not have
a phone number or an address listed in the phone book. It did not have its, name on the building
or listed in the building directory. The taxpayer's business records were kept at a facility in State
B. In January 2010, the taxpayer's address was changed to the State B facility. The taxpayer
requested an advisory opinion as to whether it has a definite place of business in Virginia. The
taxpayer asks whether it had a BPOL filing requirement for the nine months in 2009 that it was
located in the Virginia locality. Finally, the taxpayer asks how it should it situs gross receipts
without employees if it is subject to BPOL tax. The Tax Commissioner determined that the
presence of the taxpayer at Member A's office does not constitute a "regular and continuous"
business activity. The mere sharing of office space with an entity in a Virginia locality without
having employees, property, phone, or in any way advertising or holding itself out as engaging in
business in that particular location is not sufficient to create a definite place ofbusiness.
9.
Statute of Limitations & Business Classification. P.D. 11-83 (June 2,
2011). The taxpayer is a corporation with two shareholders. One shareholder is a certified
interior designer licensed as such by the Commonwealth. The taxpayer provides design,
consultation and similar services to its· customers. The taxpayer maintains a small showroom
where it displays household furnishings as well as the catalogs, samples and swatches. The
showroom is closed to the public when the certified interior designer is out of the office.
Customers can also order items through catalogs and procure installation and upholstery services
from a third-party source. Catalog prices are not made available for client review. Items that are
purchased by the taxpayer at wholesale prices are marked up and resold to customers. The
taxpayer takes title to all items prior to their resale. Along with the sale of the furniture and
furnishings, the taxpayer provides design consultation services, which are not separately charged.
The taxpayer does charge an hourly fee for design, consulting, or other services with respect to
items of property that it does not sell. The information presented indicated these separate
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charges for design services represented less than 1% of the taxpayer's total gross receipts for the
tax years at issue.
The taxpayer appealed its classification and argued that it should properly be classified as
a retail merchant for BPOL tax purposes for the 2004 through 2009 tax years as 99.5% of its
gross receipts come from the sales of goods, wares, and merchandise for use or consumption of
the purchaser. In the alternative, the taxpayer argued that if separately stated services constitute
a separate business, then it should be required to have multiple licenses pursuant to Va. Code §
58.1-3703.1(A)(I). The City contended that because the taxpayer holds itself out to the public as
an interior decorator and is marketed to the public as an interior designer in advertisements,
newspaper articles and other seminar and event announcements, it should be classified as a
business service. The City also argued that the NAICS description describes interior designers
as services providers and Title 23 of the Virginia Administrative Code (V AC) 10-500-500
defines interior decorating as a business service.
Before addressing the issues appealed by the taxpayer, the Tax Commissioner addressed
whether the tax years were open for appeal. The City received the taxpayer's initial request for
reclassification in February 2007 and responded by initiating an audit. The final local
detennination issued in September 2007 affinned the original assessments for the 2004 through
2007 tax years. The last day of the tax year for which the 2004 assessment was made was
December 31, 2004. As such, the taxpayer would have needed to file the amended return for the
2004 tax year by December 31, 2007 to meet the limitations period.' Likewise, the last day the
taxpayer could have filed a refund claim for 2005 was December 31, 2008. The taxpayer filed
refund claims for the 2004 and 2005 tax years in September 2009, well after the period of
limitations had expired for making such a claim. As the statute of limitatipns had expired, the
Tax Commissioner declined to review the claims for these years. Also, the Tax Commissioner
declined to review the claim for the 2006 and 2007 years as those years were reviewed in a prior
ruling and the taxpayer did not submit new evidence.
For the 2008 and 2009 tax years, the Tax Commissioner detennined that the taxpayer is
not a retail merchant and was properly classified by the City as a business service based on facts
discussed in the appeal. The taxpayer is not open for regular business hours, but is closed
randomly depending on when the owner has consulting appointments away from the definite
place of business. Furthennore, the taxpayer holds itself out as an interior design service in the
local online and print telephone directory.
The Tax Commissioner noted that these
advertisements leave little doubt that the taxpayer is advertising the expertise in interior design as
its primary business. The Tax Commissioner stated that the taxpayer may be classified as
separate businesses however. The Tax Commissioner detennined that the taxpayer would have
to establish the existence of two separate business activities by providing documentation of gross
receipts attributed to each of the following business activities: (1) interior design consulting fees
not associated with the purchase of home furnishings; (2) consulting fees and associated
purchases of furnishings; and (3) home furnishing purchases from either the showroom samples
or the manufacturer's catalogs. The taxpayer indicated to the Tax Commissioner that no
consulting fees were charged in association with the purchase of home furnishings. Therefore,
the Tax Commissioner detennined that the taxpayer would only need to provide documentation
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of gross receipts attributed to (1) interior design consulting fees and (2) home furnishing sales
from either the showroom samples or catalogs.
10.
Vertically Integrated Manufacturer. The taxpayer operates a business in
the City that processes poultry, soybeans and grain products, soybean meal and oil, and animal
feed. The taxpayer had been filing BPOL tax returns classified as a business service. In
December 2008, the taxpayer filed refund requests for the 2005 through 2008 tax years asserting
that it was a vertically integrated manufacturer entitled to the manufacturer's exemption from the
BPOL tax. In its final local determination, the City concluded that the taxpayer's operations
were properly classified as a business service and upheld the original assessments. The taxpayer
appealed the local determination to the Tax Commissioner contending it was a vertically
integrated manufacturer that was not subject to tax on its wholesale sales. It also avered that it
transferred all of its assets and operations located in the City to VALLC, a separate but affiliated
entity, in April 2007 and was no longer subject to the BPOL tax after that time.
In its response to the appeal to the Tax Commissioner, the City raised an astonishing
number of baseless objections and ignored prior rulings. First, the City asserted that the Tax
Department lacks jurisdiction to address the taxpayer's appeal because there was no appealable
event at the local level. The City contended that the taxpayer's appeal was filed pursuant to Va.
Code § 58.1-3983.1, and the taxpayer's appeal was not timely filed in accordance with Va. Code
§ 58.1-3703.1 (A)(6). The Tax Commissioner disagreed as the taxpayer was denied a refund
because the City declined to change the taxpayer's classification. Such a determination
constitutes an appealable event under Va. Code § 58.1-3703.1(A)(5). Also, Va. Code § 58.13703.1(A)(6) provides that any taxpayer may appeal a final local determination to the Tax
Commissioner within 90 days of the issuance of a final local determination. The City issued its
final local determination on July 13,2010. The 90th day for filing an appeal fell on October 11,
2010, which was a federal and state holiday. Therefore, the taxpayer had until the next business
day, or October 12, 2010, to file its appeal. The appeal was delivered to the Tax Department on
October 12, 2010, which was within the 90-day period. Therefore, the Tax Commissioner
determined that the appeal was timely filed.
.
The Tax Department previously addressed the issue as to whether the taxpayer is a
vertically integrated manufacturer with regard to the business tangible personal property tax and
machinery and tools tax in P.D. 08-80. Despite this ruling, the City maintained that the
taxpayer's soybean processing operations are separate and distinct from its grain import and
export business and, therefore, subject to a separate BPOL tax. (Second bite at the apple,
anyone?) The Tax Commissioner considered the American Woodmark decision to determine if
the taxpayer is vertically integrated or multiple businesses as the City argued. Ultimately the
Tax Commissioner stated that if the taxpayer is a vertically integrated business, the. activities that
occUrred at the taxpayer's facility in the City are not the sole consideration for the purposes of
BPOL taxation. If the taxpayer can show that it conducted substantial manufacturing activities
as a single business, the facility in the City would be considered to be part of a manufacturing
business.
In addition to ignoring P.D. 08-80, the City argued that the Tax Commissioner may not
rely on other public documents because the facts are not exactly the same as the facts in the
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taxpayer's situation. The City relied upon Article X, § 1 of the Constitution of Virginia which
provides that all taXes must be uniform upon the same class of taxpayers; The Tax
Commissioner summarily dismissed this argument and stated that the Tax Department will
continue to cite and rely on its previous opinions and determinations interpreting the tax laws
unless and until they are modified or reversed by a court or the General Assembly.
As to whether the taxpayer is classified as a manufacturer and not subject to BPOL, the
Tax Commissioner referred back to P.D. 08-80. In P.D. 08-80, the Tax Commissioner
determined that for the 2002 through 2006 tax years, the taxpayer was a manufacturer for
property tax purposes. This determination was made by applying the same three-part test
enumerated in BBC Brown Boveri that is applied in determining whether a taxpayer is a
manufacturer for purposes of the BPOL tax. The Tax Commissioner then did not issue an
opinion but instead opined that the taxpayer would be a manufacturer for purposes of the BPOL
tax provided that the City fip.ds that the taxpayer's facts and circumstances were the same as they
.
were in the 2002 through 2006 tax years.
In the. final argUinent, the taxpayer contended that even if it were not exempt from the
BPOL tax, its BPOL liability in the City would have ended in April 2007 because it transferred
all of its business assets and operations to VALLC. Oddly, the Tax Commissioner failed to
address this issue. In a possible rope-a-dope, the City objected and argued that since this issue
was not raised in the initial appeal that the Tax Commissioner cannot consider this argument.
The Tax Commissioner cited Title 23 V AC 10-500-760 in which a locality is permitted 30 days
from· the date of the. receipt of an appeal to the Tax Commissioner to file a written response to
such appeal or a written request to address new issues raised by the taxpayer. Per the regulation,
localities are not required to make such a request. In this case, the City only objected to the issue
being considered and did not request to address the new issue. Based on the regulation and lack
of a request from the City, the Tax Commissioner said he could consider the issue. Of course;
then he failed to do so.
Observation: Based on this ruling, it is quite clear that the. City was being as difficult as
possible. Given that fact, the Tax Department did a disservice to the taxpayer by sending the
appeal back to the City to consider additional information. After reading this ruling, is there any
basis to consider whether the City will objectively consider the information provided by the
taxpayer? The City obviously ignored one previous ruling from the Tax Commissioner. Why
should we think the City will do anything less with this ruling? It is a fair bet that a: third ruling
will have to be issued from the Tax Commissioner finally resolving these issues. On a side note,
it would be very helpful to the business community to know which of Virginia's 150+ localities
takes frivolous positions in appeals like this. For any business looking to locate in Virginia, such
knowledge would be very valuable.

11.
Situs of Gross Receipts. P.D. 11-95 (June 7,' 2011). The taxpayer·
operated a call center in City A. The call center performed customer service, took telephone
orders and performed various other customer support activities for unrelated third party
customers. The taxpayer also operated a fulfillment center in the County). The fulfillment
center performed distribution services, such as receiving, pick-pack-ship, returns handling, cycle
counts, gift wrapping, package inserts and various other distribution services for unrelated third
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party customers.' Customers contracted with the taxpayer for services that were provided by
either the call center or the fulfillment center, or services that were performed by both the call
center and the fulfillment center. Customers contracted with the taxpayer for services that were
provided by the call center or the fulfillment center. City A· audited the taxpayer for the 2007
, and 2008 tax years. City A was unable to verify the situs of gross receipts based on the
taxpayer's records and determined Virginia sales reported in the sales factors on the'taxpayer's
Virginia corporate income tax returns represented the total gross receipts. Because the IT center
generated no gross receipts, City A and the County orally agreed to evenly divide the total gross
receipts resulting in an ~sessment of BPOL tax for the 2007 and 2008 tax years. The taxpayer
filed an appeal with City A contending that City A included all gross receipts in its assessment
including those that came from the fulfillment center in the County. In its final local
determination, City A upheld that audit assessment, concluding that the taxpayer did not provide
conclusive evidence of the situs of its gross receipts. The City determined it·had the authority to .
apportion gross receipts pursuant to an apportionment agreement with the County. The taxpayer
appealed City A's fmal deteiminatioh to the Tax Commissioner contending it accurately reported
the gross receipts attributable to the call center on its 2007 and 2008 BPOL returns. The
taxpayer also asserted that the City erroneously included' gross receipts attributable to the
fulfillment ~enter in the County when issuing its assessment.
Ultimately, the Tax Commissioner punts this appeal back to the City. The Tax
Commissioner noted. that it could not determine why the City and County agreed to the 50%
apportionment method instead of payroll apportionment after talking to both localities. Neither
the taxpayer nor City A provided conclusive evidence with regard to the situs of the gross
receipts. Because the issues involving the taxpayer's records are a matter of fact, the Tax
Commissioner stated that a determination as to whether such records adequately indicate the
proper situs of gross receipts remains the prerogative of City A. Accordingly, he remanded the
case to City A in order to review any evidence the taxpayer .can provide concerning the amount
of gross receipts derived from the call center. If sufficient evidence for determining the situs of
the gross receipts. is not provided~ the County and City A may determine to apportion gross
receipts by agreement. Any agreement must rationally relate gross receipts to the licensable
activities transacted within each locality. If such agreement cannot be reached, gross receipts
should be apportioned to City A using the payroll of only those employees. who directly
participate in the businesses' licensed activity.
12.
Untimely Appeal. P.D. 11-124 (July 1, 2011). In August 2008, the
County issued a BTPP tax bill for the first half of 2008 to the taxpayer.. On August 19, 2008, the
taxpayer appealed the BTPP assessment, contending certain equipment that .the County classified
as business tangible personal property was actually machinery and tools. This letter did not
. reference· a 2008 BPOL assessment or any 2007 assessments. . The County investigated the
taxpayer's operations and verbally indicated in December 2008 that the taxpayer was not a
manUfacturer. Subsequently~ the taxpayer paid its 2007 and 2008 BPOL and BTPP tax
assessments. On April 14, 2010, the taxpayer paid its 2010 BPOL tax under protest, stating that
it was a manufacturer and that it intended to file a protest with the Tax Commissioner. The'
County issued a letter that was received by the taxpayer on May 3, 2010. In this letter, the
County concluded that the taxpayer was not a manufacturer based on its analysis done in
September 2008. On March 2,2011, the taxpayer filed an appeal with the County, contending it
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was a manufacturer for purposes of the BTPP and BPOL taxes. On April 14,2011, the County
issued a letter concluding that the taxpayer's appeal was not timely filed ..
The Tax Commissioner determined that no appeal of BTPP tax has been filed with the
County for the 2007 through 2010 tax years. Therefore, he lacked the jurisdiction to make a
. determination concerning the BTPP tax issues at this time. However, if the taxpayer files refund
reques~ with the County pursuant to Va. Code§ 58.1-3980; the County would be required to
issue a determination as to whether the refunds were valid. If the County denies 1:J?e refunds, the
taxpayer would be eligible to appeal pursuant to the procedures set forth under Va. Code § 58.13983.1. In the alternative, the County would have the discretion to issue a fmal determination in
response to the taxpayer's requests for refund in order to expedite the appeals process. With
regard to BPOL tax, the Tax Commissioner determined that Tax Department is prohibited from
addressing the taxpayer's appeal of BPOL taxes for the 2007 through 2010 tax years at this time.
The taxpayer may, however, seek correction of its assessments with the County as permitted
under Va. Code § 58.1-3980. Again, the County's response to such claims would be considered
to be an appealable event under Va. Code § 58.l-3703.1(A)(5)(a).
13.
Defmite Place of Business. P.D. 11-161 (September 20, 2011). The
taxpayer provides technology· products· and services to clients in Virginia. and throughout the
. United States. It performs "around the clock" infrastructure support and maintenance services to
a client located in the County. The taxpayer's employees are located and perform all activities at
the client's facility. The taxpayer does not own or lease any real or tangible property in Virginia.
The taxpayer does not maintain a telephone, it does not advertise to the public, and all
administrative functions are performed at the headquarters location in State A. The taxpayer
requested an opinion as to whether its activities within the County are sufficient to establish a
definite place of business, and therefore subject the taxp~yer to BPOL filing obligations.
Pursuant to Title 23 Virginia Administrative Code 10-500-200, when a service provider performs
services at a location away from its established or principal office and does not maintain a
continuous presence for more that 30 consecutive days at the other location, its definite place of
business remains the established or principal office. In 1978-790p. Va. Att'y Gen 279, the
Attorney General determined that a continuous and regular course of dealings at a location would
seem to constitute a defmite' place of business in such location when employees are "more or
less" permanently assigned to such a location. The taxpayer's employees are at the client's
location in the CoUnty 365 days a year. Based on this fact, the Tax Commissioner determined
that the taxpayer has a definite place of business at the client's location and may be subject to the
BPOL tax in the County.

D.

Opinions of the Attorney General

1.
Pass-Through of BPOL Tax to Customers. 2010 Va. Att'y Gen. 10-038
(August 24,2010). Del. Calvin C. Massie, Jr. requested an opinion regarding who may be liable'
for payment of local business, professional, and occupational license ("BPOL") taxes' and in
which instances Virginia law permits businesses subject to BPOL taxation to invoice separately
and charge their customers for the 'businesses' BPOL taxes. Specifically, Del. Massie asked
whether motor' vehicle dealers remain liable for payment of BPOL taxes when the dealer
invoices BPOL taxes imposed on its sales separately from.the base charges pursuant to Va. Code'
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§ 58.1-3734, or whether the tax liability then attaches to customers. Del. Massie also inquired
whether Va. Code § 58.1-3734 provides the sole legal basis upon which motor vehicle dealers
may pass their BPOL tax on to consumers, and if not, whether a BPOL taxpayer other than a
motor vehicle dealer, such as a telecommunications service provider, may demand payment from
its customers of charges that it separately invoices "local gross receipts tax" or "local business.
license surcharge." The Attorney General opined that liability for payment of BPOL taxes
always lies with the persons engaged in businesses, professions, or occupations upon which
localities levy such taxes, and not with their customers. Also under Va. Code § 58.1-3734, only
motor vehicle dealers may recover from their customers by way of a surcharge the BPOL taxes
attributable to the gross receipts generated by sales to those customers without the surcharge also
being included in the gross receipts and subjected to the BPOL tax.

as

VII.

TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY AND MACmNE~Y AND TOOLS TAXES
A.

2011 Legislation

1.
Machinery & Tools Tax - Classification for National Defense. House Bill
1822 (Chapter 875) and Senate Bill 999 (Chapter 877) amended Va. Code § 58.1-3245.12 and
enacted Va. Code §§ 58.1-3508.4 and 58.1-3853 to create a separate class of property for'
purposes of the Machinery and Tools Tax for machinery and tools designed and used directly in
manufacturing materials and equipment for national defense. Localities would be authorized to
levy a tax on this separate class of property at a different rate from that levied on other
machinery and tools, but which would not. exceed the rate for the general class 'of machinery and
tools. Additionally, the legislation authorizes local governing bodies to create, by ordinance, one
or more defense production zones, inside which localities would be permitted to grant tax
incentives and provide certain regulatory flexibility for a maximum period of twenty years. The
legislation also authorizes the adoption of a development taxation program for the defense
production zone, regardless of whether the zone has been designated by the Governor as an
enterprise zone, and. would make the laws that apply to enterprise zones also applicable to
defense production zones. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011.

B.

Recent Court Decisions
No' recent court decisionS.

C.

Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings

1.
Business Tangible Personal Property Tax: Distineuishing Between Real
Property and Tangible Personal Property. P.D. 11-02 (January 5, 2011). A taxpayer appealed a
determination by a locality that refrigeration units installed in a building were tangible personal
property, not real property. The taxpayer owned a warehouse in the City that included
refrigerated space. The taxpayer leased a portion of the warehouse including the refrigerated
space to a tenant .on a seasonal basis. The refrigerated space is divided into three rooms capped
by four ceiling-moUnted refrigeration units, each weighing fifteen tons. In 2005, the taxpayer
installed new refrigeration units. Installation of the refrigeration units required cutting a hole in
the building'S roof and using a crane to· hoist· the units atop the refrigerated area. The locality
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assessed the refrigeration units as tangible personal property, not part of the real property. On
appeal, the locality determined that that the refrigeration units could be removed without damage
to the property or the units themselves and, therefore, they remained tangible personal property.
On appeal to the Tax Commissioner, the Tax Commissioner applied the three part
test enunciated in Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223, 232, 16 S.E.2d 345, 349
(1941). The three tests are: (1) the annexation of the chattel (property) to the realty, actual or
constructive; (2) its adaptation to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty to which it is
connected is appropriated; and (3) the intention of the parties, i.e., the intention of the owner of
the chattel to make it a permanent addition to the freehold. In order for the rules to apply, it is
presumed that the property is annexed to the realty in some form. In its decision, the Supreme
Court noted that the "intention of the party making the annexation is the paramount and
.
controlling consideration. "
The overridmg characterization of the taxpayer's appeal is that no objective
evidence was provided. For instance, the taxpayer indicated in its appeal'that the process of
installing the new units was a complicated process that involved removing a section of the roof
of the building in order to have the 15 ton units placed properly. The taxpayer, however, did not
provide any objective evidence concerning the installation process. Likewise, the locality stated
that the refrigeration units were used to refrigerate an area used by the tenant, and were not used
to provide climate control for the building. The taxpayer argued that the heat removed by the
refrigeration units was exhausted into the nonrefrigerated area and was the only source of heat
for the area of the building leased by the tenant. Again lio objective evidence was provided to
support these assertions. Lastly, the locality asserted that under the lease agreement, the
intention of the parties is to allow the tenant to use the refrigerated space in its business. Based
on this analysis, the locality concluded that the refrigeration units were used as equipment in a
business process and, therefore, subject to BTPP tax. The taxpayer argued that it replaced
existing ~ts that had been on the building and provided no evidence.
Ultimately, the Tax Commissioner concluded that the taxpayer failed to provide
objective evidence concerning the annexation of the refrigeration units or their adaptation to the
building's purpose. In addition, the Tax Cot:mIussioner determined that the locality erred in.,
determining, the units were tangible personal property based on the tenant's use in a production
process. The Tax Commissioner remanded the case to the locality so that the locality may
evaluate the taxpayer's evidence concerning annexation and adaptation of the refrigeration units
and consider the taxpayer's intent for installing the units, consistent with the tests enunciated in
the Danville Holding case. The Tax Commissioner required the taxpayer to provide the locality
with evidence concerning the annexation and adaptation of the refrigeration units.
Practice Point: This appeal does not break any new ground regarding the tests
for determining whether property is tangible personal property or real property. However if the
descriptions of the annexation and adaptation in the appeal are correct, it is easy to imagine that
the taxpayer should have prevailed on this appeal. Why didn't the taxpayer prevail on this
appeal? No evidence was provided with the appeal. Do not forget that a taxpayer has the burden
of proof in an. appeal of an assessment. If a taxpayer does not carry that burden, the taxpayer
will not prevail.
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2.
Ownership and Valuation of Tangible Personal Property. P.D. 11-17
(February 11, 2011). The taxpayer owned and operated a motel in a locality. In addition, the .
taxpayer's parent entity owned furnished apartments and rental homes in the sale locality. Under
audit, the locality determined that the taxpayer underreported both the amount and value of its
business tangible personal property and issued assessments for the tax years at issue. The
taxpayer appealed assessments contending the locality included property owned by the
taxpayer's parent and its valuation exceeded fair market value. The locality, citing a fixed asset
listing provided by the taxpayer's accountant, issued a fmal determination upholding its
assessment. The taxpayer appealed the local fmal determination to the Tax Department.
The Tax Commissioner realized that the controlling factor in Virginia property
taxation is who.is to determine the legal owner of the property identified for taxation. Therefore,
only the property owned by" the taxpayer in the locality is subject to the BTPP tax in the locality.
The Tax Commissioner did not render an opinion regarding the valuation as the Virginia Code
charges local commissioners of the revenue with the responsibility of assessing property at FMV
and it is incumbent upon the taxpayer to prove to the satisfaction of the local taxing authority
that the taxpayer properly reported the value of its property on its BTPP returns.
3.
Aircraft Hangared in Locality for Less Than Six Months are Not Subject
to BTPP Tax. P.D. 11-34 (March 4, 2011). During the 2009 tax year the taxpayer owned and
operated an aircraft for the purpose of transporting employees on company business. The
aircraft weighed more than 10, 000 'pounds, and when not in use, the aircraft was housed in a
hangar at an airport located in the City. The City concluded that the aircraft was situs ed' within
its jurisdiction and issued a BTPP tax assessment to ,the taXpayer for the 2009 tax year. The
taxpayer appealed the assessment to the City, and in its final determination,. the City foUnd that
the aircraft was located in the taxpayer's state of domicile (Virginia) and was normally garaged at
the airport in the City when in Virginia. The taxpayer filed an appeal with the Tax
Commissioner, contending the City did not apply the proper test for assessing the BTPP tax on
the aircraft. The taxpayer asserted that the aircraft spent less than six months atthe hangar in the
City. Accordmgly, the taxpayer requests correction of the assessment issued by the City for the
2009 tax year and a refund of any tax coll~cted.
'
The Tax Commissioner agreed with the taxpayer and determined that the
assessment was erroneous. The Attorney General of Virginia has issued several opinions
,regarding the ability of a locality to tax certain tangible personal property, such as automobiles, '
boats, and aircraft. In 1979-1980 Op. Att'y. Gen. 353 (2/1/1980), the Attorney General stated, ,
"If the boat is not 'normally garaged, docked or parked ' in anyone locality for a significant',
. portion of the year (e.g., six months), it is then taxed in the jurisdiction in which the owner,
resides. II Based on the Attorney General opinions and the fact that the aircraft spent less than six
months at the hangar in the City, ,the Tax Commissioner determined that the assessment was
incorrect.
-

4.
Definition of "Manufacturer." P.D. 11-44 (March 23, 2011). The
taxpayer operates a facility in the County that assembles prefabricated components that are used
to construct homes. Thes,e components were sold exclusively to the taxpayer's parent company
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and delivered to the Parent's job sites. The Parent, a general contractor of single family homes,
employed third-party subcontractors to install the finished components. The taxpayer had
reported all of its assets on business tangible personal property (BTPP) tax returns for the 2005
through 2008 tax years. The taxpayer filed an administrative appeal with the ~ounty seeking to
reclassify itself as a manufacturer and as such, have its assets that are used in the proce'ss of
manufacturing taxed at the machinery and tools tax rate and have all other business assets
exempt from local tax. The County issued a final determination denying the taxpayer's amended
returns on the basis that the taxpayer was a contractor subject to the BTPP tax on all of its
tangible personal property. The taxpayer appealed the County's final determination contending it
is a manufacturer. The County countered that the taxpayer is not a manufacturer and, therefore,
is subject to tax on its, tangible business personal property at the BTPP tax rates. The Tax
Commissioner determined that the taxpayer is a manufacturer and subject to the machinery and
tools tax, not BTPP tax.
The Tax Commissioner applied the definition of "manufacturer" as determined by
the Virginia Supreme Court. The Virginia Supreme Court's test involves three essential
elements to determine whether a manufacturing activity is being undertaken. These elements
are: (1) original material~ referred to as raw material; (2) a process whereby the original material
is changed; and (3) a resulting product, which by reason of being subject to such processing, is
different from the original material. County of Chesterfield v. BBC Brown Boveri, 238 Va. 64
(1989). For local tax purposes, a manufacturer is one engaged in a processing activity, whereby
the original materials are transformed into a product that is substantially different in character
from the original materials. It does not matter whether the transformation is a step in getting the
product ready for market or it is a complete process. What matters for purposes of local taxation
is whether the transformation of the material takes place in the locality. See Commonwealth v.
Meyer, 180 Va. 466, 23 S.E.2d 353 (1942). ,
The taxpayer used raw materials such as wood, nails, brackets, glue, steel,
insulation, sheathing, concrete and aggregates in a number of processes that result in concrete
moisture residential foundation walls, open-web floor truss systems, structured insulated external
wall panes, and steel framed interior walls. ,Based on this, the Tax Commissioner determined
that raw materials were transformed by an assembly process into a new products that were
substantially different in character from the original materials. The County also argued that the
taxpayer's non-manufacturing activities were too substantial for the taxpayer to be considered a
manufacturer.
However, the Tax' Commissioner determined that the taxpayer's nonmanufacturing activities only accounted for 25% of its receipts and therefore permitted the
taxpayer to be classified as a manufacturer for purposes of the machinery and tools tax and the
BTPP tax.
5.
Business Tangible Personal Property Tax: Leasehold Improvements. P.D.
11-47 (March 28, 2011). The taxpayer operates a restaurant in a shopping center located in the
County. It retains a leasehold interest in the premises. The taxpayer filed a 2008 BTPP return
that reported leasehold improvements, such as concrete', masonry, doors and windows, woods
and plastics, plumbing, HVAC, electrical insulation, trim, and certain built-in furnishings, and
BTPP. The taxpayer subsequently filed an amended 2008 BTPP return reclassifying items
originally classified as BTPP as leasehold improvements; The County disallowed the taxpayer's
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amended return and assessed BTPP tax based on the original return. The taxpayer filed an
appeal with the County contending that property it reclassified as leasehold improveinents is real
property. In its final decision, the County affirmed its conclusion that the reclassified property is
subject to BTPP tax based on the taxpayer's intent. The taxpayer appealed to the Tax
Commissioner asserting that the property it reclassified as leasehold improvements on its
amended 2008 BTPP return is realty. The Tax Commissioner determined that the 'leasehold
improvement were real property and not subject to BTPP tax. The County' argued that the
taxpayer's _lease expressed his intention for the improvements to remain tangible personal
property as the 'lease gives the taxpayer the option to keep all ad4itions and improvements at the
end of the lease. Upon reviewing the lease, the Tax Commissioner disagreed and found that the
overall intent of the taxpayer and its landlord is that all additions, alterations, _and improvements
attached to or installed on the property become the landlord's property.
6.
Machinery' & Tools Tax: Property Removed from Facility. P.D. 11'-54
(April 7, 2011). In 2005, the taxpayer ,acquired a manufacturing facility in the City. In April
2009, the taxpayer filed amended returns with the City for the 2006 through 2008 tax years to
report equipment that had been shipped to another facility. The City requested additional
information, toured the plant, and examined the property at issue. In its final determination, the
City agreed to remove assets that were transferred to other locations with proof. of shipment.
Because the taxpayer failed to provide verification of disposals and additional transfers of assets,
the City did not issue a refund to the taxp~yer related to these assets. The taxpayer appealed the
City's final determination contending that the property was not located at the plant during one or
more of the tax years at issue. The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer must
provide sufficient documentation to the City to show when it disposed of the property in question
and returned the appeal to the City for such a determination. ' '
7.
Machinery & Tools Tax: Notification of Idle Machinery. P.D. 11-84
(June '2, 2011). The taxpayer operates a manufacturing plant in the County. The plant had seven
manufacturing lines at the end of 2007. One line operated continuously since 2007. Three of the
seven lines were never placed in service. Three other lines were placed in service in 2007, but
_were shut down prior to January 1, 2008. ·The lines were then placed back in service in 2010
when demand increased for the product that the equipment produced: The taxpayer did not file
M&T tax returns with the County for the 2008 through 2010 tax years. As a result, the County
. issued assessments for M&T tax. The taxpayer appealed to County claiming that a six of the
seven manufacturing lines were not subject to the M&T tax for the tax years at issue. The
County issued a fmal determination concluding that the line that was in continuous operation
from 2007 was subject to the M&T tax and the three lines that were never put into service were
not subject to the M&T tax. The County's fmal determination also held that the three lines put in
service in '2007, but ceased production ,prior to 2008 were not idle machinery because the-taxpayer had failed to provide written notice that these lines were idled prior to April 1 of the
previous tax year. The taxpayer appealed the County's fmal determination to the Tax
Commissioner, contending that the three manufacturing lines at issue should have been classified
as idle machinery for the 2009' and 2010 tax years. The Tax Commissioner upheld the County's
final determination. The taxpayer conceded that the manufacturing lines at issue were not idle
machinery for the 2008 tax year beca,usethey were not out of service for an entire year, and the
County was not notified in writing that these lines had been withdrawn from service prior to
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April 1, 2007. The taxpayer contended, however, that the lines qualified as idle machinery for
the 2009 and 2010 tax years because they were discontinued in use for at least one year prior to
any tax day. The County concluded that the lines were not idle machinery and tools because the
taxpayer failed to provide written notice by April 1 of the prior year. As Virginia Code § 58.13507(D) requires taxpayers to provide written notice of idle machinery, the Tax Commissioner
upheld the assessment. .,
8.
Machinery and Tools Tax: Pollution Control & Recycling Equipment
Exemptions; Modification Costs. P.D. 11-110 (June 17, 2011). The taxpayer, a manufacturer
located in the County, filed amended M&T tax returns for the 2007 thfough 2009 tax years
requesting removal of certain equipment included on the original returns as machinery and tools.
The County did not remove all of the equipment and issued a partial refund. The taxpayer
appealed the County's final determination contending certain equipment was incorrectly
classified by the County ~ machinery and tools. It argued that certain pollution control and
recycling equipment were not machinery and tools. In addition"the taxpayer disagreed with the
County's treatment of replacement costs for certain assets. The taxpayer believed the County
should not be permitted to assess M&T tax on' both the original equipment cost and the
replacement parts that are necessary for the continuing operations of the equipment.
The pollution control equipment at issue was used to remove fumes from the taxpayer's
manufacturing facility caused by certain processes in the manufacturing process. Specifically,
they were used to control particulates, volatile organic compounds and carbon monoxide
emissions. This equipment was located on the roof of the facility. In this case, the pollution
control equipment was used to control particulates and emissions into the air. However, it was
not clear to the Tax Commissioner what happens to the waste materials generated by the
pollution control equipment. There is some indication thatthe taxpayer is permitted to use the
waste materials to provide power and heat for the manufacturing plant. If the particulates and
emiss'ions were in fact used to provide power to the manufacturing machinery" the pollution
control equipment could be classified as machinery and tools. The Tax Commissioner remanded
this matter to the County with the instructions that it consider any other documentation the
taxpayer may be able to provide to demonstrate that the pollution control equipment was not
used to produce power and heat for the manufacturing plant.
The taxpayer contended that the recycling equipment, a fmes bin, met the standards of the'
exemption under Va. Code § 58.1-3661. The exemption for certified recycling equipment and
facilities is a general property tax exemption offered as an' option to localities. However as the
County did, not adopted such an ordinance, the Tax Commissioner determined that the exemption
did not apply.'
'
The taxpayer capitalized certain modifications to items of machinery., Most of the
modifications involved replacing signifi~ant parts on original equipment. The taxpayer asserted
that these capitalized cpsts should be classified as repairs for purposes of the M&T taX and not
included in the cost of the machinery. The taxpayer believed that assessing the refurbishment
costs resulted, in some equipment being taxed on both the original cost and the replacement cost,
which is essentially double taxation. The County countered that allowing for the removal of all
replacement costs fails to consider the value added to the upgraded equipment. The Tax

81

Commissioner noted that the taxpayer provided no objective evidence that the County's method
of valuing the modified machinery exceeds fair market value or results in double taxation and
did not adjust the retuln, but allowed the taxpayer to provide additional evidence to the County
as to the fair market value of the modified machinery.
9.
Business Tangible Personal Property Tax: HV AC Units. P.D. 11-117
(June 22, 2011). The taxpayer is engaged.in business at a facility in the City. The facility is
owned by the taxpayer. Under audit, the City found a number of items of property that were not
listed on the taxpayer's BTPP returns. The property included that two heating, ventilation and air
conditioning (HV AC)'units with related HV AC "fit outs" and a backUp generator with a related
transfer switch. The taxpayer filed an appeal with the City, contending the HV AC systems and
backup generator were real property. In its fmal determination, the .City concluded that the
HV AC equipment was tangible personal property used to cool computers, and the generator and
transfer switch were subject to BTPP tax because they were placed in service after the taxpayer
began operating the building and their removal would not impact the value of the building. The
taxpayer appealed to the Tax Commissioner, contending the HVAC systems and generator were
permanently affixed to the real property and it would be economically infeasible to remove any
of the equipment. The taxpayer also asserted that the HVAC equipment was used to cool the
building and not the computers. Furthermore according to the taxpayer, the generator and
transfer switch were part· of the realty because they were a necessary part of the technical nature
of the taxpayer's business and would not be removed if the taxpayer left the building..
The Tax Commissioner' considered both the taxpayer's position and the City's position..
He applied the three tests enunciated by Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223, 232,
16 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1941), to determine whether property is real property ortallgible personal
property. The three tests are: 1) the annexation of the chattel (property) to the. realty, actual or
constructive; (2) its adaptation to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty to which it is
connected is appropriated; .and (3) the intention of the parties, i. e., the intention of the owner of
the chattel to make it a permanent addition to the freehold. The Tax Commissioner determined
th~t although the equipment was annexed to the building, he could not determine whether its use
part of the building or if it was the owner's attention to make it part of the building. According
to the ruling, there is disagreement as to whether the equipment was used to cool the building or
. computers. Accordingly, the tax Commissioner sent the appeal back to the City to determine
whether the HVAC units are necessary for the cooling of the building or the computers.
However the tax Commissioner did determine that the backup generator and transfer switch were
necessary for the taxpayer's operations and therefore are taxable as tangible personal property.

D.

Opinions of the Attorney General
No recent opinions.

VIII. MISCELLANEOUS TAXES·
A.

2011 Legislation-

1.
Aircraft Sales and Use Tax: Exemption for Qualified Companies
Headquartered in Virginia. House Bill 2221 (Chapter 492) and Senate Bill 1188 (Chapter 443)
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amended Va. Code § 58.1-1505 to provide an exemption from the aircraft sales and use tax
beginning July 1, 2011 and ending December 31, 2014 for any aircraft sold or leased by a
qualified company that is an aviation-related company, limited liability company, partnership, or
a combination of such entities that have a common ownership interest. Persons qualifying for
the proposed exemption will also be entitled to a refund for any aircraft sales and use tax paid
between January 1, 2011, and before July 1, 2011. The two bills also exempt aircraft sold in the
Commonwealth and registered outside of the Commonwealth from the aircraft sales and use tax
so long as the aircraft is removed from the Commonwealth within 60 days of the date of
purchase on the Bill of Sale. If the aircraft is removed within 60 days of the date of purchase, the ,
time between the date of purchase and the removal of the aircraft will not be counted for
purposes of determining whether an aircraft is required to be'licensed in the Commonwealth.
This bill was effective on July 1,2011.
2.
Tire ~ecycling Fee Collection. Senate Bill 1431 (Chapter 649) amended
Va. Code § 58.1-640 to impose the tire recycling fee on individuals who perform installation of
tires in Virginia pursuant to an agreement with a person whq makes a retail sale of such tires, but
does not collect the tax'. Under current law, every retailer of tires in Virginia is subject to the tire
recycling fee. "Retailer of tires" means any person engaged in the business of making retail
sales of tires, whether new or used, in Virginia. This legislation was effective on July 1,2011.
3.
Insurance Premiums Tax: Retaliatory Tax Credit. House Bill 2335
(Chapter 817) and Senate Bill 1359 (Chapter 863) amend Va. Code § 58.1-2510 to increase the
maximum annual retaliatory tax credit refund amount for the insurance premiums tax from $1.6
million to $7 million for qualified companies receiving a credit in taxable year 2000 that file a
refund application with the State Corporation Commission for taxable years beginning on and
after January 1, 2011. It also allows taxpayers to carry forward any' unused credits until the
entire credit amount is used. This legislation requires that all refunds be made after July 1
following the filing of the refund application. Finally, the legislation limits the amount of the
credit for qualified companies not receiving a credit for the 2000 taxable year to 60 percent of
the retaliatory costs paid to other states. The limitation provision is retroactive to license years
beginning on'and after July 1, 2006 and taxable years ending on and after December 31, 2006,
which is the effective date of the same provision in the Appropriation Act. The effective date for
the refund date and carryover portions of this legislation was July 1, 2011.
4.
Fuels Tax: ' Commercial Watercraft. Senate Bill 1137 (Chapter 165)
amends Va. Code §§ 58.1-609.1 and 58.1-2201 to clarify that the definition of cqmmercial
watercraft includes watercraft owned by a private business and used in the ,conduct of its own
business or operations, including but not limited to the transport of persons or property. This
legislation was effective on July 1, 2011.
5.
Insurance Premiums Tax: Administration. Senate, Bill 1124 (Chapter
850) amends and enacts numerous sections in the Virginia Code to transfer the administration of
the insurance premiums tax from the State Corporation Commission ("SCC") to the Tax
Department. The duties transferred include the processing of tax returns, the handling of
payments and billing, customer service functions, collections, and aUditing duties. The Tax
Department would also be responsible for administering the retaliatory costs assessment on '
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certain foreign insurance companies, as well as the retaliatory cpsts tax. credit for domestic
insurance companies. The SCC would continue to be responsible for the licensing of insurance
companies and the administration of the maintenance fund. This legislation also makes certain
changes to the taxation of surplus lines brokers to ensure that their tax is based on direct gross
premiums from Virginia insureds as required by a recently enacted federal law. This legislation
is effective for taxable years beginning on and after January 1, 2013, except that certain
provisions related to surplus lines brokers were effective on July 1,2011.
6.
Motor Vehicle Rental Tax: Transfer of Administration. House Bill 1798
(Chapter 405) and Senate Bill 1132 (Chapter 639) amends and enacts numerous sections in the
Virginia Code to transfer the administration aIid collection of the Motor Vehicle Rental Tax from
the Department of Motor Vehicles to the Department of Taxation. The revenues from the 2%
rental fee on daily rental vehicles will continue to be dedicated to pay the debt service on the
bonds issued for the Statew!.de Agencies Radio System. This legislation was effective on July i,
2011.
7.
Cigarette Tax: Enforcement Working Group. House Bill 2038 (Chapter
366) and Senate Bill 1085 (Chapter 293) requires the Tax Commissioner to c~mvene a working
group to review the current policies on i) appeals of penalties related to the cigarette tax. assessed
on wholesalers and retailers; ii) the desirability of having a single stamp for state and local taxes;
iii) methods of determining the validity of partially visible cigarette tax stamps; and. iv) other
related issues. The working group will consist of representatives the Virginia Wholesalers and
Distributors Association, Virginia Retail Merchants Association, the Retail Alliance, the Virginia
Petroleum, Convenience and Grocery Association, the Northern Virginia Cigarette Tax Board,
the Virginia Municipal League, those counties that levy a local cigarette tax, and other
individuals as deemed necessary. The legislation requires the working group to begin as soon as
possible after the conclusion of the 2011 General Assembly Session and provide a report and
recommendations to the chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Finance no· later than
December 1, 2011.
8.
Combined Transient Occupancy and Food Tax. House Bill 1451 (Chapter
192) amends Va. Code § 58.1-3842 to authorize Madison County to levy.a combined transient
occupancy and food and beverage tax. on the aggregate charges for rooms and meals in bed and
breakfast establishments when .such charges are not separately stated. Madison County would be
authorized to impose the tax at a maximum rate of four percent of the total amount charged for
the occupancy of the room and for the food and beverages. Madison County would .only be
permitted to levy this tax if a food and beverage tax has been approved in a referendum within
the county. Under current law, Rappahannock County is the only county that is authorized to
. levy a combined transient occupancy and food and beverage tax on the aggregate charges for
rooms and meals in bed and breakfast establishments, provided the requirements set forth above
are met. This legislation was effeCtive on July 1, 2011.
9.
Transient Occupancy Tax. House Bill 1452 (Chapter 385) and Senate .Bill
984 (Chapter 606) amend Va. Code' § 58.1-3819 to add the counties of Accomack (HB 1452
only), Brunswick (HB 1452 only), Madison, and Washington to the list of localities that are
currently authorized to Impose a transient occupancy tax at a maximum rate of five percent.
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Revenues from the portion of the tax in excess of two percent would be required to be used
solely for tourism or marketing of tourism. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011.

B.

Recent Court Decisions·

1.
AMG National Trust Bank v. Commonwealth of Virgini~ Civil Docket
No.: CLI0-3031 (Norfolk Circuit Court; April 7, 2011 and July 6, 2011). See also P,.D. 11-151,
11-152, & 11-153. The Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk determined that a trust company
was exempt from the Virgirtia corporate income tax and instead subject to the Virginia bank
franchise tax. The trust company is chartered as a national banking association yet did not
accept any deposits at its Virginia location. In addition, the Circuit Court declined a request
from the Virginia Tax Commissioner (the "Tax Commissioner") to determine how the trust
company should apportion its 'net capital for purposes of the Virginia bank franchise tax.
, The taxpayer, AMG National Trust Bank ("AMG"), ·was chartered as a national banking
association pursuant to the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. sec. 21, et seq. in August 2001 and
maintained that charter and held itself out to the public as engaged in the banking business
continuously throughout 2004 through 2009; During this time period, AMG had an office
located in Norfolk known as Old Dominion Trust Company. Through this office, AMG offered
trust services and investment management services, which AMG and the Commonwealth agreed'
are traditional and historical parts of banking. AMG neither solicited nor accepted deposits at its
Virginia office from January 1, 2004 through January 31,2008. After January 31, 2008, AMG
solicited deposits and loans from its Virginia office, but did not accept deposits or loans at that
location. Deposits and loans were accepted at its main banking office in Boulder, Colorado.
In 2009, the Tax Department rejected AMG's 2009 bank franchise tax return on the.
ground that AMG did not meet the definition 'of a "b8.Qk" contained in the Virginia Bank
Franchise Act (the "Act"). The Tax Commissioner determined that AMG was not conducting
banking business in Virginia because the Virginia branch did not accept deposits. Therefore, she
ruled that AMG was not subject to the bank franchise tax and instead subject to the corporate
income tax. Based on this conclusion, the Tax Commissioner directed AMG to file corporate
income tax returns for all the years that its trust office operated in Virginia. ,As a result, AMG
filed suit and asked the Circuit Court to determine that it is a "bank" within the meaning of the
Act.
The Act requires every bank to pay annual franchise taxes based on the net capital of the
taxpayer. This tax is paid in lieu of all other state or local taxes. Va. Code § 58.1-1202. The
Act pro~ides four separate definitions of a "bank," plus a fifth exclusionary clause:
"Bank" means:
(1)
any incorporated bank, banking association, savings bank that is a member,
of the Federal Reserve System, or trust company organized by or under
.the authority of the laws of the Commonwealth and '
(2)
any bank or banking association organized by or under the authority of the
laws of the United States, ,doing business or having an office in the
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(3)

(4)

(5)

Commonwealth or having a charter which designates any place within the
Commonwealth as the place of its principal office, and
any bank which establishes and maintains a branch in this Commonwealth
under Article 6 (§ 6.2-836. et seq.) of Title 6.2 or Article 7 (§ 6.2-849 et
seq.) of Title 6.2, whether such bank or banking association is authorized
to transact business as a trust company or not, and
any joint stock land bank or any other bank organized by or underthe
authority of the laws of the United States upon which the Commonwealth
.
is authorized to impose a tax.
The tenn shall exclude all corporations organized under the laws of other
states and doing business in the Commonwealth, corporations organized
not as banks under the laws of the Commonwealth and all natural persons
and partnerships. Va. Code § 58.i-1201.

The Circuit Court detennined that AMG met the definition of a "bank" under the second
and fourth clauses of the definition above. The Circuit Court also detennined that AMG was not
excluded by the exclusionary clause in the definition.
The Tax Depa.rtrn.ent made two arguments to the Court that AMG should not be
considered a "bank" for purposes of the Act. Both arguments were based on the fact that AMG
.did not accept deposits in Virginia. First, the Tax Department argued that because the statute
uses the word "bank" to defme "bank,'~ the Court should also consider the definition of "bank"
which is included in the Virginia Banking Act. The Virginia Banking Act defines "bank" as "a
corporl:!-tion authorized by statute to accept deposits' and to hold itself out to the public as engaged
in the banking business in this Commonwealth." Va. Code § 6.2-800. Based on this defmition,
the Tax Department argued that AMG should not be classified as a "bank" in Virginia asAMG
did not accept deposits in Virginia. The Tax Department's second argument was that the "doing:
business or having an office in the Commonwealth" in the second clause of the defmition in the
Act requires AMG to conduct the business of banking in the Commonwealth. In support of this
argument, the Tax Department pointed to the section of the Act (Virginia Code sec. 58.1-1204.1)
that provides a treatment for banks that were only present in Virginia for part of the calendar
year. Virginia Code sec. 58.1-1204.1 defmes "transacting business" as '~accepting deposits from'
customers in the regular course of business."
.
The Circuit Court rejected both arguments by focusing on the defmition of a "bank" in
the Act. First, the Circuit Court noted that the defmition of a "bank" in the Virginia BankingAct
is shorter and less detailed that the definition of "bank" in the Act Citing Lynchburg Div. of
Soc. Servs. v. Cook, 276 Va. 465, 481, 666 S.E.2d 361, 369 (2008), the Circuit Court followed
the principle that when two statutes address the same subject, the two statutes should be
harmonized, if possible, and the more specific statute should prevail when they conflict. Based
011. this principle, the Circuit Court concluded ~at the definition in the Act did not require AMG
to accept deposits in Virginia to be considered a "bank." The Circuit Court recognized that if the
General Ass~mbly had intended for such a requirement to be in effect, it would have included the
requirement in the Act. Therefore, the Circuit Court detennined that AMG met the definition of
a "bank" under the Act and was subject to the bank franchise tax, not the corporate income tax.
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Following this detennination by the Circuit Court, the Tax Department asked the Circuit
Court to reconsider its ruling or, in the alternative, clarify its ruling regarding the proper method
the Tax Department should use to apportion AMG's net capital. The Circuit Court did not
reconsider its detennination that AMG is a "bank". and instead focused on the Tax Department's
request for clarification. After some discussion of the issue, the Circuit Court declined to give
guidance on the proper method the Tax Department should use to apportion AMG's net capital
as the Tax Department did not file a declaratory action itself.
The Tax Department requested guidance on apportionment because the Act fails to
provide a method for apportionment of a multi-state bank's net capital as is required by the U.S.
Constitution. To adapt for this lack of a statutory apportionment method, the Tax Department
has required banks present in Virginia to apportion net capital based on the location of deposits.
However for banks who do not accept deposits, the Tax Department requires such banks to
request pennission to use an alternative method for apportionment. As AMG fell into this latter
category, it properly requested an alternative apportionment method based on its cost of
perfonnance.
The Tax Department argued to the Circuit Court that under the Act AMG's tax liability is
zero as the Tax Department never approved an alternative apportionment method. Ergo, AMG
was not "subject" to the bank franchise tax and was subjeGt to the corporate income tax. The
Circuit Court rejected this argument and stated that whileAMG might have a bank franchise tax
liability of $0, it is still subject to the bank franchise tax and exempted from the corporate
income tax. The Circuit Court added that if AMG's tax liability is indeed zero, it is only because
the Tax Department failed to approve an alternate method of apportionment.
2.
Buchanan County v. Equitable Production Company, Case No.
1: 11 CV00004 (United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, March' 28, 2011
and June 1, 2011). Buchanan County filed a collection action in the Circuit Court of Buchanan
County, Virginia, against defendants Equitable Production Company, Equitab~e Resources, Inc.,
and EQT Production Company (collectively, "EQT") to collect unpaid coal severance tax. In its
Complaint the County sought a declaratory judgment rejecting certain deductions it alleged EQT
took in calculating the amount of coal severance tax due to the County. It also sought monetary·
relief in the fonn of taxes owed from previous years. The case was removed by EQT to federal
court,. with subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship and amount m
controversy.
The County moved to remand the case back to state court pursuant to the Tax Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341, or based on abstention doctrine or the principles of comity. EQT
opposed the motion. The Tax Injunction Act provides that "[t]hedistrlct courts shall not enjoin,
suspend or restrairi the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under Stat.e law where a plain,
speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341. It
applies to actions for anticipatory relief and actions for declaratory relief. California v. Grace
Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982). The Court .also.noted that the Tax Injunction Act
does not bar federal jurisdiction over tax collection actions or over defenses to such actions
bas~d on Jefferson County, Alabama v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 435.(1999). Despite the CoUnty's
arguments that because of the declaratory nature of the relief sought the Tax Injunction Act
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prohibited the Court from considering this c~e, the Court opined that such a prohibition did not
exist as this case sought declaratory and monetary relief.
The County also asserted that the case should be remanded under principles of abstention
and comity. Abstention is an insufficient basis for declining jurisdiction. The County argued
that abstention doctrines apply because the state law issues are both important and complex and
because the case involves state taxes and would affect government revenues. However, the
Court noted that abstention is the exception, not the rule, and, only applies in exceptional
circumstances. The Court determined that the only exceptional circumstance plausibly
applicable to this case would exist when a difficult question of state law of substantial public
importance whose importance would transcend the ultimate result in the case is presented. As
the County did not allege such a circumstance, the Court rejected the County's assertion that the'
case should be remanded under principles of abstention.
The Court also rejected the County's comity argument. Under the principle of comity,
the Court would remand the case to avoid interference with state laws. The Court determined
however that there is no challenge to the state tax law, and federal jurisdiction will not result in
federal. interference with the state's administration of its taxing al;lthority.
After its fIrst motion to remand the case was rejected, the County filed a second motion
to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice in order to refile it in state court with additional
nondiverse defendants so that it cannot be removed to federal court. In other words, the County
tried to publicly do an end-run around the first ruling. The County intended to refile the action in
the Circuit Court of Buchanan County and add local business defendants so as to make the case
nonremovable. The Court denied this motion as it would have been prejudicial to EQT. The
Court noted that the case had been pending for well over a year, and EQT expended considerable
resources in bringing it ·to the current point. ' In addition, the joinder of additional taxpayers
would likely add extra procedural hurdles and prolong, the resolution of'the dispute, to the'
prejudice of EQT. Furthermore, the County did not show that Virginia procedure would permit
the joinder of multiple taxpayers in a single collection lawsuit. The Court' said that while there
may be common questions of law to collect the coal severance tax from multiple Buchanan
County taxpayers, the facts supporting the claims are likely to be different and would not arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence. Each defendant's ultimate liability would depend
upon its particular buSiness operation and tax'returns. For these reasons, the Court rejected the
second motion. According to the second opinion issued by the Court, this case is set for trial in
December 2011.
0

C.

Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings

Recordation Tax: Related Entities & Value of Property. P.O. 10-266
(December 15, 2010). In June 2008, Corporation A and Corporation B merged their United
States operations into a combined entity that commenced operating as the taxpayer. Corporation
A and Corporation B maintained a 58% and 42% interest in the taxpayer, r~spectively. ,As part ,
of this merger, real property located in the County was transferred from Corporation B to the
taxpayer and recordation taxes were paid. The taxpayer requested a refund of the recordation
taxes paid, contending that the transfer of the property was exempt from recordation tax as
1.
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transfers between certain related' parties' under either Va. Code §§ 58.l-811(A)(8), 58.1811(A)(9), or 58.l-811(A)(10). The taxpayer also disputed the value of the property the tax was
levied on as less than 100% of each parcel was conveyed. The Tax Commissioner detennined
that the infonnation submitted with the appeal was insufficient to determine if any of the
exemptions apply. The Tax Commissioner did forward the taxpayer's concerns about the value
that was conveyed to the circuit court clerk.
2.
Guidelines and Rules for the Tobacco Products Tax. P.D. 10-277
(December 17, 2010). The Tax Commissioner issued updated guidelines and rules for the
tobacco products tax.
3.
Guidelines and Rules for the Prepaid Wireless E-911 Fee. P.D. 10-284
(December 27, 2010). The Tax Commissioner issued updated guidelines and rules for the
prepaid wireless e-911 fee.
4.
Recordation Tax: Refinancing Exemption. P.D. 11-19 (February 18,
2011). The taxpayer's original 2006 home mortgage was held by Lender A. In February 2010,
the taxpayer refinanced his mortgage and recorded the refmanced deed of trust in the County.
The County's deed of receipt shows the taxpayerrefmanced with Lender B. The County
determined that the taxpayer was not entitled to the recordation tax exemption pursuant to the
provisions under Virginia Code § 58.1-803(D) for refmancing with the same lender because
Lender A and Lender B did not qualify as the same lender. The taxpayer appealed to the State
Tax Commissioner contending that the refinanced loan was made through the same lender. The
Tax Commissioner agreed with the County and determined, that Lender A and Lender B are
separate legal entities despite the fact that the lenders were related. Therefore, the taxpayer was
not entitled to the exemption for refmancing a debt with the same lender as the taxpayer's
refmancing'did not occur with the same lender as required by Virginia Code § 58.l-803(D).
5.
Recordation Tax: Refinancing Exemption. P.D. 11-23 (February 24,
2011). The taxpayer refinanced her mortgage and recorded the refmanced deed of trust m. the
County. The County determined that the taxpayer was, not entitled to the recordation tax
exemption pursuant to the provisions under Virginia Code§ 58.1-803(D) for refinancing with the
same lender. The taxpayer appealed to the State Tax Commissioner contending that the
refinanced loan was made through the same lender. The Tax Commissioner ultimately upheld
the tax as imposed as the taxpayer did not respond to several written attempts by the Tax
Department to obtain the infonnation necessary to verify that the taxpayer refmanced her deed of
trust withthe same lender. '
6.' ,Recordation Tax: Value of Parcel. P.D. 11-41 (March 14,2011). In May,
2010, the taxpayer presented a deed for recordation to the County. The County assessed
recordation .tax based on the assessed value of the property, which was greater than the
consideration for the conveyance of the real property interest. The taxpayer appealed .the
assessment and contended that the state and local recordation taxes should have been based on
the consideration paid. The taxpayer presented an appraisal that values the subject property at
less than' the consideration of the conveyance in support of its position. The Tax Commissioner ,
did not issue a decision as he stated that the responsibility for placing a value on real estate is
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entirely' a factual determination that is best made by one who is thoroughly familiar with the·
property itself and local market conditions that lies with the Clerk.
7.
Consumer Utility Tax: Pipeline Distribution Company. P.D. 11-51 (April
5, 2011). The taxpayer is a parent holding company for numerous subsidiaries, including
"Energy." Energy performs fuel management services for all of the taxpayer's operating
facilities. Energy purchases various types of fuel from utilities and other vendors, sells the fuel
to the taxpayer and its subsidiaries, and facilitates the delivery of the fuel to operating facilities.
In 1997, the-taxpayer acquired a facility (the "Plant") that generates electric power in the City.
Soon thereafter, Energy began purchasing and managing natural gas for use in the Plant's
operations. The natural gas was transported by pipelines owned by a pipeline distribution
company to a pipeline owned by the City. The City-oWned pipeline connected the Plant and
other natural gas consumers to the pipeline distribution company's line. The taxpayer paid the
City a fee for transporting natural gas through the pipeline. In 2004, the City initiated an audit
and determined that the taxpayer was subject to consumer utility tax on the natural gas used at
the Plant. Assessments were issued for the January 2001 through December 2004 tax periods.
The -taxpayer timely filed an- appeal of these assessments in March 2005. A subsequent audit
resulted in assessments for the January 2005 through February 200.8 tax periods followed by
another timely appeal filed by the taxpayer. In August 2009, the City issued its final
determination in both cases. The City found that: (1) the taxpayer was a consumer of natural gas
subject to the consumer utility tax; (2) Energy was a pipeline distribution company required to
collect _the tax; (3) the City's assessment did not conflict with the "revenue neutrality"
amendments enacted by the General Assembly in 2000. The taxpayer appealed the City's final
determination to the Tax Commissioner. The taxpayer argued the consumer utility tax applies
only to natural gas provided by pipeline distribution company or gas utility.

a

The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer is a pipeline distribution
company and subject to the tax. For purposes of the consumer utility tax on natural gas, Va.
_ Code g 58.l-3814(J) provides- that the term "pipeline distribution company" has the same
meaning as provided in Va. Code § 58.1-2600. Under this code section, a pipeline distribution
company is "a corporation, other than a pipeline transmission company, which transmits, by
means of a pipeline, natural gas, manufactured gas or crude petroleum and the products or byproducts thereof to a purchaser for purposes of furnishing heat or light." In this case, Energy
purchased natural gas from utilities and other suppliers and contracted with a pipeline company
to deliver the gas to the City's pipeline where the gas was sold to the Plant. The taxpayer argued
that Energy did not transmit or deliver gas to the -Plant by means -of a pipeline or otherwise and
did not operate any natural gas pipeline. The City, on the other hand, concluded that Energy was
a pipeline distribution company because it transmitted the gas through a pipeline to the Plant.
The City points out that the statutes do not require a pipeline distribution company to physically
deliver the gas to a purchaser. For purposes of the consumer utility tax,_ the tax Commissioner
determined that a pipeline distribution company could include a corporation that transmits or
causes to be transmitted natural gas through a pipeline, whether owned or operated by such
corporation or not, to a purchaser for purposes of furnishing heat or light.
-
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8.
Merchants' Capital Tax: Consignment Inventory. P.D. 11-63 (April 21,
2011). The taxpayer is an artist who produces works ofart in her studio located in the County A.
The taxpayer sells her work on consignment in a gallery located in the County B. County B
imposes a merchants' capital tax in lieu of the Business, Professional, and Occupational License
(BPOL) tax on merchants' gross receipts located in County B. The taxpayer asked whether art is
inventory for purposes of the merchants' capital tax and sought an explanation of art inventory
valuation. The Tax Commissioner said 'that the art would not be subject to merchants' capital
tax. Citing 1972-1973 Op. Att'y General 407, the Tax Commissioner stated that inventory that is
in possession of a dealer is subject to the merchants' capital tax if it is owned by the dealer, not if
the dealer is holding the inventory on consignment for an owner. Citing 1990 Op. Att'y General
262 and 1988 Op. Att'y General 560, the Tax Commissioner stated that art that is inventory
would be valued at 100% of the cost.
9.
Watercraft Sales and Use Tax: Unreported Sales. P.D. 11-76 (May 23,
2011). The taxpayer sells-, rents, and services boats and other watercraft. In addition, the
taxpayer sells watercraft acc~ssories. The Tax Department conducted an audit of the taxpayer'~
business as a result of an investigation by the Department of Game and Inland Fisheries. As a
result of the Tax Department's audit, the taxpayer was assessed the retail sales and use tax on
untaxed sales, asset and expense purchases. In addition, the taxpayer was assessed the watercraft
sales and use tax on untaxed watercraft sales. The taxpayer contested the audit assessments and
claims that it had no sales during the audit period. The Tax Commissioner upheld the
assessment as the taxpayer's records that it made sales and rentals during the audit period and the
taxpayer did not provide any evidence to the contrary.
10.
Tobacco Products Tax Dealer Discount. P.D. 11-97 (June 8, 2011). The
Tax Commissioner issued Tax Bulletin 11-6 to update Tax Bulletin 10-5 regarding the tobacco
products tax dealer discount.
11.
Virginia Tire Tax Recycling Fee. P.D. 11-98 (June 10, 2011). The Tax
Commissioner issued Tax Bulletin 11-8 regarding the changes to the Virginia tire tax recycling
fee pursuant to 2011 Senate Bill 1431.
12.

Wireless E-911 Fee: Prepaid Phone Cards.

P~D.

11 .. 115 (June 21,2011).

All individual who represents approximately 48 clients who sell prepaid phone cards at retail
requested a ruling regarding the application of the Prepaid Wireless E-911 Fee on such prepaid
phone cards. The prepaid phone cards can be used for both landline and mobile phones and are
not specifically for wireless calling service. The individual contended that the phone cards are
not subject to the prepaid wireless E-911 fee. The Tax Commissioner disagreed as Virginia
Code § 56-484.17:1 provides that a $0.50 prepaid wireless E-911 charge shall be collected by the
dealer from the end user on each purchase of "prepaid CMRS" from a dealer for any purposes
other than resale. "Prepaid CMRS" is defmed as CMRS, or mobile telecommunications service,
that allows a caller to dial 911 to access the 911 system, which CMRS service is required to be
paid for in advance and is sold in predetermined units or dollars of which the number declines
with use in a known amount.
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13.
Recordation Tax: Refinancing Exemption. P.D. 11-160 (September 19,
2011). The taxpayers refinanced their home mortgage in November 2007 through a broker, (the
"Broker"), a subsidiary of the "Bank," in the County and paid the recordation tax. Mortgage
payments under the agreement were made to the Bank's mortgage servicing center. In May
2010,the taxpayers again refinanced their mortgage through the Broker. When the deed was
submitted for recording, the County concluded that the taxpayers were not entitled to the
recordation tax exemption for refmancing with the same lender because the mortgage payments
were made to the Bank rather than the Broker. The taxpayers paid the recordation tax based on
the entire amount of the refmanced mortgage and filed an appeal contending the refinanced loan
was made through the same lender.
Virginia Code § 5S.1-S03(A) imposes the recordation tax on deeds of trust, mortgages,
arid supplemental indentures. Under Va. Code § 5S.1-S03(D), when a deed of trust is used in
refinancing an existing debt with the same lender ~d the tax has been previously paid on the
original deed of trust securing the debt, the recordation tax will only apply to the portion of the
deed of trust that exceeds' the amount originally secured by the original debt. The Tax
Department has defined "existing debt with the same lender" to mean that the lender providing
the refmancing must be the same as the lender now holding the' existing debt being refmanced.
In other words, in order to qualify for the exemption provided in Va. Code § 5S.1-S03(D), a
taxpayer must refmance his debt with the mortgage lender that holds the deed of trust.
According to the evidence provided to the Tax Commissioner, the taxpayers refinanced their
mortgage with the Broker in November 2007. The documentation indicated that'the Broker sold
its entire interest in.the mortgage to the Bank. The Tax Department did not consider the Broker
to be the same lender for the purposes of Va. Code § 5S.1-S03(D) when the taxpayers refmanced
the mortgage in May 2010, as the Broker retained no interest in the original mortgage.
Accordingly, the Tax Commissioner determined that ,the taxpayers were not entitled to the
exemption from recordation tax for refmancing a mortgage with the same lender.

D.

Opinions of the Attorney General

1.
Recordation Tax: Calculation of Tax. 2011 Va. Att'y Gen. 11-073. (May
27, 2011). The Circuit Court Clerk of Henrico County inquired about how to calculate the
recordation tax on deeds of trust when the amount secured under the deed is greater than the fair
market value of the property subject to the deed. The Attorney General opined that when the
amoUnt secured by a deed of trust is known, the Clerk of Court should calculate the recordation
tax based on the amount of indebtediless rather than the fair market value of the encumbered
property. Prior opinions of the Attorney General have concluded that the measure of the
recordation tax is the amount of the obligation secured, and that Va. Code sec. 5S.1-:-S03(A)
provides that the tax is assessed on the basis of the fair market value of the property only where
the amount of the obliga~ion cannot be ascertained from the face of the instrument. This is so
even where the amount of the loan secured is considerably less than the fair market value of the
property. Furthermore, where the question presented was whether the tax should be based on the
maximum amount authorized under the line of credit or the fair market value of the property, the
Attorney General determined that the proper tax should be based upon the maximum amount for
which the owners may be held liable under their guaranty. That maximum is the same maximum
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amount which is authorized under the line of credit line and not the fair market value of the
property conveyed.
2.
License Tax on Gas Producers. 2011 Va. Att'y Gen. 10-110 (August 5,
2011). The Commissioner of the Revenue for Tazewell County inquired whether Va. Code
§ 58.1-3712, which authorizes localities to impose a license tax on gas producers, pennits a
taxpayer to deduct expenses and production costs from the gross receipts upon which the tax is
imposed, when the receipts are for gas produced by means not in connection with coal mining.
The Commissioner ,also inquired regarding the scope of the Commissioner's ability to conduct
audits relating to the collection of severance taxes authorized under Va. Code § 58.1-3712. The
Attorney General opined that Va. Code § 15:2-3712 allows persons engaged in the production
and operation of severing gas from the earth not in connection with coal mining to take certain
deductions when the sale occurs at a point outside the county or city where the gas was extracted
and the producer has incurred additional expenses, for the gas to reach its destination. Those
deductions might include, -but are not limited to, depreciation, compression, maintenance,
transportation fees, and personal property taxes; however, persons, who are engaged in the
production and operation of severing gas from the earth in connection with coal mining may not
take such deductions. The Attorney General also opined that Commissioners of the Revenue are
authorized to perfonn audits in connection with their duty to assess license taxes.
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Local Tax Appeals
. January 1,2011 through September 20,2011
10 Determinations

Taxpayer Loses

Taxpayer Wins*
9

1

Treatment on Remand

No discretion
(complete win)
1

Discretion on·
some issues **
2

.'

*

Discretion on
all issues ***
6

.'

A "win" is a ruling that does not completely affirm· the locality's
position(s) .
** Taxpayer won on all issues not remanded ..
*** One ruling (PD 11-51) remanded one issue; taxpayer lost on second issue.
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